"FROM  HAMBURG  TO  THE  PERSIAN  GULF 
THE  NET  IS  SPREAD." 

PRESIDENT  WILSON'S  FLAG  DAY  ADDRESS,  JUNE  15,  1917. 


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BY      ANDRE      CHERADAME 


THE  PANGERMAN  PLOT  UNMASKED. 
Berlin's  Formidable  Peace-Trap  of  "The 
Drawn  War."  Introduction  by  the  late 
Earl  of  Cromer,  O.M.  Illustrated  with 
maps net    SI. 25 

"  It  is  by  all  means  the  most  pregnant  volume  on  the 
deeper  issues  of  the  war  that  has  come  under  our  eyes. 
The  author  has  his  material  reduced  to  its  lowest  di- 
mensions, and  he  has  it  at  his  finger-tips.  It  is  a  book 
that  everj'  one  should  read  and  think  about." 

— Boston  Transcript. 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND 
PANGERMANIA 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND 
PANGERMANIA 


BY 
ANDRE  CHERADAME 

AtJTHOB    OF    "THE    PANGERMAN    PLOT    UNMASKED' 


''  From  Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf  the  net  is  spread." 

— President  Wilson's  Flag-Day  Address. 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 

1918 


COPTBIGHT,   1918,   BT 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 


Published  January,  1918 


^  +  (1.31 


■V 


'"^O  MY  AMERICAN  READERS. 

For  twenty -two  years  before  the  frightful 
struggle  let  loose  upon  the  world  by  Prussian- 
ized Germany,  I  spent  all  my  time  and  all 
that  I  could  command  of  resources  and  intelli- 
gence in  studying  the  Pangerman  conspiracy 
by  means  of  systematic  investigations  which 
took  me  into  one  hundred  and  seventy-seven 
cities  of  Europe,  America,  and  Asia.  It  was 
my  hope  that  by  exposing  the  German  plans 
I  might  give  a  timely  enough  warning  of  the 
approaching  danger  to  make  it  possible  that 
fitting  action  could  avert  war. 

I  did  not  succeed  in  gaining  a  hearing  from 
those  whom  it  was  necessary  to  convince  in 
Europe;  but  the  long  continuance  and  persis- 
tence of  my  efforts,  evidenced  by  the  works  I 
published  before  1914,  prove  conclusively  that 
I  am  a  man  of  peace,  for  I  have  done  every- 
thing in  my  power  to  prevent  war.  Con- 
tinuing my  task  in  the  same  spirit,  it  is  my 
wish  at  least  to  contribute  toward  the  ending 
of  this  appalling  conflict  on  such  conditions  that 
it  can  never  be  renewed.     A  decisive  victory 


vi     UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

of  the  Allies  which  will  make  any  aggressive 
return  of  Pangermanism  impossible  is  the  only 
way  by  which  this  end  can  be  attained.  Toward 
gaining  this  victory,  by  rejecting  from  the  be- 
ginning the  crafty  manoeuvres  of  the  Berlin 
Government  unceasingly  renewed  to  divide 
and  deceive  the  Allies,  the  dehberate  and  pro- 
found conviction  of  every  citizen  of  the  United 
States  can  accomplish  much  I  have,  there- 
fore, brought  together  in  this  little  book,  writ- 
ten for  you  especially,  a  series  of  specific  facts, 
easily  verified,  which  should  estabUsh  among 
you  this  certain  conclusion: 

Germany  no  longer  exists.  In  her 
place  stands  Pangermany,  whose  ex- 
istence is  incompatible  with  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  United  States  and 
the  freedom  of  the  world. 

September  10,  1917. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

Preface — To  My  American  Readers        -        -        -       v 

CHAPTER  I. 

Pangermanism  and  William  II.  -        -        -        -        1 

I.  The  Pangerman  doctrine. 
II.  The  Kaiser,  originator  of  the  Pangerman  plan, 

CHAPTER  II. 

The  Pangerman  Plan -      10 

I.  Its  extension  from  1895  to  1911. 
II.  The  plan  of  1911  regarding  Europe  and  Turkey. 

III.  Its    extension    to    Asia,    Africa,    America,    and 

Oceania. 

IV.  General  view  of  the  German  plan  of  world-wide 

domination. 
V.  The  stages  toward  its  fulfilment. 

CHAPTER  m. 

The  Immediate  Causes  of  the  War  -        -        -      31 

I.  Why  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest  suddenly  became  a 

formidable  obstacle  to  the  Pangerman  plan. 
n.  How  political  conditions  in  Austria-Hungary  in- 
clined Germany  to  bring  on  the  war. 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Pangermany  is  Made 41 

I.  The  extent  of  the  realization  at  the  beginning  of 

1917  of  the  Pangerman  plan  of  1911. 
II.  Economic  Pangermany. 
III.  Military  Pangermany. 


viii    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 
CHAPTER  V. 

PAGE 

Pacifist  Manceuvres  to  Keep  the  Hamburg-Persian 
Gulf  Scheme  for  Germany  as  a  Minimum  Result 
OF  THE  War 59 

I.  Strategic  and  economic  conceptions  of  the  Ger- 
man General  Staff  upon  which  all  pacifist  ma- 
noeuvres are  based. 
II.  Separate  peace  to  be  made  by  Berlin  with  one  of 
the  Entente.     The  trick  of  Alsace-Lorraine. 
m.  Separate  peace  to  be  made  with  the  Entente  by 

Turkey,  Bulgaria,  or  Austria-Hungary. 
IV.  The  democratization  of  Germany. 
V.  Peace  by  the  "Internationale"  or  Socialist  party. 
VI.  The  trick  of  an  armistice. 

VII.  The  "Drawn  Game,"  or  "Peace  without  annexa- 
tions or  indemnities." 
Vni.  What  is  Germany's  word  worth.? 

CHAPTER  VI. 

The  "Drawn  Game";  the  Insidious  Snare  of  the 
Formula,  "Peace  without  Annexations  or  Indem- 
nities"        --86 

I.  How  the  hj'pothesis  is  brought  forward. 
II.  Cost  of  the  war  much  greater  to  the  Allies  than 

to  the  Germans. 
m.  The   struggle   has   allowed   Germany   to   obtain 
enormous  advantages  in  the  present  and  for 
the  future. 
IV.  The  war  has  brought  the  Allies  only  losses. 
V.  Consequences  of  the  Hamburg-Persian  Gulf  plan 
in  regard  to  Russia  and  Asia. 
VI.  The  blatant  falsehood   of  the  formula,    "Peace 
without  annexations  or  indemnities." 
Vn.  The  formidable  danger  of  the  Hamburg-Persian 
GuK  plan  to  the  Allies, 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  ix 


CHAPTER  VII. 

PAGE 

How  TO  Destroy  Pangermany   -----    122 
I.  Why  Austria-Hungary  is  the  crucial  point  of  the 
universal  problem  presented  by  the  Hamburg- 
Persian  Gulf  plan. 
II.  The  thesis  of  the  preservation  of  Austria-Hungary. 

III.  The  application  of  the  principle  of  nationalities 

to  Central  Europe. 

IV.  A  strong  barrier  of  anti-Pangerman  nations  can  be 

established  in  Central  Europe,  and  there  only. 


CHAPTER  Vm. 

The  United  States  and  the  Pangerman  Plot  -        -    139 
I.  The   moral   principles   of   the   American   people 

make  it  their  duty  to  take  part  in  the  war. 
II.  The  political  interests  of  the  United  States  oblige 
them  to  contribute  toward  a  decisive  victory 
for  the  Allies.  • 

in.  The  United  States  and  the  Austro-Hungarian 
question. 


CONCLUSIONS. 

I.  Germany's  responsibility  for  bringing  on  the  war 
is  inexcusable  and  crushing,  since  its  premedi- 
tation by  the  Prussian  Government  antedates 
the  outbreak  of  hostilities  by  at  least  twenty- 
one  years 150 

n.  The  Allies  should  constantly  bear  in  mind  not 
only  the  German  occupations  of  Entente  terri- 
tory, but  also  the  Pangerman  seizures  which 
have  been  made  at  the  expense  of  their  own 
allies 159 


UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

PAGE 

III.  The  Allies  should  so  conduct  the  war  that  Pan- 
germany  shall  not  only  be  destroyed,  but  re- 
placed by  territorial  conditions  which  will  pre- 
vent its  recurrence,  and  which  conform  to  the 
principles  which  the  Allies  have  proclaimed     -    162 


MAPS  AND  FACSIMILES. 

PAGE 

The  Poles  in  the  east  of  Germany           -        -        _        _  i 

The  Danes  in  Prussia     -------2 

Germans  and  non-Germans  in  Austria-Hungary      -        -  3 

The  Pangerman  plan  of  1911 12 

World-consequences  of  the  Hamburg-to-the-Persian  Gulf 

project  as  forecast  by  the  plan  of  1911     -        -        -  15 

Colonial  Pangermanism  and  South  America   -        -        -  19 

The  anti-German  barrier  in  the  Balkans  after  the  Treaty 

of  Bucharest  August  10,  1913           -        _         _        -  33 

The  nationalities  in  Austria-Hungary      -        -        -        -  35 

The  three  barriers  of  anti-Germanic  peoples  in  the  Bal- 
kans and  in  Austria-Hungary           _         _        _        -  38 

Pangermany  at  the  beginning  of  1917-         -         -         -  43 

The  German  fortress  at  the  beginning  of  1917         -        -  63 

Results  of  the  move  known  as  the  "Drawn  Game"         -  91 

The  results  in  Asia  of  the  realization  of  the  Hamburg-to- 
the-Persian  Gulf  plan       ---..-  109 

The  knot  of  the  European  problem         -        -        -        -  123 

Map  of  the  Martyrs 141 


xii  MAPS   AND   FACSIMILES 


PAOB 


Distribution  and  percentage  of  Germans  born  in  Germany, 
now  residing  in  the  United  States,  in  proportion  to 

the  population  born  in  United  States  (1890)     -         -  143 

Title-page  of  Kannenberg's  book  on  Asia  Minor    -        -  152 

Facsimile  of  photograph  from  Kannenberg's  book 

facing  page  154 

"From  Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf  the  net  is  spread "  -  158 

Territory  occupied  by  Pangermany  at  the  opening  of  1917  160 

The  Europe  of  the  Peace 165 


THE  UNITED   STATES  AND 
PANGERMANIA 


CHAPTER  I. 

PANGERMANISM   AND    WILLIAM   H. 

I.     The  Pangerman  doctrine. 
II.    The  Kaiser,  originator  of  the  Pangerman  plan. 


Pangermanism  is  a  doctrine  of  purely  Prus- 
sian origin,  which  aims  at  annexing,  irrespec- 


Poles 

0         100        200       300  Km 


1         o 

^^\Breslau 
OPragueV**\'is^ 


A    U    ^T    R    I   A 


THE  POLES  IN  THE  EAST  OF  GERMANY 


tive  of  race  or  language,  all  the  various  regions 
of  which  the  possession  is  deemed  useful  to 
the  power  of  the  Hohenzollerns. 


2     UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 


It  was  in  the  name  of  Pangermanism,  a 
theory  of  usefulness  based  on  sheer  cupidity 
and    arbitrary    will,    that    Germany    formerly 


THE  DANES  IN  PRUSSIA 


took,  and  means  to  keep,  the  eastern  prov- 
inces which  should  by  right  belong  to  the 
Slavs,  since  they  still  contain  a  population  of 
about  four  million  Poles. 


PANGERMANISM  AND  WILLIAM  11.        3 

It  was  in  the  name  of  Pangermanism  that 
in  1864  Prussia  seized  that  part  of  Schleswig 
which  was  entirely  Danish. 

It  is  still  in  the  name  of  Pangermanism  that 


I       I  Germans 
{:^:%^  Non  Germans 

0  too  200  300  f 


GERMANS  AND  NON-GERMANS  IN  AUSTRIA- HUNGARY 


Austria-Hungary  has  long  been  coveted  by 
Germany,  although  their  own  figures  show  that 
Germans  are  in  a  very  sinall  minority  there, 
having  only  12  million  against  38  million  of 
non-Germans. 

As  far  back  as  1844  the  future  Marshal  von 
Moltke  wrote:  "We  hope  that  Austria  will 
uphold  the  rights  and  protect  the  future  of 


4      UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

the  Danubian  countries,  and  that  Germany 
will  finally  succeed  in  keeping  open  the  mouths 
of  her  great  rivers."*  Inspired  by  this  doc- 
trine of  rapine,  the  author  of  a  pamphlet  which 
was  published  in  1895,  just  twenty-two  years 
ago,  under  the  authority  of  the  Alldeutscher 
Verband,  a  powerful  Pangerman  society  which 
did  its  utmost  to  bring  on  the  present  war, 
after  indicating  the  vast  programme  of  future 
annexations,  found  it  a  natural  conclusion  that 
no  doubt  the  newly  constituted  German  Em- 
pire will  not  be  peopled  by  Germans  alone, 
but  "they  alone  will  govern;  they  alone  will 
exercise  political  rights;  they  alone  will  serve 
in  the  army  and  navy;  they  alone  will  have 
the  right  to  hold  land;  and  they  will  thus  be 
made  to  feel  that  they  are  a  people  of  rulers, 
as  they  were  in  the  Middle  Ages.  They  will, 
however,  allow  inferior  tasks  to  be  carried 
out  by  the  foreign  subjects  under  their  domina- 
tion." f 

Pangermanism  means  the  absolute  nega- 
tion of  the  principle  of  nationalities,  which  was 
the  noblest  idea  given  to  the  world  by  the 
French  Revolution.     It  may  be  summed   up 


*Von  Moltke,  Schriften,  vol.  II,  p.  313. 

t  Gross  Deutschland  und  Mitteleuropa  urn  das  Jahr  1950,  published 
by  Thormann  &  Goetsch,  Berlin,  1895,  p.  48. 


PANGERMANISM  AND  WILLIAM  II.        5 

as  a  system  of  international  burglary,  and  of 
slavery  imposed  by  Prussianized  Germans 
upon  other  races. 

II. 

From  this  Pangerman  doctrine  sprang  the 
mihtary  and  political  Pangerman  plan,  of 
which  the  originator  and  promoter  is  the 
Kaiser.  Shortly  after  his  accession  in  1888 
he  made  a  speech  which  showed  distinctly  his 
Pangerman  tendencies,  and  in  his  answer  to 
a  speech  made  by  the  burgomaster  of  Mayence, 
on  August  28th,  1898,  he  said  that  he  intended 
to  keep  inviolate  the  inheritance  bequeathed 
to  him  by  his  *' immortal  grandfather,"  add- 
ing, "but  this  I  can  only  do  if  our  authority 
is  firmly  upheld  in  regard  to  our  neighbors, 
and  to  this  end  there  must  he  united  co-opera- 
tion from  all  of  German  blood''  On  the  28th 
of  October,  1900,  at  a  reunion  of  officers,  he 
declared,  "My  highest  aim  is  to  remove  what- 
ever separates  our  great  German  race,''  and  a 
month  before,  at  Stettin,  he  said:  *'I  have  no 
fear  of  the  future.  I  am  convinced  that  my 
plan  will  succeed."  In  the  Kaiser's  mind  this 
plan  was  summed  up  in  the  chief  formula  of 
the  Pangerman  doctrine.  From  Hamburg  to  the 
Persian  Gulf;   and  to  accomplish  this  object 


6      UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERIVIANIA 

he  was  resolved  to  bind  Austria-Hungary  and 
Germany  together  by  increasingly  closer  ties. 
In  order  to  make  sure  of  his  supremacy  over 
the  Balkan  peoples  he  counted  on  the  co-op- 
eration of  such  of  their  Kings  as  were  of  Ger- 
manic origin,  as  in  Bulgaria  and  Roumania,  or 
who  would  feel  strongly  the  Germanic  influ- 
ences which  he  could  bring  to  bear.  Thus,  in 
1889,  he  married  his  sister  Sophia  to  the  heir 
of  the  throne  of  Greece,  later  King  Constan- 
tine,  whose  Germanophile  role  it  has  been 
easy  to  follow. 

The  Kaiser  had  scarcely  come  to  the  throne 
before  he  conceived  the  scheme  of  flattering 
the  Turks  and  Mohammedans,  in  order  that 
he  might  seize  the  Ottoman  Empire  later,  and 
make  use  of  Moslems  throughout  the  world 
as  a  menace  to  other  Powers. 

On  November  8th,  1898,  at  Damascus, 
William  II.  pronounced  the  famous  words  of 
which  the  significance  is  fully  apparent  now 
that  we  have  seen  the  German  policy  devel- 
oped in  Russia,  in  Turkey,  in  Persia,  and  in 
China,  and  have  witnessed  its  efforts  to  stir 
up  agitation  among  the  Moslem  populations: 
"May  His  Majesty  the  Sultan,  as  well  as  the 
300  millions  of  Moslems  who  venerate  him  as 
their  Khalifa,  rest  assured  that  the  German 


PANGER]VL\NISM  AND  WILLIAM  11.        7 

Emperor  is  their  friend  forever."  In  conse- 
quence of  this  adulation  of  the  Red  Sultan, 
Abdul  Hamid,  the  Kaiser  obtained,  on  the 
27th  of  November,  1899,  the  first  concession 
of  the  Bagdad  railway,  which,  now  that  it  is 
nearly  finished,  is  an  instrument  of  the  Ger- 
man military  offensive  against  Russia  and 
England.  The  German  naval  and  military 
leagues,  which  count  their  members  by  millions 
throughout  the  Empire,  have  always  been  en- 
couraged by  the  Kaiser,  and  in  return  they 
have  backed  up  his  incessant  demands  for  a 
larger  army  and  navy.  He  also  encouraged 
the  formation  of  the  Alldeutscher  Verband, 
or  Pangerman  Union.  This  association  has 
many  important  and  influential  persons  among 
its  members,  and  upon  it  rests  an  overw^helm- 
ing  responsibility  for  the  outbreak  of  the  pres- 
ent war.  Since  its  foundation  in  1894  it  has 
organized  thousands  of  lectures,  and  scattered 
millions  of  pamphlets  spreading  the  Panger- 
man doctrine,  with  its  lust  of  aggrandize- 
ment, among  the  German  people.  It  was  also 
through  the  Alldeutscher  Verband  that,  with 
a  view  to  the  present  conflagration,  all  Ger- 
mans living  outside  the  Empire  were  system- 
atically organized;  this  was  especially  the  case 
in  Austria  and  in  the  United  States. 


8      UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

As  for  the  time  of  the  outbreak  of  war,  it 
was  the  Kaiser  who  determined  it.  After  the 
Treaty  of  Bucharest,  August  10th,  1913,  the 
situation  in  the  Balkan  States  and  the  poHti- 
cal  conditions  in  Austria,  for  reasons  which  I 
shall  show  in  my  third  chapter,  made  him 
decide  that  the  time  had  come  to  strike. 
From  November,  1913,  he  was  busy  preparing 
for  early  hostilities;  he  knew  that  the  widen- 
ing of  the  Kiel  Canal  would  be  finished  by 
July,  1914,  and  made  his  arrangements  to  fit 
that  date.  He  dazzled  the  Archduke  Francis 
Ferdinand,  heir  to  the  throne  of  Austria- 
Hungary,  by  visions  of  the  great  advantages 
which  action  in  common  would  give  to  the 
Central  Powers;  he  made  the  archduke  a 
visit  at  Miramar,  near  Trieste,  in  April,  1914, 
and  followed  it  up  by  another  in  June,  at  the 
castle  of  Konopischt.  This  time  he  had  for 
his  companion  Von  Tirpitz,  since  so  conspicu- 
ous as  the  chief  of  German  submarine  piracy, 
and  it  was  then  that  the  main  outlines  of  the 
combined  action  of  the  German  and  Austrian 
forces,  by  land  and  sea,  were  drafted. 

The  assassination  of  the  archduke  on  the 
28th  of  June  made  no  difference  to  the  Kaiser's 
plans;  on  the  contrary,  this  murder  was  an 
excellent  excuse  for  intervention  against  Serbia; 


PANGERMANISM  AND  WILLIAM  11.        9 

it  precipitated  events.  War  was  declared  on 
the  1st  of  August,  just  a  few  days  after  the 
completion  of  the  Kiel  Canal. 

The  criminal  action  of  the  Kaiser  in  foster- 
ing the  Pangerman  plan  for  twenty-five  years, 
was  thus  revealed  to  the  world.  Moreover — 
and  let  there  be  no  mistake  about  this — 
thanks  to  the  Pangerman  propaganda  carried 
on  by  his  express  orders,  when  he  came  out 
for  war  he  was  supported  in  his  decision  not 
only  by  the  leaders  of  German  opinion,  but  by 
a  very  large  majority  of  the  German  people. 

Maximilian  Harden  explicitly  acknowledged 
this  when  he  wrote  in  the  Zukunft  of  Novem- 
ber, 1914:*  "This  war  has  not  been  forced  on 
us  by  surprise;  we  desired  it,  and  were  right 
to  do  so.  Germany  goes  into  it  because  of 
her  immutable  conviction  that  what  she  has 
accomplished  gives  her  the  right  to  wider 
outlets  for  her  activities  and  more  room  in 
the  world." 

*  Le  Temps,  November  20th,  1914. 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE    PANGERMAN    PLAN. 

I.     Its  extension  from  1895  to  1911. 
n.     The  plan  of  1911  regarding  Europe  and  Turkey. 
in.     Its  extension  to  Asia,  Africa,  America,  and  Oceania. 
IV.     General   view   of   the   German   plan   of   world-wide 

domination. 
V.    The  stages  toward  its  fulfilment. 

I. 

The  Pangerman  plan  was  fundamentally 
established  in  1895,  but  after  that  date  events 
happened  in  the  world  which  induced  the 
Pangermanists  to  extend  it  further.  Chief 
among  these  were:  the  tension  between  France 
and  England  because  of  Fashoda,  in  1898;  the 
defeat  of  Russia  by  the  Japanese,  in  1905; 
the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  by 
Austria  with  the  approval  of  Berlin,  in  1900; 
the  agreement  at  Potsdam  by  which  the  Czar 
of  Russia  abandoned  all  opposition  to  the 
completion  of  the  Bagdad  railway,  in  1910; 
and  finally  the  Franco-German  treaty  of  No- 
vember 4th,  1911,  by  which  France  ceded 
275,000  square  kilometres  of  the  Congo  to  the 
Germans,  while  allowing  them  to  hold  heavy 

10 


THE  PANGERMAN  PLAN  11 

economic  mortgages  on  Moroccan  territory. 
All  these  were  interpreted  by  the  Pangerman- 
ists  as  signs  that  Russia,  France,  and  England 
desired  peace  so  much  that  they  would  keep 
it  on  any  terms;  and  the  Pangermanists  con- 
cluded that  their  most  ambitious  hopes  might 
soon  be  fulfilled.  Thus  the  basic  plan  of  1895, 
revamped  and  considerably  increased,  became 
the  plan  of  1911. 

II. 

This  plan  of  1911  provided,  in  Europe  and 
western  Asia,  for: 

1.  The  establishment,  under  German  rule, 
of  a  vast  Confederation  of  Central  Europe, 
comprising  in  the  west  Holland,  Belgium, 
Luxemburg,  Switzerland,  and  the  northern 
departments  of  France  to  the  northeast  of  a 
line  drawn  from  the  south  of  Belfort  to  the 
mouth  of  the  Somme;  to  the  east  Russian 
Poland,  the  Baltic  provinces  of  Esthonia, 
Livonia,  and  Courland,  and  the  three  Russian 
governments  of  Kovno,  Vilna,  and  Grodno; 
to  the  southeast,  Austria-Hungary.  These 
three  groups  form  a  total  of  1,182,113  square 
kilometres,  with  94,323,000  inhabitants.  In 
this  Confederation  the  territory  actually  be- 


12    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERIVIANIA 


longing  to  the  German  Empire  only  com- 
prised 540,858  kilometres,  with  about  68  mil- 
lion  inhabitants,  and    out   of  a  total  of  162 


THE  PANGERMAN  PLAN  13 

million  inhabitants  only  77  million  were  Ger- 
mans, the  other  85  million  being  of  other 
nationalities. 

2.  The  absolute  submission  of  all  the  Bal- 
kan States  (containing  499,275  square  kilo- 
metres, and  22  millions  of  non-Germans)  to  the 
Central  European  Confederation,  thus  making 
them  mere  satellites  of  Berlin. 

3.  The  political  and  military  seizure  of 
Turkey,  which  was  to  be  compelled  afterward 
to  add  to  its  dominions  by  the  annexation  of 
Egypt  and  Persia,  the  object  being  to  put 
Turkey,  with  her  1,792,000  square  kilometres, 
and  her  20  millions  of  non-German  inhabitants 
(to  say  nothing  of  those  in  Egypt  and  Persia), 
under  a  strict  German  protectorate. 

This  Germanic  Confederation  of  Central 
Europe  was  to  form  a  huge  Zollverein  or  Cus- 
toms Union.  Treaties  of  commerce  of  a  spe- 
cial character  imposed  on  the  Balkan  States 
and  on  subjugated  Turkey  would  have  pro- 
vided Great  Germany  with  an  economic  out- 
let, and  reserved  those  vast  regions  for  her 
exclusively. 

The  Pangerman  plan  of  1911  may  be  summed 
up  in  four  formulas:  Berlin — Calais;  Berlin — 
Riga;  Hamburg — Salonika;  Hamburg — Persian 
Gulf.     The   union   of   the   three   groupings — 


14    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

Central  Europe,  the  Balkan  States,  and  Turkey 
— would  have  made  Berlin  the  predominating 
influence  over  4,015,146  square  kilometres  of 
territory,  inhabited  by  204  millions  of  men, 
of  whom  127  million  were  to  be  ruled,  directly 
or  indirectly,  by  only  77  millions  of  Germans. 

III. 

It  was  intended  that  the  Pangerman  plan 
of  1911  should  be  made  still  more  effective  by 
important  seizures  of  territory  in  all  the  other 
parts  of  the  world.  These  forcible  annexa- 
tions show^n  on  the  map  (p.  15)  were  set  forth 
in  Otto  Tannenberg's  work.  Greater  Germany, 
the  Work  of  the  20th  Century,  published  at 
Leipsic.  The  exceptional  importance  of  this 
book  cannot  be  disputed  since  it  bears  the  date 
of  1911  and  contains  the  exact  programme  of 
seizures  to  be  effected  in  Europe  and  Turkey, 
just  as  they  have  already  been  carried  out  by 
the  German  General  Staff.  The  territorial 
acquisitions  in  Asia,  Africa,  America,  and 
Oceania,  which  Tannenberg  proclaims  would 
be  the  logical  sequence  of  the  Hamburg-Persian 
Gulf  scheme,  would  most  certainly  be  realized 
if  the  AUies  should  abandon  the  struggle  be- 
fore their  victory  was  decisive. 


THE   PANGERMAN  PLAN 


15 


16    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

Supposing  them  to  do  so,  it  is  certain  that 
after  a  treacherous  peace  the  Alhed  peoples, 
exhausted  morally  and  physically,  facing  the 
formidable  armies  of  Pangermany,  would  be 
unable  to  oppose  the  colonial  expansion  of 
Great  Germany  (to  which  the  Hamburg- 
Persian  Gulf  plan  would  inevitably  lead)  be- 
cause they  had  already  given  way  on  an  issue 
even  more  vital  to  them — that  of  the  inde- 
pendence of  Europe. 

It  must  be  added  that  this  programme,  of 
which  the  details  are  given  below,  was  laid 
down  by  Tannenberg  on  the  supposition, 
counted  on  by  the  Berlin  Government,  that  Eng- 
land would  not  go  into  the  war.  In  order  to 
make  sure  of  her  neutrality,  Tannenberg  ad- 
vocated dividing  the  colonies  of  the  other 
European  Powers  between  London  and  Ber- 
lin. Now,  however,  that  England  is  fully  in 
the  struggle  it  is  certain  that  in  case  of  defeat 
the  colonies  Tannenberg  assigned  her  would 
be  taken  from  her,  since  she  would  be  power- 
less to  resist. 

A  summary  of  Tannenberg's  predictions 
follows,  and  it  is  well  to  remember  that  the 
world-wide  acquisitions  which  he  assigned  to 
Germany  in  1911  are  less  than  she  will  be  able 
to  attain  if   she  succeeds  in  establishing  her 


THE  PANGERMAN  PLAN  17 

scheme  of  domination  from  Hamburg  to  the 
Persian  Gulf;  if  she  does  that,  no  organized 
force  on  earth  will  be  able  to  curb  the  boundless 
ambition  of  Berlin. 

In  regard  to  western  Asia,  Tannenberg  ex- 
plains that  Asia  Minor,  Syria,  Mesopotamia, 
Palestine,  western  Persia,  and  the  greater 
part  of  Arabia  would  be  put  under  the  protec- 
torate of  the  German  Empire — that  disposes 
of  3,200,000  square  kilometres,  with  16,500,- 
000  inhabitants.  Once  masters  of  the  shores 
of  the  Adriatic,  of  the  iEgean,  of  the  Darda- 
nelles, and  of  Aden  (and  here  they  would  be 
helped  by  their  Panislamic  propaganda),  the 
seizure  of  Egypt,  and  therefore  of  the  Suez 
Canal,  would  be  inevitable.  Germany,  if  she 
commanded  these  essential  strategic  points, 
would  obviously  be  able  to  retake  her  colonies 
in  Africa  and  Oceania:  Togo,  Kameroon, 
southwest  Africa,  eastern  Africa,  Kaiser  Wil- 
helm  Land,  Bismarck  Archipelago,  the  Caro- 
line Islands,  Marshall  Islands,  the  Marianes 
and  Samoa,  making  a  total  of  2,952,000  square 
kilometres,  with  11,787,000  inhabitants.  If 
the  Allies  should  give  way  in  Europe  they 
could  not  prevent  Great  Germany  from  snatch- 
ing—  still  according  to  Tannenberg's  pro- 
gramme— the  Belgian,  Portuguese,  and  Dutch 


18    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

colonies,  namely,  the  Belgian  Congo,  Portu- 
guese Angola,  and  the  Dutch  East  Indies,  with 
their  5,680,000  square  kilometres  and  57,306,- 
000  inhabitants.  Next  would  come  the  turn 
of  the  French  colonies,  the  cession  of  which  to 
Great  Germany  is  foreseen  by  Tannenberg. 
These  are  Morocco,  the  French  Congo,  Mada- 
gascar, Mayotta  and  the  Comores  Islands, 
Reunion,  Obok  and  its  dependencies  in  east 
Africa,  Indo-China,  and  the  French  islands  of 
Oceania,  making  a  total  of  3,391,000  square 
kilometres,  with  33,588,000  inhabitants.  Tan- 
nenberg also  informs  us  that  the  aim  of  Ger- 
man politics  in  China  was  the  establishment 
of  a  zone  of  solely  German  influence  on  the 
whole  lower  course  of  the  Yang-tse-Kiang  and 
the  Hoang-ho;  that  is  to  say,  over  that  vast 
portion  of  China  which  forms  the  hinterland 
of  Kiao-chau,  with  its  total  of  about  750,000 
square  kilometres  and  50  millions  of  inhabi- 
tants. He  finally  gives  an  exact  enumeration 
of  the  various  German  protectorates  which 
would  be  estabhshed  in  the  southern  part  of 
South  America,  which  is  largely  settled  by 
Germans.  A  glance  at  the  map  will  show 
these  protectorates,  as  planned  in  1911. 

"Germany,"    says   Tannenberg,    ''will   take 
under  her  protection  the  republics  of  Argen- 


THE  PANGERMAN  PLAN 


19 


tina,  Chili,  Uruguay  and  Paraguay,  the  south- 
ern third  of  BoHvia,  so  far  as  it  belongs  to  the 
basin  of  the  Rio  de  la  Plata,  and  also  that  part 


'NICARAGUA 


COLONIAL  PANGERMANISM 
AND  SOUTH  AMERICA 


of  southern  Brazil  in  which  German  culture 
prevails."  That  is  to  say,  about  6,347,000 
square  kilometres,  with  18,197,000  inhabitants. 


20    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

"German  South  America,"  he  concludes,  "will 
provide  for  us,  in  the  temperate  zone,  a  colonial 
region  where  our  emigrants  will  be  able  to 
settle  as  farmers.  Chili  and  Argentina  will 
preserve  their  language  and  their  autonomy, 
but  we  shall  require  that  German  be  taught  in 
the  schools  as  a  second  language.  Southern 
Brazil,  Paraguay,  and  Uruguay  are  countries 
of  German  culture,  and  there  German  will  be 
the  national  tongue." 

As  in  every  other  country,  the  preparations 
for  carrying  out  the  Pangerman  plan  in  South 
America  were  conducted  by  the  organizers  of 
the  movement  most  methodically. 

In  1895,  when  Germany  had  decided  what 
she  wanted,  she  proceeded  to  make  a  list  of  all 
Germans  on  the  face  of  the  globe,  in  order  to 
pick  out  from  among  them  those  who  were 
most  likely  to  prove  useful  tools  for  carrying 
out  the  Pangerman  plan.  The  result  of  this 
registration  of  the  German  element  throughout 
the  world  may  be  found  in  the  Pangerman 
Atlas  of  Paul  Langhans,  published  by  Justus 
Perthes,  at  Gotha,  in  1909. 

These  are  the  figures  relative  to  South 
America:  In  Peru,  in  1890,  there  were  two 
thousand  Germans;  in  Paraguay,  in  the  same 
year,  three  thousand;  in  Colombia  also  three 


THE  PANGERMAN  PLAN  £1 

thousand,  and  in  Brazil  four  hundred  thousand. 
In  1894  there  were  five  thousand  in  Vene- 
zuela; in  1895  there  were  fifteen  thousand  in 
Chih  and  sixty  thousand  in  Argentina;  and  in 
1897  there  were  five  thousand  in  Uruguay. 

The  Pangerman  societies  have  carried  on  a 
vigorous  propaganda  among  all  these  Ger- 
mans, especially  since  1900,  and  in  Argentina 
and  Brazil,  which  were  intended  to  be  the 
principal  German  protectorates,  they  were  or- 
ganized with  particular  care.  The  German 
law  of  July  22d,  1913,  known  as  Delbrlick's, 
which  deals  with  nationality  under  the  Empire 
and  under  the  State,  has  greatly  favored  Ger- 
man organization  in  America,  and  it  is  impor- 
tant to  know  at  least  the  gist  of  it,  since  it  is 
full  of  significance,  and  marks  the  last  stage  of 
Pangerman  organization  prior  to  the  war. 

The  second  part  of  its  article  25  runs  as 
follows:  ''If  any  person  before  acquiring  na- 
tionality in  a  foreign  State  shall  have  received 
the  written  permission  of  a  competent  au- 
thority of  his  native  State  to  retain  his  nation- 
ality of  that  State,  he  shall  not  lose  his  nation- 
ality of  the  said  native  State.  The  German 
consul  shall  be  consulted  before  this  permis- 
sion is  granted." 

From  these  words  we  can  measure  the  depth 


2^    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

of  German  astuteness.  According  to  this  pro- 
vision, a  German  may  become  a  citizen  of  a 
foreign  State,  but  if  he  obtains  a  written  per- 
mission "from  a  competent  authority  of  his 
native  State,"  he  still  continues  to  enjoy,  for 
himself  and  his  descendants,  all  the  rights  of 
a  German  citizen,  and  may  claim  the  protec- 
tion of  the  German  Empire. 

As  this  provision  is  contrary  to  all  general 
principles  of  international  law  concerning  na- 
tionality, a  German  citizen  who  takes  advan- 
tage of  it  is  careful  not  to  inform  the  foreign 
State  whose  nationality  he  has  acquired  of  the 
highly  peculiar  situation  in  which  he  stands. 
Thus  Germany  was  able  to  have,  in  every 
State,  agents  devoted  to  her  aggressive  policy, 
while  these  States  were  unaware  of  the  danger 
to  which  this  secret  service  exposed  them. 
Apparently  they  had  only  to  do  with  fellow 
citizens  whom  they  had  no  right  to  suspect. 
It  was  only  after  many  months  of  war,  when 
their  criminal  actions  compelled  them  to  take 
off  their  disguise,  that  the  power  of  these  Ger- 
mans masquerading  under  other  nationalities 
appeared  in  all  its  formidable  importance.  In 
South  America  the  German  effort  at  coloniza- 
tion has  for  a  long  time  been  concentrated 
upon  three  Bazilian  States:  Parana,  which  has 


THE  PANGERMAN  PLAN  23 

sixty  thousand  Germans,  Santa  Catarina, 
where  there  are  one  hundred  and  seventy 
thousand,  and  Rio  Grande  do  Sul,  with  two 
hundred  and  twenty  thousand.  In  these  rich 
provinces  they  preserve  the  language,  the  tra- 
ditions, and  the  prejudices  of  the  Fatherland, 
and  are  almost  absolute  masters.  Only  forty- 
seven  thousand  of  them  are  still  openly  citizens 
of  the  German  Empire;  about  four  hundred 
thousand  are  apparently  Brazilian  citizens,  but 
in  virtue  of  the  Delbruck  law  a  large  number 
have  remained  or  become  once  more  liegemen 
of  the  Kaiser.  It  may  be  noted  that  the 
budget  of  the  German  Empire  included  a  sum 
of  500,000  marks  for  the  establishment  and 
maintenance  of  German  schools  in  Brazil,  and 
in  1912  Prince  Henry  of  Prussia,  brother  of 
William  II.,  landed  at  the  port  of  Itajahy  in 
the  course  of  his  cruise,  to  visit  his  fellow 
countrymen  in  Santa  Catarina.  Since  the 
outbreak  of  the  war  the  German  game  in  Brazil 
has  gradually  been  revealed;  numerous  rifle 
clubs  were,  in  fact,  societies  for  military  drill, 
and  dangerous  enough  to  necessitate  their 
disarmament. 

Outside  the  three  provinces  mentioned  above 
Germans  are  not  numerous  in  Brazil,  but  they 
fill   most   of   the   principal   posts   in   business 


-24     UNITED   STATES  AND   PAXGER^LVNIA 

houses  and  banks.  In  the  first  period  of  the 
war  these  men,  having  estabhshed  Germano- 
phile  newspapers  pubhshed  in  Portuguese, 
were  able  to  prevent  Brazil  from  getting  ac- 
curate information  as  to  the  origin  and  devel- 
opment of  the  conflict. 

To  sum  up,  the  result  of  the  PangeiTuan 
programme  for  countries  outside  of  Europe 
would  assure  to  Germany,  under  the  form  of 
colonies,  protectorates,  or  zones  of  special  in- 
fluence, in  Asia,  4,753,000  square  kilometres, 
with  a  population  of  83,490,000;  in  Africa, 
8,906,000  kilometres,  with  a  population  of 
46,850,000;  in  Oceania,  ^2,314,000  kilometres, 
with  a  population  of  38,840,000,  and  in  America 
6,347,000,  with  a  population  of  18,197,000, 
making  a  total  of  '2''2, 3-20. 000  kilometres,  hav- 
ing a  population  of  187,378,000. 

IV. 

If  to  these  figures  we  add  the  4,015,000  kil- 
ometres, with  204  milHon  inhabitants  which 
the  Pangerman  plan  of  1911  intended  to  cover 
in  Europe  and  Turkey,  we  find  that  the  Ger- 
man project  of  universal  dominion  looks  for  a 
total,  in  round  numbers,  of  26  million  square 
kilometres,  with  390  million  inhabitants. 

These  figures  include  at  the  utmost  only  90 


THE  PAXGERM\N  PLAN  25 

millions  of  Germans,  properly  speaking,  who 
would  thus  exercise  supremacy  over  257  mil- 
lion belonging  to  other  races.  It  must  be 
clearly  understood  that  the  enormous  posses- 
sions of  Pangermany  in  both  hemispheres 
would  be  strictly  controlled  from  Berlin.  A 
glance  at  the  map  on  p.  15  will  show  that  all 
the  essential  strategic  points  which  command 
the  seas  of  the  world  are  included;  besides  the 
Adriatic,  the  iEgean  and  the  Dardanelles,  the 
Straits  of  Gibraltar  from  the  side  of  Morocco 
would  be  controlled,  the  Strait  of  Malacca,  also 
Cape  Horn,  Madagascar,  and  the  naval  bases 
of  Oceania. 

WilHam  II.  was  well  aware  that  such  a 
project  could  only  become  an  enduring  reahty 
through  the  disappearance  of  all  other  great 
Powers.  \Mien  he  had  finally  decided  on  the 
Pangerman  plan  he  was  deliberately  resolved 
on  the  destruction  of  five  of  these  Powers. 
This  essential  truth  must  be  kept  firmly  in 
our  minds  if  we  wish  to  understand  the  pres- 
ent war.  Austria-Hungary  was  to  disappear 
through  absorption,  disguised  at  its  entry  into 
the  German  Zollverein.  A  fierce  aggressive 
war  was  to  annihilate  the  mihtary  forces  of 
France  and  Russia.  To  cripple  England  later 
would  be  an  easy  job  with  France  and  Russia 


26    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

dismembered  and  impotent.  As  for  Italy,  it 
was  intended  that  she  should  be  a  vassal 
State,  and  she  was  not  considered  capable  of 
offering  even  a  slight  resistance  to  Pangerman 
ambition.  It  must  be  added  that  the  plan  of 
1911  did  not  include  war  with  England.  When 
the  Kaiser  forced  it  on  France  and  Russia  in 
1914  he  did  not  believe  that  Great  Britain 
would  come  in,  or  at  least  not  immediately. 

The  initial  German  plan  was  upset  by  Eng- 
lish intervention  following  on  the  respite  gained 
by.  the  splendid  resistance  of  armed  Belgium. 
But  Germans  are  stubborn  and  crafty;  by 
adapting  themselves  to  new  conditions  thrust 
upon  them,  they  have  almost  succeeded  in 
carrying  out,  even  now,  their  plan  of  1911. 

To  sum  up,  the  complete  Pangerman  plaii 
aims  at  procuring  for  Germany  all  the  means 
of  domination  by  land  and  sea  which  would 
enable  her  to  hold  the  entire  world  in  the 
crushing  grip  of  Prussian  militarism  brought 
to  the  highest  point  of  efficiency.  Not  for  a 
moment  do  the  Pangermans  pause  to  reflect 
on  the  criminality  of  this  programme  of  uni- 
versal slavery.  *' War,"  says  Tannenberg  with 
his  monstrous  cynicism,  ''must  leave  nothing 
to  the  vanquished  but  their  eyes  to  weep  with. 
Modesty  on  our  part  would  be  only  madness." 


THE  PANGERMAN  PLAN  27 

It  is  a  fundamental  truth,  of  which  I  wish 
to  convince  my  readers,  that  the  Pangerman 
plan  is  solely  and  entirely  based  on  the  achieve- 
ment of  the  scheme  ''from  Hamburg  to  the 
Persian  Gulf,"  which  forms  its  backbone.  If 
this  is  broken  it  falls  to  the  ground,  and  the 
projects  for  German  domination  are  frustrated 
forever.  The  principal  problem  which  the 
Allies  must  solve,  if  they  would  insure  their 
liberty  and  that  of  the  whole  world,  is  that  of 
making  the  plan  of  "from  Hamburg  to  the 
Persian  Gulf"  impossible. 

V. 

In  order  to  establish  the  responsibility  of 
Germany  we  need  only  show  clearly  the  ma- 
chinery for  the  realization  of  the  Pangerman 
plan  as  it  appears  in  the  light  of  facts.  For 
twenty-two  years,  from  1892  until  war  broke 
out,  the  Pangerman  movement  has  developed 
with  ever-growing  intensity;  a  multitude  of 
publications,  giving  full  details  of  the  Pan- 
german plan,  have  been  scattered  among  the 
German  people  in  order  to  excite  in  them  the 
greed  of  conquest,  and  prepare  them  for  the 
fight  by  the  bait  of  plunder. 

Two  of  these  publications  are  particularly 
important:  the  pamphlet  published  under  the 


28    UNITED   STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

authority  of  the  Pangerman  Union,  Gross- 
deutschland  und  Mitteleuropa  iivi  das  Jahr  1050 
(Great  Gerviany  and  Central  Europe  in  1950), 
pubhshed  by  Thormann  &  Goetsch,  S.  W. 
Beesel  Strasse,  17,  BerHn,  1895,  which  gives 
the  Pangermanist  plan  of  that  year;  and  the 
book  by  Otto  Richard  Tannenberg:  Gross- 
Deutschland,  die  Arbeit  des  20  Jahrhunderts 
(Great  Germany,  the  Work  of  the  20th  Cen- 
tury), which  was  issued  by  Bruno  Volger  at 
Leipsic  in  1911,  and  which  gives  nearly  all  the 
information  to  be  desired  with  regard  to  that 
year's  plan. 

The  great  importance  of  this  Pangerman 
Hterature  is  incontestable,  and  the  reality,  the 
extent,  and  the  successive  stages  of  the  Pan- 
german plan  of  1911  are  shown: 

1.  By  the  course  which  Germany  has  fol- 
lowed in  her  political  and  military  operations 
since  August  1st,  1914.  Many  have  supposed 
that  her  object  has  been  to  obtain  pledges  of 
security,  but  it  has  really  been  to  seize  territory 
for  annexation  almost  exactly  in  the  manner 
set  forth  in  Tannenberg's  book  in  explaining 
the  plan  of  1911. 

2.  By  the  memorial  presented  on  May 
20th,  1915,  to  the  German  Chancellor  by  the 
League  of  Agriculturists,  the  League  of  Ger- 


THE  PANGERMAN  PLAN  29 

man  Peasants,  the  Provisional  Union  of  Ger- 
man Peasants'  Christian  ^Associations  (now 
called  the  Westphalian  Peasants'  Association), 
the  Central  German  Manufacturers'  Union, 
the  League  of  Manufacturers,  and  the  Middle- 
Class  Union  of  the  Empire.  The  importance 
of  this  document  cannot  be  overrated,  for  it 
was  issued  by  the  most  powerful  associations 
of  the  Empire,  in  which  were  included  all  the 
influential  elements  of  the  German  nation, 
especially  the  agrarians  and  the  ill-omened 
Prussian  squires.  Now,  the  object  of  that 
memorial  was  to  demand  all  the  annexations 
mentioned  in  the  Pangerman  plan  of  1911 
which  had  been  made  possible  by  the  progress 
of  military  operations. 

3.  By  the  declarations  made  at  the  sitting 
of  the  Reichstag  on  the  11th  of  December, 
1915.  The  Imperial  Chancellor,  Von  Beth- 
mann-Hollweg,  said:  "If  our  enemies  do  not 
submit  now,  they  will  be  obliged  to  do  so  later. 
.  .  .  When  our  enemies  shall  offer  us  proposals 
of  peace  compatible  with  the  dignity  and 
security  of  Germany  we  shall  be  ready  to  dis- 
cuss them.  ...  But  our  enemies  must  under- 
stand that  the  more  unrelentingly  they  wage 
war,  the  higher  will  be  the  guarantees  which 
we  shall  necessarily  exact."     One  of  the  depu- 


30    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

ties,  Spahn,  then  explained  the  drift  of  the 
Chancellor's  speech  with  still  greater  precision: 
"We  await,"  he  said,  "the  hour  which  will 
allow  of  peace  negotiations  framed  to  safe- 
guard permanently,  and  by  every  means,  in- 
cluding necessary  territorial  annexations,  all 
the  military,  economic,  and  social  interests  of 
Germany  through  its  whole  extent." 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE    IMMEDIATE   CAUSES  OF  THE  WAR. 

I.     Why   the  Treaty   of  Bucharest   suddenly  became  a 
formidable  obstacle  to  the  Pangerman  plan. 
n.     How  political  conditions  in  Austria-Hungary  inclined 
Germany  to  bring  on  the  war. 

Although  the  Pangerman  plan  is  unques- 
tionably the  underlying  and  principal  cause  of 
the  war,  yet  when  William  II.  brought  it  on, 
in  August,  1914,  he  did  so  for  immediate  and 
secondary  reasons,  a  knowledge  of  which  is  nec- 
essary to  a  clear  understanding  of  events. 


Up  to  1911,  when  Tannenberg  published  the 
programme  of  annexations,  all  the  important 
happenings  had  furthered  the  Kaiser's  aims; 
but  after  1912  very  serious  and  quite  unlooked- 
for  obstacles  arose  to  thwart  them. 

Chief  among  these  was  the  new  condition 
of  affairs  resulting  from  the  Treaty  of  Bucha- 
rest, which  was  signed  August  10th,  1913, 
ending  the  Balkan  Wars  of  1912-13.  This 
treaty  created  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula  two 

31 


32    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

groups  of  States  sharply  opposed  to  each  other. 
To  the  first  belonged  the  beaten  and  sullen 
participants,  Bulgaria  and  Turkey;  the  second 
was  composed  of  those  peoples  who  had  profited 
by  the  fight,  and  were  satisfied  with  the  re- 
sult, namely  Roumania,  Serbia,  Montenegro, 
and  Greece.  These  latter,  because  of  their 
recent  acquisitions,  made  at  the  expense  of 
Turkey  and  against  the  will  of  Germany,  to 
whom  Turkey  was  already  bound,  leaned  more 
and  more  toward  the  Triple  Entente,  while  the 
conquered  States,  Turkey  and  Bulgaria,  tended 
to  uphold  Germanism.  Before  the  Balkan 
Wars  the  influence  of  the  Entente  was  much 
less  in  the  peninsula  than  that  of  Germany, 
but  after  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest  the  tables 
were  turned,  and  the  Entente  found  support 
in  that  group  of  States  which  was  most  power- 
fully organized,  and  which,  as  the  map  shows, 
presented  a  solid  barrier  to  the  Pangerman 
plan  in  the  East. 

If  peace  had  lasted  a  few  more  years  the 
situation  would  have  been  consolidated,  and 
this  barrier  would  have  been  still  more  im- 
passable; therefore  Berlin  determined  to  in- 
tervene. Serbia  was  unquestionably  the  pivot 
on  which  the  new  Balkan  equilibrium  turned; 
it  was  decided  to  destroy  her  without  delay. 


IMMEDIATE  CAUSES  OF  THE  WAR      33 


THE  ANTI- GERMAN  BARRIER  IN  THE  BALKANS 

AFTER  THE  TREATY  OF  BUCHAREST 

August  lO,  1913 


34    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

and  at  the  same  time  set  fire  to  Europe,  in 
order,  by  one  swift  stroke,  to  realize  the  plan 
of  1911.  The  Treaty  of  Bucharest  was  signed 
on  August  10th,  1913.  On  November  6th  of 
the  same  year  the  Kaiser  told  King  Albert  of 
Belgium,  during  a  visit  at  Potsdam,  that  in 
his  opinion  war  with  France  was  near  and  un- 
avoidable.* 

II. 

Not  only  wfere  the  consequences  of  the  Treaty 
of  Bucharest  disastrous  to  Pangerman  ambi- 
tions in  the  Balkan  Peninsula;  to  the  bound- 
less fury  of  the  government  at  Berlin  they  ac- 
celerated considerably  the  internal  political  evo- 
lution of  Austria-Hungary,  which  of  itself  had 
already  threatened  to  counteract  all  the  Ger- 
man plans. 

There  are  nine  different  nationalities  in  the 
Hapsburg  Monarchy;  these  are  divided  among 
four  races:  Germanic,  Slavonic,  Latin,  and 
Magyar — this  last  a  peculiar  race,  of  Asiatic 
origin.  There  are  about  12  million  Germans, 
four  million  Latins  (made  up  of  Italians  and 
Roumanians),  24  million  Slavs,  and  10  mil- 
lion Magyars.  Since  1867  the  Germans  and 
Magyars  have  agreed  to  exercise  and  main- 

*UAllemagne  avant  la  Guerre,  by  Baron  Beyens,  p.  24. 


IMMEDIATE   CAUSES  OF  THE  WAR      35 


tain  supremacy  for  their  own  profit  over  the 
Slavs  and  Latins,  although  these  latter  (28 
million)    outnumber    them,    and    have    fought 


36    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

hard  for  the  last  thirty  years  to  obtain  poKtical 
rights  in  the  Monarchy  proportionate  to  the 
majority  they  possess  of  Hving  human  beings, 
taxable  and  conscriptable  at  will.  These  ef- 
forts have  disquieted  WilHam  II.  and  his 
Pangermanists  in  the  highest  degree.  This  is 
readily  understood,  for  if  the  poHtical  power 
in  the  Hapsburg  Monarchy  were  vested,  as 
justice  demands,  in  the  Slavs  and  Latins,  ivho 
detest  Prussianisui,  that  in  itself  would  be  the 
ruin  of  the  Kaiser's  plan  for  the  economic 
absorption  of  Austria-Hungary,  and  icitliout 
this  absorption  he  cannot  carry  out  his  inad- 
missible plans  of  exclusive  influence  in  the  Bal- 
kans and  in  the  East.  His  game  has  therefore 
been,  especially  since  1890,  to  say  to  Francis 
Joseph  and  the  Magyars:  ''xAbove  all,  do  not 
concede  the  claims  of  your  Slav  and  Latin 
subjects.  Keep  up  absolutely  the  Germano- 
Magyar  supremacy.  I  will  uphold  you  in  the 
struggle  with  all  my  power."  For  a  long  time 
these  tactics  were  successful,  but  a  few  years 
before  the  war  they  were  on  the  point  of 
breaking  down. 

The  culture  of  the  Slavs  and  Latins  grew 
steadily,  despite  the  cynical  and  ingenious  ob- 
stacles put  in  their  way  by  the  Germans  and 
Magyars;  their  national  organization  became 


IMMEDIATE  CAUSES  OF  THE  WAR      37 

closer,  and  they  had  also  the  advantage  of 
being  more  prolific  than  their  political  rivals. 
These  reasons  made  it  increasingly  difficult 
for  Francis  Joseph  and  his  henchmen  at 
Bucharest  to  resist  their  enlarged  demands. 

The  Balkan  victories  of  the  Slavs  in  1912, 
and  the  success  of  Roumania  in  1913,  roused 
the  Latin  and  Slav  subjects  of  the  Hapsburgs 
to  the  greatest  enthusiasm,  as  in  them  they 
saw  the  triumph  of  the  principle  of  nationality 
— ^their  own  cause.  They  persisted  more  than 
ever  in  demanding  their  rights  from  Vienna 
and  Budapest,  and  the  Germano-Magyars 
persisted  in  refusing  them,  although  with 
waning  energy.  If  peace  had  been  main- 
tained, the  cumulative  effect  of  the  Bucharest 
Treaty  would  have  made  these  claims  irresisti- 
ble, while  Roumania,  exulting  over  her  annexa- 
tion in  1913  of  the  Bulgarian  Dobrudja,  began 
to  look  upon  Transylvania  as  a  fruit  ripe  for 
the  plucking  at  Hungary's  expense,  at  a  mo- 
ment when  all  political  signs  pointed  to  an 
approaching  radical  transformation  in  the 
Hapsburg  Monarchy.  If  all  this  had  taken 
place  the  influence  of  Germanism  would  have 
been  jeopardized  in  the  Hapsburg  Empire 
quite  as  much  as  in  the  Balkans. 

Under  the  growing  pressure  of  her  Slav  and 


38     UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 


Latin  elements,  the  partition,  or  at  any  rate 
the  evohition  toward  federation,  of  Austria- 
Hungary    would    have    become    a    necessity. 


THE  THREE  BARRIERS  OF  ANTI- GERMANIC  PEOPLES 
IN  THE  BALKANS  AND  IN  AUSTRU  HUNGARY 


This  federalism  would  not  have  affected  the 
frontiers  of  the  Hapsburg  dominions,  but  it 
would  surely  have  given  political  preponder- 


IMMEDIATE  CAUSES  OF  THE  WAR      39 

ance  to  the  more  numerous  and  more  prolific 
Slavs  and  Latins.  Of  these  a  very  large  ma- 
jority were  resolutely  opposed  to  any  alliance 
with  Germany.  The  foreign  policy  of  the 
Hapsburg  Monarchy  would  have  thus  become 
progressively  more  independent  of  Berlin,  and 
been  drawn  closer  to  Russia,  France,  and  Eng- 
land. Germany  would  have  been  deprived  of 
the  artificial  prop  which  the  Germano-Magyar 
predominance  at  Vienna  and  Budapest  had 
given  her  since  the  days  of  Sadowa,  and  William 
II.  confronted  by  conditions  opposing  a  bar- 
rier to  his  Oriental  ambitions  even  more  for- 
midable than  that  created  by  the  Treaty  of 
Bucharest.  The  Kaiser,  therefore,  decided 
to  make  war  at  once. 

The  three  determining  causes  in  eastern 
Europe  may  be  summed  up  in  three  lines: 

1.  The  defeat  of  Turkey  by  the  Balkan 
peoples  and  Italy  in  1912. 

2.  The  consequences  of  the  Treaty  of 
Bucharest. 

3.  The  internal  evolution  of  Austria-Hun- 
gary. 

The  three  anti-German  barriers  are  shown 
on  the  map  (p.  38)  by  broad  black  strokes; 
these  barriers  would  have  effectually  broken 
up  the  Pangerman  plan,  and  the  Kaiser,  fore- 


40    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

seeing  this,  had  recourse  to  war,  which  Mira- 
beau  pithily  described  long  ago  as  "the  na- 
tional industry  of  Prussia." 


CHAPTER  IV. 

PANGERMANY  IS  MADE. 

I.    The  extent  of  the  realization  at  the  beginning  of  1917 

of  the  Pangerman  plan  of  1911. 
n.     Economic  Pangermany. 
in.    MiUtary  Pangermany. 


The  Pangerman  plan  of  1911  (see  map  p.  12) 
comprehended : 

1.  The  formation  of  a  great  German  Con- 
federation which  was  to  put  under  the  absolute 
supremac3^  of  the  present  German  Empire,  with 
its  540,858  square  kilometres  and  68  million 
inhabitants,  foreign  territories  situated  around 
Germany,  which  have  an  area  of  1,182,113 
square  kilometres,  and  contain  94  million  in- 
habitants. 

Early  in  1917  the  German  seizures  already 
effected  in  these  territories  amounted  in  the 
West  to  90,478  square  kilometres,  in  the  East 
to  260,000,  and  in  the  South  (Austria-Hungary) 
to  676,616,  making  a  total  of  1,027,094  square 

41 


42    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

kilometres.  Germany  has  therefore,  so  far  as 
concerns  the  territories  to  be  absorbed  into  the 
Germanic  Confederation,  achieved  her  pro- 
gramme in  the  proportion  of  86%,  or  about 
nine-tenths. 

2.  The  absohite  subordination  to  Germany 
of  all  the  Balkan  States,  with  a  superficies  of 
499,275  square  kilometres,  holding  22  mil- 
lions of  inhabitants.  Here,  in  the  begin- 
ning of  1917,  the  German  seizure  extended 
over  about  285,585  square  kilometers.  The 
German  programme  concerning  the  Balkans 
had,  therefore,  been  realized  in  the  proportion 
of  57%. 

3.  The  German  seizures,  more  or  less  dis- 
guised, in  the  Ottoman  Empire,  extended  over 
1,792,900  square  kilometres,  holding  20  mil- 
lion inhabitants.  Early  in  1917  (not  count- 
ing the  portions  of  Persia  occupied  by  the 
Turco-Germans,  of  which  the  area  about  bal- 
ances the  Anglo-Russian  occupations  in  Ar- 
menia and  Mesopotamia)  we  may  say  that 
the  whole  of  Turkey  is  under  German  influ- 
ence exclusively,  and  therefore  the  German 
plan  has  been  reahzed  in  the  proportion  of 
100%. 

Let  us  now  group  together  the  figures  which 
allow  us  to  ascertain  how  nearly  the  general 


PANGERMANY  IS  MADE 


43 


♦-  OOO  OO  OOOOOOOOOOOO  r- 

OOO  OO  OOOOOOOOOOOO  - 

OOO  O  O  OOOOOOOOOOOO 

doo  do"  dddddddddcScSd  S 

OOO  oo  ooooooooooo"  " 


44    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

plan  of  continental  Pangermany,  made  in  1911, 
has  been  carried  out  in  1917. 


Forecast  in 

1911. 

Square 

kilometres 

Realization  in 

the  beginning 

of  1917. 

Square 

kilometres 

I. 

Territories  to  be  included 
in    the     great     German 
Confederation  . . 

1,182,113 

499,275 

1,792,900 

1,027,094 
285,585 

TT. 

Balkans 

ITT. 

Turkey 

1,792,900 

Total 

3,474,288 

3,105,579 

These  figures  are  startling  evidence  that  early 
in  1917  Germany  had  realized  her  Pangerman 
plan  of  1911  in  the  enormous  proportion  of  89%, 
or  almost  nine-tenths.  If  to  each  of  these 
totals  we  add  the  superficies  of  the  German 
Empire,  540,858  square  kilometres,  we  find  the 
area  of  Pangermany,  in  round  numbers,  at  the 
beginning  of  1917,  to  be  3,600,000  square  kil- 
ometres, a  figure  which  comes  very  close  to 
the  4,015,000  square  kilometres  which  represent 
Pangermany  in  the  plan  of  1911. 

This  figure  is  graphically  confirmed  by  the 
map  on  p.  43. 

We  can  see  at  a  glance  the  geographical  as 
well  as  superficial  relations  which  exist  between 


PANGERMANY  IS  MADE  45 

the  boundaries  of  the  plan  of  1911  and  the 
fronts  occupied  early  in  1917  by  armies  under 
the  exclusive  direction  of  Berlin. 

* 

A  new  extension  of  Pangerman  invasion 
took  place  in  the  second  half  of  1917,  following 
the  capture  of  Riga  and  the  advance  of  the 
German  armies  in  Russia.  The  figures  given 
above  are,  therefore,  considerably  below  the 
truth;  the  fact  which  they  demonstrate  is 
therefore  still  more  convincing. 

Our  conclusion  from  the  foregoing  state- 
ments must  be  that  Germany  exists  no  longer; 
there  is  only  Pangermany,  That  is  an  essen- 
tial fact,  of  which  the  importance  is  not  yet 
fully  realized,  and  as  a  result  the  Allies  still 
continue  to  speak  of  Germany,  Austria-Hun- 
gary, or  Turkey  as  if  these  States  had  remained 
in  the  same  conditions  in  which  they  were 
before  the  war.  But  that  is  by  no  means  the 
case.  The  Quadruple  AUiance  of  Central  Eu- 
rope is  a  great  illusion,  carefully  fostered  by  the 
astute  government  at  Berlin,  because  it  is  of 
the  greatest  service  to  their  game.  In  reality 
Turkey,  Bulgaria,  and  Austria-Hungary  are 
not  allies,  but  vassals  of  Berlin,  and  have  less 
influence  there  than  Saxony  or  Bavaria. 


46    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

As  may  be  seen  by  a  glance  at  the  map  on  p. 
43,  the  effective  forces  of  these  three  States  are 
closely  subordinated  to  the  Prussian  mihtarism 
which  has  helped  Germany  to  reduce  to  prac- 
tical slavery  82  millions  of  Latins,  Slavs  and 
Semites,  belonging  to  thirteen  different  nation- 
ahties.  The  governments  of  Constantinople, 
of  Sofia,  of  Vienna,  and  of  Budapest  have  a 
thousand  reasons  in  common  for  complying 
with  the  orders  of  Berlin,  from  which  this 
enormous  whole  is  administered. 

Therefore,  in  order  to  reason  clearly  hence- 
forth, we  must  not  see  only  Germany,  but 
Pangermany;  unless  we  do  this,  disastrous 
errors  of  judgment  will  be  made  by  the  Allies. 
It  is  only  by  examining,  not  Germany  but  the 
actual  Pangermany,  that  is  to  say,  a  gigantic 
territory  counting  already  at  the  present  time 
about  176  million  souls,  that  we  can  justly 
appreciate  the  resources  of  every  kind,  mili- 
tary and  economical,  which  the  government  of 
Berhn  has  at  its  disposal;  more  particularly 
should  we  endeavor  to  form  a  clear  idea  of 
economic  and  also  of  mihtary  Pangermany,  as 
one  completes  the  other. 


PANGERMANY  IS  MADE  47 

II. 

Economic  Pangermany,  as  it  was  formerly 
outlined  by  Teutonic  economists  such  as  List, 
Roscher,  Rodbertus,  etc.,  may  be  thus  defined: 
A  territory  grouping  together  (solely  under  the 
supreme  guidance  of  Berlin)  Central  Europe, 
the  Balkans,  and  Turkey,  this  territory  being  vast 
enough  to  contain  military  and  economic  re- 
sources  entirely  sufficient  for  the  needs  of  its 
population  during  war,  and  to  insure  its  directors, 
in  time  of  peace,  domination  over  the  world. 

As  soon  as  the  Hamburg-Bagdad  railway  was 
practically  finished,  the  parcelling  out  of  eco- 
nomic Pangermany  was  hastily  carried  on  by 
Berlin  under  many  widely  different  forms. 

Control  of  customs:  As  realization  of  the 
great  Pangerman  Zollverein,  or  Customs  Union, 
was  not  possible  all  at  once,  the  Kaiser's  gov- 
ernment set  about  preparing  the  necessary 
steps.  Numerous  congresses  were  held  in  Ber- 
lin, attended  by  parliamentarians  and  men  of 
business,  German,  Austrian,  and  Hungarian, 
who  agreed  on  these  three  essential  conclusions: 

1.  An  economic  customs  agreement,  of  long 
duration,  in  which  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary  should  constitute  an  economic  unit; 

2.  In  order  to  attain  this  by  degrees,  each  side 


48    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

should  add  to  the  number  of  articles  already 
free  from  customs  duties,  and  should  establish 
a  unified  tariff  for  certain  sorts  of  merchandise; 
3.  That  Austro-Germany,  Bulgaria,  and  Tur- 
key should  be  brought  into  close  economic 
union  as  rapidly  as  possible. 

Ethnographic  control:  Certain  populations 
considerably  hinder  the  consolidation  of  the 
Hamburg-Persian  Gulf  plan;  the  Serbian  na- 
tion, whose  spirit  cannot  be  subdued,  are  an 
obstacle  to  the  establishment  of  the  Panger- 
man  bridge  or  nexus  between  Hungary  and  Bul- 
garia, without  which  bridge  all  the  Pangerman 
plan  could  not  be  realized.  The  systematic 
destruction  of  the  Serbian  nation  was  confided 
to  the  Bulgarians,  who,  under  pretext  of  put- 
ting down  insurrections,  slew  not  only  Serbian 
men  of  fighting  age,  but  old  people  of  both 
sexes,  women,  and  children  in  arms.  In  the 
Ottoman  Empire,  the  Armenians  occupied  the 
regions  which  were  indicated  by  Herr  Del- 
bruck  in  the  Reichstag  long  ago  as  destined 
to  constitute  Germanic  India.  Berlin  utilized 
the  hereditary  Turkish  liking  for  the  massacre 
of  Christians,  and  already  more  than  a  million 
Armenians  have  been  wiped  off  the  face  of  the 
earth. 

Agricultural   control:    The   food  crisis  from 


PANGERIMANY  IS  MADE  49 

which  Germany  suffers  has  determined  Beriin 
to  make  all  haste  to  profit  by  the  rich  agri- 
cultural regions  which  the  war  has  brought 
under  her  power.  She  has,  therefore,  sent 
hundreds  of  agronomic  engineers,  with  thou- 
sands of  agricultural  machines,  to  Roumania, 
to  Serbia,  and  to  Asia  Minor.  In  this  latter 
country  two  centres  of  cultivation  have  re- 
ceived especial  attention;  in  the  province  of 
Adana  the  production  of  cotton  is  being  de- 
veloped; on  the  Anatolian  plains  the  intensive 
cultivation  of  cereals  is  pushed  as  fast  as  pos- 
sible. These  energetic  efforts  will  have  this 
twofold  result:  the  Turks  will  not  rise  against 
the  German  domination,  or  at  least  not  be- 
cause of  scarcity  of  food,  and  by  means  of  the 
ever-increasing  yield  of  Serbian,  Roumanian, 
and  Turkish  soil,  now  scientifically  treated, 
the  food  supply  of  the  Central  Powers  will  be 
more  and  more  completely  assured. 

Banking  control:  As  the  exploitation  of 
Oriental  Pangermany  requires  an  immense 
amount  of  capital,  the  German,  Austro-Hun- 
garian,  Bulgarian,  and  Turkish  banks  have 
formed  a  group  of  powerful  combinations. 
The  leaders  in  Germany  are  the  Deutsche 
Bank,  the  Dresdner  Bank,  and  the  Kolnische 
Bankverein;    in  Austria-Hungary,  the  Kredit 


50    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

Anstalt  in  Vienna,  and  the  Hungarian  Bank  of 
Credit  in  Budapest. 

Economic  control:  As  the  rapid  development 
of  the  latent  resources  of  the  Balkans  and 
Turkey  is  the  chief  economic  objective  of  the 
Germans,  they  have  recently  established,  in 
co-operation  with  King  Ferdinand,  an  Institute 
for  Improving  Economic  Relations  between  Ger- 
many and  Bulgaria,  and  in  order  to  facilitate 
German  penetration  in  Turkey,  ten  thousand 
Turkish  boys,  from  twelve  to  eighteen  years  of 
age  are  to  come  to  Germany  for  their  technical 
education.  They  will  live  in  German  families, 
learn  the  German  language,  and  be  saturated 
with  German  ideas,  with  the  result  that  they 
will  become  useful  underlings  and  efficient 
fellow  workers  with  the  real  Germans  toward 
the  Germanization  of  Turkey,  and  also  for  ex- 
ploiting the  concessions  of  every  sort  which 
the  subjects  of  the  Kaiser  will  exact  from  the 
Ottoman  Government  on  account  of  the  war. 

Railway  control:  The  railway  system  through- 
out European  Pangermany  has  been  improved 
and  perfected  by  every  possible  means;  in 
Turkey  all  the  roads  are  under  the  absolute 
control  of  German  officers.  Of  the  2,435  kil- 
ometres which  separate  Haidar  Pacha  (Con- 
stantinople) from  Bagdad  only  583  kilometres 


PANGERMANY  IS  MADE  51 

are  stil!  to  be  built,  and  this  distance  is  already 
crossed  by  automobile  roads. 

Canal  control:  The  canal  project  which  was 
outlined  by  the  Pangermanist,  Doctor  G.  Zoepfl, 
at  a  congress  held  in  Berlin  as  far  back  as 
April  26th,  1895,  was  taken  up  and  followed 
by  the  Economic  Congress  of  Central  Europe 
which  met  at  Berlin  on  the  19th  of  March, 
1917. 

This  plan  is  made  up  of  the  following  ele- 
ments: 1.  Union  of  the  Rhine  and  Danube  by 
the  adaptation  of  the  Main  to  canal  navigation 
and  by  the  canal  from  the  Main  to  the  Danube; 
2.  Completion  of  the  central  canal  between  the 
Vistula  and  Rhine;  3.  Canal  from  the  Oder  to 
the  Danube,  uniting  the  Baltic  and  the  Black 
Sea;  4.  Adaptation  of  the  Rhine  as  far  as  Basle; 
5.  Union  of  the  Weser  and  Main  by  means  of 
the  Fulda-Werra  Rivers;  6.  Union  of  the  Elbe 
and  Danube  by  the  Moldau;  7.  Union  by  means 
of  canals  of  the  Oder  to  the  Danube  and  Vis- 
tula; 8.  Union  of  the  Danube  and  the  Dniester 
by  the  Vistula;  9.  Canalization  of  the  Save; 
10.  Canalization  of  the  Morava  and  the  Var- 
dar  as  far  as  Salonika. 

The  Danube,  being  the  most  powerful  flu- 
vial artery  of  central  Pangermany,  is  the  basis 
of  this  gigantic  scheme. 


52    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

*'The  Danube  means  everything  to  us,"  de- 
clared General  von  Groener  in  December,  1916. 

This  rapid  sketch  of  the  preparations  now 
going  on  in  economic  Pangermany  will  enable 
any  clear-sighted  mind  to  understand  the 
crushing  power  which  this  formidable  organ- 
ism will  possess  when  all  these  mighty  resources 
have  been  developed  by  the  Germans  for  the 
benefit  of  their  supremacy. 

The  organization  of  Pangermany  is  only  be- 
ginning, and  yet  the  economic  forces  which  she 
is  able  to  put  at  the  service  of  Berlin  are  such 
as  to  permit  Germany  to  keep  up  the  war 
against  enemies  who,  although  much  greater 
in  number,  are  scattered. 

The  German  dogged  power  of  work,  spirit 
of  enterprise,  and  skill  in  organization  need 
no  further  demonstration.  We  must,  there- 
fore, not  doubt  for  a  moment  that  they  would 
draw,  to  their  enormous  advantage,  all  possi- 
ble profits  from  Austria-Hungary,  where  there 
are  vast  regions  still  to  be  turned  to  account. 
The  same  would  apply  to  the  Balkan  countries, 
many  of  which  are  still  entirely  untouched, 
and  which  contain  a  considerable  amount  of 
unexplored  sources  of  wealth,  both  agricul- 
tural and  mineral.  This  would  also  be  true 
of  Asiatic  Turkey. 


PANGERMANY  IS  MADE  53 

What  intolerable  authority  would  be  wielded 
by  an  economic  Pangermany,  comprising  nearly 
three  millions  of  square  kilometres,  when  once 
it  was  completely  organized!  It  is  obviously 
indisputable  that  the  methodical  turning  to 
account,  upon  a  great  scale,  of  all  the  economic 
products  of  Pangermany,  whether  minerals  or 
crops,  live  stock  or  manufactures,  transported 
by  cheap  methods  (such  as  a  complete  net- 
work of  canals)  would  allow  the  Germans,  even 
if  they  paid  high  wages  to  their  own  workmen, 
to  reduce  the  cost  price  so  considerably  in  all 
fields  of  production  that  the  world  would  be 
forced  to  accept  the  products  of  Germany  be- 
cause of  their  cheapness.  Our  own  good  sense 
should  convince  us  that  any  economic  renas- 
cence of  the  European  countries  now  allied 
would  be  impossible  in  face  of  the  overwhelm- 
ing methods  of  economic  Pangermany.  The 
economic  ruin  of  the  present  Allies,  following 
so  onerous  and  exhausting  a  war  as  this  one, 
would  from  the  nature  of  things  force  them 
into  political  subjection  to  Berlin.  Besides, 
not  a  single  country  in  all  the  world  could 
hold  out  against  the  pressure  of  economic 
Pangermany  on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the 
other  of  the  financial  crises  which  would  follow 
the  irremediable  ruin  of  the  Allies.     The  fact 


54    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

that  economic  Pangermany  is  now  being  or- 
ganized is  an  ominous  event  on  which  the 
attention  of  all  free  peoples  throughout  the 
world  should  be  concentrated,  for  it  puts  into 
the  hands  of  Germany  all  the  elements  of  an 
economic  power  which  has  no  precedent  in 
history. 

III. 

From  this  time  forward  Germany  relies, 
above  all  else,  on  her  military  resources  in 
order  to  establish  indestructibly  in  the  future 
the  economic  Pangermany  which  will  be  for 
her,  in  time  of  peace,  an  instrument  for  the 
permanent  acquisition  of  wealth,  and  through 
this  of  world-wide  domination.  Military  Pan- 
germany is,  therefore,  at  once  the  complement 
and  the  guarantee  of  economic  Pangermany. 
The  seizure  by  Berlin,  under  cover  of  the  war, 
of  new  sources  of  man-power  (Austro-Hun- 
garian,  Bulgarian,  and  Turkish  contingents), 
and  of  bases  or  regions  of  exceptional  strategic 
importance,  either  in  the  invaded  districts  or 
in  the  countries  of  her  allies,  has  given  Ger- 
many the  foundations  of  military  Panger- 
many. In  1914  the  rigor  of  Prussian  miU- 
tarism  was  only  felt  by  the  68  million  inhabi- 
tants of  the  German  Empire;  at  the  beginning 


PANGERMANY  IS  MADE  55 

of  1917  it  was  exercised,  whether  they  wanted 
it  or  not,  over  about  176  milHon  belonging  to 
Pangermany  (see  maps  pp.  12,  43).  This  re- 
sult, the  evident  consequence  of  an  immense 
extension  of  exclusive  influence  throughout 
Central  and  Oriental  Europe,  has  allowed  the 
General  Staff  of  Berlin  to  organize  as  it  chose 
strategic  bases  and  regions  where,  before  the 
war,  it  could  exercise  no  direct  action.  For 
instance,  Zeebrugge,  on  the  North  Sea,  Trieste, 
Pola,  and  Cattaro  on  the  Adriatic,  the  Bul- 
garian coast  of  the  ^gean,  the  Ottoman 
straits,  and  the  Turkish,  Bulgarian,  and  Rou- 
manian shores  of  the  Black  Sea  have  always 
been  bases  or  regions  of  exceptional  strategic 
value.  This  value  is  infinitely  enhanced  by 
the  fact  that  these  are  now  comprised  in  the 
military  system  which  is  subject  only  to  the 
directing  and  organizing  force  of  the  General 
Staff  at  Berlin. 

At  the  present  time  the  Pangerman  frontier 
is  on  these  essential  strategic  bases,  which 
are  connected,  one  with  another,  to  form  a 
series  of  continuous  fronts,  fortified  more 
strongly  than  has  ever  been  known  before  by 
an  intensive  system  of  barbed-wire  entangle- 
ments, deep-dug  underground  shelters,  machine- 
guns,  and  heavy  artillery. 


56    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

The  internal  military  organization  of  Pan- 
germany  is  being  swiftly  and  steadily  pursued. 
Munition  factories  are  judiciously  distributed 
throughout  the  country,  in  order  to  utihze 
raw  materials  near  where  they  are  produced, 
and  also  to  minimize  the  cost  of  transporta- 
tion, and  render  it  easy  to  send  abundant  am- 
munition quickly  to  any  front  which  may  be 
menaced.  Thus,  at  the  beginning  of  the  war, 
Krupp  estabhshed  a  number  of  very  impor- 
tant branch  munition  factories,  not  only  in 
Bavaria  but  also  in  Bulgaria  and  Turkey. 

The  system  of  strategic  railways  and  auto- 
mobile roads  in  Pangermany  is  being  every- 
where developed  with  great  speed,  especially 
in  the  Balkans  and  in  Turkey,  where  it  was 
relatively  rudimentary.  Behind  every  mili- 
tary front  railways  parallel  to  that  front  have 
been  multiplied,  to  the  end  that  reinforce- 
ments may  be  sent  with  the  greatest  possible 
haste  to  any  sector  threatened.  All  this  has 
already  made  Pangermany  into  a  gigantic  and 
exceedingly  strong  fortress. 

A  new  phase  is  also  in  course  of  preparation. 
The  Kaiser's  General  Staff,  no  longer  content 
with  holding  high  command  over  the  various 
armies  of  Pangermany,  also  desires,  as  far  as 
is  possible,  to  standardize  their  weapons,  their 


PANGERMANY  IS  MADE  57 

munitions,  and  their  methods  of  instruction. 
Frederick  Naumann,  a  deputy  who  is  one  of 
the  protagonists  of  ''  Mitteleuropa,''  is  obvi- 
ously preparing  the  way  toward  this  end, 
which,  for  geographical  reasons,  must  first 
touch  Austria-Hungary.  In  the  Vossische 
Zeitung  Naumann  has  advocated  a  "full  and 
complete  community  between  the  Central 
Empires  in  matters  concerning  military  or- 
ganization." He  adds  firmly — and  it  is  an 
avowal  worth  remembering — ''Mitteleuropa  clearly 
exists  to-day ;  she  only  lacks  the  organs  of 
movement  and  action.  These  organs  can  be 
given  her  by  our  two  Emperors,  since  they 
dispose  of  the  elements  which  are  fundamental 
for  the  creation  of  a  common  army."*  It  is 
evident  that  if  this  hypothesis  of  the  standardi- 
zation of  the  armies  of  the  two  Central  Empires 
is  some  day  realized,  neither  Turkey  nor  Bul- 
garia, whose  whole  military  resources  seem 
likely  to  be  used  to  their  fullest  extent  by  the 
German  General  Staff,  could  prevent  the  ab- 
sorption of  their  military  organization  into  the 
bosom  of  Pangermany. 

It  is  easy  to  calculate  the  strength  which  the 
latter  would  be  able  to  control.  Even  if  Ger- 
many should   evacuate   Russia,   Poland,  Bel- 

*  Le  Temps  of  June  28th,  1917. 


58    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

gium,  and  France  she  would  still  include  about 
150  millions  of  inhabitants.  As  she  has  mo- 
bilized about  20%  of  her  own  population  and 
of  those  of  her  allies  who  have  become  her 
vassals,  it  is  easy  to  see  that  central  Panger- 
many  can  count  upon  approximately  30  mil- 
lions of  soldiers. 

Prussian  militarism,  whose  annihilation  by 
the  Allies  is  the  true,  the  legitimate,  and  essential 
aim  of  the  war,  has  therefore  become,  by  the  carry- 
ing out  of  the  Hamburg -Persian  Gulf  "plan,  more 
wide-spread  and  more  active  than  it  was  in  1914. 
The  events  which  have  already  occurred,  and 
those  which  are  foreshadowed,  show,  in  addi- 
tion, that  Berlin,  while  pursuing  with  system- 
atic ardor  a  peace  campaign  intended  to  dupe 
and  to  separate  the  Allies,  is  taking  every 
measure  possible  to  make  Pangermany  into  a 
fortress  of  a  strength  hitherto  unknown. 


CHAPTER  V. 

PACIFIST  MANCEUVRES  TO  KEEP  THE  HAMBURG- 
PERSIAN  GULF  SCHEME  FOR  GERMANY  AS  A 
MINIMUM  RESULT  OF  THE  WAR. 

I.     Strategic  and  economic  conceptions  of  the  German 
General  Staff  upon  which  all  pacifist  manoeuvres 
are  based. 
II.     Separate  peace  to  be  made  by  Berlin  with  one  of 

the  Entente.     The  trick  of  Alsace-Lorraine. 
ni.     Separate  peace  to  be  made  with  the  Entente  by 

Turkey,  Bulgaria,  or  Austria-Hungary. 
IV.     The  democratization  of  Germany. 
V.     Peace  by  the  "Internationale"  or  Socialist  party. 
VI.     The  trick  of  an  armistice. 

VII.     The  Drawn  Game,  or  "Peace  without  annexations 
or  indemnities." 
VIII.     What  is  Germany's  word  worth? 

The  mathematical  and  geographical  evi- 
dence given  in  the  preceding  chapter,  which 
establishes  the  fact  that  Pangermany  is  al- 
ready nine-tenths  made  (see  map  p.  43)  en- 
ables us  to  see  clearly  why  Germany  has  been 
anxious,  since  the  end  of  1915,  to  conclude 
peace.  Berlin  wants  it  simply  because,  as 
the  Frankfurter  Zeitung  said  with  the  utmost 
frankness  at  that  time,  the  objects  of  the  war 
had  been  attained.     In  December,  1916,  one 

59 


60    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

of  her  allies,  Count  Karolyi,  speaking  in  the 
Hungarian  Chamber  of  Deputies,  declared 
that  "Germany  is  fighting  for  Berlin-Bag- 
dad."* Now  the  Berlin-Bagdad  plan  has 
been  substantially  realized  since  the  end  of 
1915,  and  the  prolongation  of  the  war  (by 
giving  all  the  nations  of  the  world  who  were 
threatened  by  it  time  to  understand  the  huge 
danger  of  the  Hamburg-Persian  GuK,  a  for- 
mula more  exact  than  Berlin-Bagdad  to  explain 
the  framework  of  the  whole  Pangerman  plan) 
could  only  compromise  and  finally  do  away 
with  the  enormous  results  already  achieved 
by  Germany.  The  Berlin  Government  therefore 
wants  "peace — hut  it  wants  a  Pangerman  peace, 
which  will  leave  Germany  the  greatest  advantage 
possible,  whether  through  the  seizures  which  she 
has  made  at  the  expense  of  her  own  allies,  or 
through  those  which  she  has  realized  at  the  expense 
of  the  Entente,  As  Major  Moraht  said  bluntly 
in  the  Berliner  Tageblatt:  ''Our  military  lead- 
ers are  not  in  the  habit  of  giving  up  what  it 
has  cost  us  blood  and  sacrifice  to  gain."f 

But,  as  a  coalition  of  three-fourths  of  the 
world  was  being  organized,  it  was  thought  at 
Berhn  that  it  would  be  skilful  to  appear  to 

*  Le  Journal  de  Geneve,  December  30th,  1916. 
t  Le  Matin,  December  27th,  1915. 


PACIFIST  MANCEUVRES  61 

yield  just  enough  to  break  up  this  world-wide 
alliance.  Germany  therefore  resolved  to  give 
up — if  it  was  absolutely  necessary,  and  moreover 
only  for  the  moment — a  fraction  of  the  terri- 
tories which  she  had  invaded  in  the  east  and 
those  which  she  occupied  in  the  west,  in  order 
to  make  sure,  by  indirect  means  (which,  how- 
ever, should  still  have  practical  results)  of  those 
Pangerman  seizures  and  advantages  which 
were  to  her  of  vital  importance.  With  this  end 
in  view  Berlin  has  thought  out  the  most  sub- 
tle and  ingenious  manoeuvres,  and  is  carrying 
them  on  with  untiring  persistence,  thanks  to 
her  marvellous  equipment  for  propaganda. 

Her  one  and  only  aim  is  to  divide  and  dupe 
the  Allies,  that  in  the  end  she  may  at  least 
keep  Central  Pangermany — that  is  to  say  the 
Hamburg-Persian  Gulf — which  is  the  result  of 
the  hegemony  established  by  Germany  over  Aus- 
tria-Hungary, Bulgaria,  and  Turkey,  because  of 
the  destruction  of  Serbia,  For  reasons  which 
will  be  given  in  Chapter  VI,  Central  Panger- 
many would  provide  Germany  with  all  the 
means  to  carry  out  in  full,  and  within  a  short 
time,  her  programme  of  universal  domination. 


62    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

I. 

In  order  to  grasp  clearly  the  true  meaning 
of  the  German  pacifist  manoeuvres  (which  are 
all  only  intended  to  secure  possession  of  a 
maximum  amount  of  invaded  territory  and  hold 
seizures  already  made),  we  must  have  a  clear 
idea  of  the  strategic  and  economic  plans  of 
the  General  Staff  at  Berlin,  upon  which  these 
manoeuvres  are  based. 

The  Germans  are  intrenching  themselves 
more  and  more  strongly  on  all  the  fronts  of 
Pangermany,  which  they  have  made  into  a  gi- 
gantic fortress  (see  map  on  p.  63),  by  accumu- 
lating everywhere  concrete  trenches,  deep-dug 
underground  shelters,  fields  of  barbed  wire, 
machine-guns  and  heavy  artillery,  and  by 
mobilizing,  as  in  Germany,  about  20%  of  the 
population  of  Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria,  and 
Turkey.  Thanks  to  this  organization,  which 
is  particularly  strong  in  the  west,  the  Germans 
hope  to  be  able  to  continue  resistance  to  the 
Allies  until  the  enemy  grows  weary  of  the 
frightful  struggle.  The  experience  of  the  war 
having  proved  how  extremely  difficult  it  is  to 
pierce  strongly  fortified  lines,  the  German  Gen- 
eral Staff  appears  to  have  taken  this  knowl- 
edge as  the  base  of  the  following  calculation: 


PACIFIST  MANCEUVRES 


63 


"We  have  achieved  nine-tenths  of  the  an- 
nexations on  which  we  counted;  only  Calais, 
Verdun,  Belfort,  Riga,  and  Salonika  are  want- 


64    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

ing.  We  will  try  to  obtain  possession  of  these 
places  if  opportunity  offers,  if  not,  in  order  to 
avoid  excessive  risks,  we  shall  remain  every- 
where in  Europe  on  a  keen  defensive,  pretend- 
ing all  the  time  that  we  wish  to  attack,  in 
order  to  mislead  our  adversaries.  If  the  Allies 
insist  on  concentrating  their  efforts  above  all 
against  our  lines  of  the  eastern  front,  as  these 
lines  are  manifold  and  constantly  strengthened 
the  enemy  losses  will  be  such  that,  even  if  they 
succeed  in  making  us  fall  back  by  successive 
stages,  their  own  forces  will  finally  be  so  ut- 
terly exhausted  that  they  will  not  be  able  to 
cross  the  Rhine.  For  that  reason,  therefore, 
they  will  be  powerless  to  dictate  peace  to  Ger- 
many, who  will  therefore  remain  mistress  of 
Central  Pangermany  under  such  conditions 
that  the  Pangerman  conquests  in  the  west 
may  be  definitely  realized  once  for  all  after  a 
short  respite." 

This  strategic  conception,  which  seems  to 
be  that  of  Hindenburg,  is  further  based  on  the 
following  economic  considerations:  The  enor- 
mous fortress  into  which  Pangermany  has  been 
made  comprises  such  a  vast  territory  that  it 
contains,  although  undeveloped,  all  the  food- 
stuffs essential  to  Germany  and  her  aUies. 
The  only  problem  consists  in  creating  an  effec- 


PACIFIST  MANOEUVRES  65 

tive  organization  quickly  enough  to  draw  out 
these  latent  resources  in  time  to  have  them 
ready  when  they  are  needed.  It  is  certain 
that  the  measures  recently  taken  by  the 
United  States  will  make  the  blockade  of  the 
Central  Powers  by  sea  very  stringent.  The 
neutral  States  can  only  supply  them  to  a  lim- 
ited extent.  Until  hostilities  are  over  Ger- 
many must  go  without  certain  products  which 
need  years  for  their  cultivation,  but  as  she 
has  laid  hands  on  more  than  half  Roumania, 
and  has  taken  possession  of  exceedingly  fertile, 
although  uncultivated,  lands  in  the  Balkans, 
and  also  in  Asia  Minor,  it  will  be  possible  for 
her  to  prevent  the  food  difficulty  from  reach- 
ing an  acute  stage. 

That  is  why,  for  the  last  two  years,  those 
great  tracts  of  country,  whether  already  under 
cultivation  or  still  virgin,  have  been  brought 
gradually  under  intensive  culture.  The  increas- 
ing production  of  cereals  in  that  rich  Oriental 
soil  will  solve  the  food  problem. 

Germany  and  her  vassals  will,  no  doubt,  be 
more  or  less  pinched  from  an  alimentary  point 
of  view,  but,  contrary  to  the  belief  held  in 
many  of  the  allied  countries,  they  cannot  be 
actually  starved.  Besides,  the  effects  of  the 
German  submarine  warfare,  combined  with  the 


66    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

anarchy  which  has  been  let  loose  in  Russia 
through  German  propaganda,  will  considerably 
diminish  the  food  supplies  of  Germany's  ad- 
versaries. Under  these  circumstances,  and 
above  all,  thanks  to  the  resources  of  Panger- 
many,  Germany  may  hold  out  at  least  as  long 
as  the  Allies. 


It  would  seem  that  those  must  be  substan- 
tially the  strategic  and  economic  conceptions 
upon  which  the  German  Staff  grounds  its 
faith  that  the  war  can  be  carried  on  as  long 
as  is  necessary.  But  as  prolongation  of  the 
struggle  carries  with  it  the  chances  of  various 
serious  contingencies,  Berlin  would  like  to 
make  an  end  of  it  under  conditions  allowing 
her  to  reserve  a  maximum  amount  of  her 
seizures.  That  is  the  object  of  the  German 
pacifist  manoeuvres,  some  of  the  chief  of 
which  are  exposed  above. 

II. 

It  is  clear  that  the  defection  of  one  of  the 
principal  Allies  would  necessarily  place  the 
others  in  vastly  more  difficult  positions  for 
continuing  the  struggle.  Assuming  that  such 
a  thing  were  to  happen,  the  Germans  could. 


PACIFIST  MANCEUVRES  67 

indeed,  hope  to  discuss  peace  on  the  base  of 
the  territories  which  they  actually  occupy. 
It  is  for  that  reason  that  they  have  made  re- 
peated proposals  for  a  separate  peace  to  the 
Russians,  as  Berlin  especially  dreads  their 
continuance  in  the  war,  on  account  of  the  in- 
exhaustible reserves  of  man-power  still  con- 
.tained  in  the  old  Empire  of  the  Czars.  The 
moment  will  probably  come  when  the  Ger- 
mans will  also  attempt  to  draw  Italy  out  of 
the  coalition  by  offering  her  Trent  and  per- 
haps even  Trieste,  at  the  expense  of  Austria; 
the  latter  concession,  however,  in  the  mind  of 
Berlin,  would  be  only  for  a  very  brief  period. 

The  Germans  desire  so  strongly  to  break  up 
the  coaKtion  at  any  price  that  we  must  be 
prepared  to  see  them  go  so  far,  when  the  time 
comes,  as  to  offer  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France. 

We  may  judge  how  sincere  such  a  proposi- 
tion would  be  by  the  words  written  by  Maxi- 
milian Harden  early  in  1915:  ''If  France  be- 
lieves that  peace  is  only  possible  through  the 
restitution  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  and  if  necessity 
obliges  us  to  sign  such  an  agreement^  the  seventy 
millions  of  our  German  people  would  soon  tear 
it  up."  "^  Nothing  indeed  would  be  easier 
than  for  Germany,  helped  by  the  man-power 

*  Le  Temps,  February  9th,  1916. 


68    UNITED  STATES  AND   PANGERMANIA 

of  Central  Pangermany,  speedily  to  retake 
Alsace-Lorraine,  even  if  she  ceded  it  for  a 
short  time  as  a  tactical  measure. 

The  allied  State  which,  contrary  to  its 
solemn  agreement,  should  separately  treat  with 
Berlin  would  be  punished  for  its  infamy  with- 
out delay.  By  allowing  Germany  to  conclude 
peace  more  or  less  on  the  basis  of  the  terri- 
tories she  holds  at  present,  it  would  find  itself 
at  once  confronted  by  a  formidable  Germanic 
Empire,  and  would  inevitably  soon  become  one 
of  its  future  victims. 

III. 

One  of  the  most  astute  manoeuvres  of  Ber- 
lin consists  in  secretly  favoring — not  perhaps 
a  treaty  of  peace  formally  signed — but  official 
negotiations  for  a  separate  peace  between  one 
of  her  allies.  Turkeys  Bulgaria,  or  Austria- 
Hungary — and  the  Entente. 

The  advantage  to  be  gained  from  this  arti- 
fice will  be  readily  seen  from  its  bearing  on 
the  definite  consohdation  of  the  Hamburg- 
Persian  Gulf,  if  one  imagines  the  Allies  con- 
cluding a  "peace  by  negotiation,  from  weariness, 
with  Turkey,  for  instance.  On  this  hypothesis, 
the  Alhes  could  only  treat  with  Germany's 
liegemen  at  Constantinople,  for  all  the  other 


PACIFIST  jMAN(EU\TIES  69 

elements  having  any  value  whatever  in  Turk- 
ish polities  are  already  suppressed.  Now,  if  the 
Allies  were  to  deal  with  the  Ottoman  Govern- 
ment, dripping  with  the  blood  of  a  million  Ar- 
menians, Greeks,  and  Arabs  massacred  whole- 
sale because  they  were  anti-Germanic  and 
friends  of  the  Entente,  the  result  of  the  negotia- 
tion would  be  as  follows :  The  Entente,  by  con- 
doning the  unheard-of  crimes  committed  in  Tur- 
key would  abandon  her  moral  standards;  she 
could  never  again  pretend  that  she  was  fighting 
in  the  cause  of  civilization.  The  Turkish  Gov- 
ernment, which  is  notoriously  made  up  of 
assassins,  would  be  oflScially  recognized,  and 
the  group  of  men  who  sold  the  Ottoman  Em- 
pire to  Germany  would  be  confirmed  in  power. 
Their  leader,  Talaat  Pacha,  declared  in  the 
Ottoman  Chamber  in  February,  1917:  "We 
are  bound  to  the  Central  Powers  for  hfe  or 
death."  *  The  seizure  of  the  Ottoman  straits 
by  Germany,  a  strategic  position  of  immense 
and  universal  value,  to  be  held  by  her  accom- 
plices, would  be  confirmed;  the  many  agree- 
ments signed  in  BerHn  in  January,  1917,  estab- 
hshing  a  stringent  German  protectorate  over 
all  Turkey,  would  be  in  full  force  during  a 
Pangerman  peace. 

*  Le  Matin,  February  17th,  1917. 


70    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

Bulgarian  intrigues  for  a  pretended  sepa- 
rate peace  with  the  Alhes  have  been  at  least 
as  numerous  as  Turkish  manoeuvres  of  the 
same  description.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
Bulgarian  agents  who  were  sent  to  Switzer- 
land, apparently  for  the  purpose  of  opening 
tempting  negotiations  with  the  official  rep- 
resentatives of  the  Entente,  were  working  in 
concert  with  Berhn,  and  their  real  object  was 
to  sound  the  Allies  in  order  to  find  out  to  what 
extent  they  were  weary  of  the  war.  The  Bul- 
garians have  never  been  really  disposed  to 
make  a  treaty  of  peace  with  the  Allies  on  any 
equitable  terms;  they  want  a  peace  which 
will  insure  them  enormous  advantages  at  the 
expense  of  the  Greeks,  the  Roumanians,  and 
above  all  the  Serbians,  for  Sofia's  chief  desire 
is  to  be  in  direct  geographic  contact  with 
Austria-Hungary.  Therefore  the  Allies  cannot 
have  dealings  with  Bulgaria  without  commit- 
ting themselves  to  the  infamy  of  sacrificing 
their  smaller  Balkan  allies  and  accepting  terri- 
torial conditions  which  would  allow  Bulgaria 
to  form  a  Pangerman  bridge  between  Hungary 
and  Turkey,  over  the  corpse  of  Serbia.  This 
bridge  is  indispensable  to  the  working  of  the 
Hamburg-Persian  Gulf  plan,  and  therefore  to 
Central  Pangermany,  and  is  precisely  the  result 


PACIFIST  MANCEUVRES  71 

of  the  war  which  Bulgaria  wants  most  of  all. 
The  King  of  Bulgaria  declared  in  the  Neues 
Tagehlatt  of  Stuttgart,  in  August,  1917:  "The 
economic  future  of  Bulgaria  depends  on  her 
close  connection  with  Germany  and  Austria."  * 
Further,  Doctor  Friedrich  Naumann,  one  of 
the  most  ardent  advocates  of  the  Hamburg- 
Persian  Gulf,  said  in  a  pamphlet  which  he  pub- 
lished at  Berlin  in  1916,  under  the  title  of  BuU 
garia  and  Mitteleuropa,  that  he  had  found  from 
investigations  made  in  Bulgaria  that  the  pros- 
pect of  a  close  union  with  the  Germanic  Empires 
was  hailed  with  real  enthusiasm. 

A  peace  made  by  negotiation  between  the 
Allies  and  Bulgaria,  which  would  in  reality  be 
a  peace  made  because  of  weariness,  would  only 
lend  further  sanction  to  these  conditions. 

It  is  also  true  that  a  peace  by  negotiation 
between  the  Allies  and  Austria-Hungary  could 
only  definitely  consolidate  the  Hamburg-Per- 
sian Gulf.  Both  from  a  military  and  from 
a  financial  standpoint  the  monarchy  of  the 
Hapsburgs  is,  as  a  State,  absolutely  dependent 
on  Germany.  The  Hapsburg  Emperor,  no 
matter  what  his  own  feelings  may  be,  can  do 
nothing  without  Hohenzollern  consent.  Any 
peace  signed  by  Vienna  would  have  its  condi- 

*  Le  Matin,  August  14th,  1917. 


72    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

tions  practically  arranged  by  Berlin.  It  is 
well  to  have  no  illusions.  Only  a  complete  vic- 
tory by  the  Allies  will  force  Germany  to  give  up 
her  seizure  of  Austria-Hungary,  for  that  seizure 
is  to  her  the  indispensable  result  of  the  war. 

It  is  that  seizure  which,  because  of  its  geo- 
graphic, military,  and  economic  value  insures 
to  Berlin  domination  over  the  Balkans  and  the 
Orient,  and  therefore  over  Central  Panger- 
many  and  the  Hamburg-Persian  Gulf  strip, 
with  all  the  momentous  consequences  which 
their  possession  entails. 

Let  us  be  firmly  assured  that  all  attempts  at 
a  separate  peace  on  the  part  of  Turkey,  Bul- 
garia, or  Austria-Hungary  which  have  taken 
place  already  or  which  may  take  place  in  the 
future  are  only,  and  can  only  be,  manoeuvres 
having  in  view  a  peace  said  to  be  by  negotiation, 
which  would  be  merely  a  cloak  for  a  peace  not 
only  German  but  Pangerman. 

Furthermore,  the  Allies  should  clearly  un- 
derstand that  if  they  really  wish  to  destroy 
Prussian  militarism,  so  that  it  cannot  again 
exist,  they  must  at  the  same  time  put  an  end 
to  the  neo-imperialism  of  the  Turks  and  Pan- 
islamists,  Balkan  imperialism  in  Bulgaria,  Aus- 
trian imperialism  at  Salonika,  and  the  feudal 
imperialism  of  the  Magyars — that  is  to  say,  four 


PACIFIST  MANCEUVRES  73 

secondary  imperialisms,  dangerous  in  a  high 
degree,  as  they  are  the  complements  of  German 
imperialism,  and  would,  if  allowed  to  exist,  per- 
mit a  revival  of  Prussian  militarism. 

Now,  these  four  secondary  imperialisms  can- 
not possibly  be  destroyed  by  a  peace  by  nego- 
tiation, which  would  only  be  the  outcome  of  war- 
weariness  ;  they  must  perish  through  a  military 
victory  on  the  part  of  the  Allies — that  is  to  say, 
by  intelligent  strength  serving  the  cause  of  justice, 

IV. 

As  some  of  the  allied  groups  appeared  to 
believe  that  the  *' democratization"  of  Ger- 
many would  suffice  to  end  Prussianism  and  Ger- 
man imperialism  automatically,  Berlin  came 
to  the  conclusion  that  at  least  a  certain  part 
of  them,  tired  of  fighting,  would  content  them- 
selves with  merely  nominal  amends,  in  order 
to  end  the  war.  That  is  the  reason  why  Ber- 
lin, in  order  to  throw  dust  in  the  eyes  of  the 
Allies,  and  make  them  willing  to  enter  into 
negotiations,  lent  herself  increasingly,  during 
the  first  six  months  of  1917,  to  the  comedy 
of  "the  democratization  of  Germany."  Dur- 
ing this  period  the  most  avowed  Pangermans 
bridled  their  utterances.     They  spoke  no  more 


74    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

of  annexations  nor  of  war  indemnities.  They 
only  talked  of  *' special  political  organizations," 
which  in  their  own  minds  meant  the  same  re- 
sult, but  which  had  the  advantage  of  not 
hindering  the  action  of  those  pacifists  in  the 
allied  countries  who  wanted  peace  at  any  price. 
The  manoeuvre  of  the  "democratization  of 
Germany"  was  supplemented  by  that  of  the 
Stockholm  congress,  which,  as  we  know,  was 
above  all  meant  to  convince  Russian  Socialists 
that  Russia  had  nothing  to  gain  by  going  on 
with  the  war,  since  Germany  in  her  turn  was 
firmly  resolved  to  tread  the  path  of  democ- 
racy, etc. 

We  must  acknowledge  that  many  of  the 
Allies  were,  for  a  time,  taken  in  by  this 
game,  and  honestly  believed  that  Germany 
meant  seriously  to  undertake  internal  reforms. 
But  when  these  tactics  had  had  the  tremen- 
dous result  of  letting  anarchy  loose  in  Russia 
(a  state  of  things  which  was  at  once  taken 
advantage  of  by  the  General  Staff  of  Berlin), 
the  comedy  of  ''the  democratization  of  Ger- 
many" was  withdrawn.  The  Chancellor,  Beth- 
mann-Hollweg,  was  sacrificed  because  it  was 
necessary  to  stop  a  movement  which  he  had 
been  directing,  and  was  replaced  by  Michaelis, 
Hindenburg's  man,  who  therefore  stood  for  the 


PACIFIST  MANCEUVRES  75 

Prussian  military  party  and  ultra-Pangerman- 
ism. 

As  this  manoeuvre  of  the  "democratization 
of  Germany"  is  sure  to  be  tried  many  times, 
it  is  in  the  highest  degree  important  that  the 
AlHes  should  not  again  be  duped  by  it.  They 
can  never  suflSciently  safeguard  themselves 
against  bad  faith  on  Germany's  part.  Should 
a  German  republic  be  established,  the  result 
would,  no  doubt,  be  serious,  but  even  then  the 
most  positive  and  most  effective  measures  should 
be  taken  by  the  Allies  themselves,  if  they  really 
wish  to  put  an  end  to  huge  armaments  and  prevent 
any  recrudescence  of  German  militarism. 

Good  sense  would  seem  to  indicate  the  de- 
struction of  all  German  munition  factories  as 
among  the  most  important  of  these  measures 
on  the  part  of  the  Allies;  destruction  which 
would  only  be  complete  if  the  Allies  did  it 
themselves  or  had  it  done  under  their  direct 
supervision.  Without  that  indispensable  pre- 
caution— to  say  nothing  of  many  others — the 
sacrifices  of  the  Allies  during  the  war  would 
have  been  made  in  vain. 

Indeed,  the  Germans  have  always  had  such 
an  inveterate  taste  for  rapine  that  they  are 
perfectly  capable  of  forming  a  great  military 
republic    and    submitting    themselves    volun- 


76    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

tarily  to  Prussian  discipline  in  order  to  be  able 
to  start  new  and  great  wars  for  the  sake  of 
plunder. 

This  truth  should  be  ever  in  our  minds.  If, 
in  Mirabeau's  words,  the  HohenzoUerns  have 
been  able  to  make  war  'Hhe  national  in- 
dustry" of  the  Germans,  it  is  because,  since 
the  beginning  of  history,  the  Germans  have 
always  subordinated  everything  else  to  their 
passion  for  lucrative  fighting.  And  such  is  still 
the  case.  For  the  last  twenty  years  especially 
the  Berlin  Government  has  instilled  into  the 
people  that  the  creation  of  Pangermany  would 
insure  them  great  material  advantages.  It  is 
because  that  conviction  is  firmly  rooted  in  their 
minds  that  almost  all  the  Socialist  workmen 
serve  the  Kaiser  without  flinching,  and  are 
content  to  suffer  all  the  horrors  of  the  present 
war  so  long  as  they  are  not  defeated  by  force 
of  arms. 

"During  the  war,"  said  M.  E.  Laskine,* 
"the  organs  of  the  workmen's  syndicates  have 
given  the  most  constant  and  solid  support  to 
the  policy  of  aggression  and  conquest.  The 
Internationale  Korrespondenz,  published  in  the 
name  of  the  General  Commission  of  Syndi- 
cates by  Legien  and  Bauermeister,  aflBrms  that 

*  Le  Matin,  August  27th,  1917. 


PACIFIST  MANCEUVRES  77 

Germany  has  a  right  to  'soHd  guarantees,' 
whether  furnished  by  annexations  or  by  'eco- 
nomic ties.'  Emil  Kloth,  president  of  the 
syndicate  of  bookbinders,  was  applauded  by 
the  Kreuzzeitung,  the  organ  of  the  Junker 
squires,  for  declaring  himself  as  opposed  to 
the  independence  of  Belgium.  On  the  24th 
of  October,  1914,  we  might  have  read  in  the 
Kurier,  which  is  the  mouthpiece  of  the  power- 
ful syndicate  of  transportation  workers,  this 
statement:  'The  German  flag  now  floats  over 
the  towers  of  Antwerp — let  us  hope  forever ^ 

Thus  even  the  German  Social  Democrats  use 
glibly  expressions  such  as  "solid  guarantees" 
and  "economic  ties,"  which,  in  their  practical 
application,  insure  the  consolidation  of  Cen- 
tral Pangermany.  It  is  impossible  to  doubt 
that  the  Pangerman  spirit  has  penetrated  into 
the  very  soul  of  the  German  working  classes. 
As  this  state  of  feeling  has  been  in  accord  with 
German  psychology  for  hundreds  of  years,  we 
should  be  singularly  credulous  to  imagine  that 
a  few  measures  of  "democratization,"  more 
formal  than  actual,  could  change  the  mental 
attitude  of  the  German  people.  To  obtain  this 
result  other  and  more  appropriate  measures 
must  be  taken. 


78    UNITED  STATES  AXD   P.VNGER^LWIA 

V. 

Peace  thrrmgh  the  Internationale  Ls  yet  an- 
other device  invented  at  Berlin.  In  fact,  a.** 
the  Interjifit.ionale  has  always  followed  the 
gijirlanee  of  the  German  Marxists,  it  has  been 
the  chief  means  employed  during  the  la.st 
thirty  years  to  deceive  the  Srx:ialists  of  the 
countrifrs  now  allierl,  by  making  them  believe 
that,  thanka  precisely  to  the  Internatirmale, 
war  coiild  never  come  again.  In  a  refK^rt  ufK^n 
**The  International  Relations  of  German  Work- 
men's Unions,"  publisherl  in  Berlin  by  Hey- 
mann  in  1914,  the  Imperial  Bureau  of  Statistics 
could  announce,  on  p.  10,  as  an  incontestable 
tnith,  that  '*In  almost  all  international  organ- 
izations German  influence  is  predominant."* 

The  profKised  congress  at  Stof:kholm,  which 
was  suggested  by  German  agents,  and  that  at 
Berne,  for  which  they  are  working  now,  are 
measures  .sf:t  on  frx^t  by  German  syndicalism 
in  order  to  regain  in  all  countries  the  German 
influence  which  has  F>een  lr>st  by  the  war.  It 
is  a  question  of  subjecting  the  proletariat  of 
the  worlrl  to  German  guirlance.  The  end  offi- 
cially avowf!fl  is  to  restore  the  Internatumale  in 
the  interests  of  demrK:racy,  but  as  a  matter  of 

•  M.  E.  Lutkinr;  U  Matin,  Ainpwt  27th,  I{>17. 


PACIFIST  MANCEUVTIES  79 

fact  it  is  above  all  to  bring  class  antagonism 
again  to  the  fore  in  all  the  allied  countries,  in 
order  to  destroy  the  sacred  union  which  alone 
will  allow  parties  of  widely  differing  opinions 
to  carry  on  the  war  against  Pangerman  Ger- 
many with  vigor.  The  government  of  Berlin 
is  well  aware  that  it  has  nothing  to  fear  from 
its  Socialists,  of  whom  the  great  majority,  even 
when  they  refuse  to  call  themselves  Panger- 
mans,  are  in  favor  of  Central  Pangermany. 
Any  profit  from  this  manoeuvre,  based  on  the 
Internationale,  would  accrue  to  Germany,  who 
would  keep  her  powers  of  moral  resistance  in- 
tact, while  the  aUied  States,  again  the  prey  of 
the  most  intense  social  disruptions,  would  find 
their  powers  of  offensive  so  diminished  that 
peace  would  finally  be  made  on  the  basis  of 
the  actual  German  occupations  of  territory. 

VI. 

All  the  foregoing  manoeuvres,  whether  em- 
ployed separately  or  in  combination,  are  in- 
tended to  play  the  ** armistice  trick"  on  the 
Allies.  This  is  the  result  of  crafty  calculation, 
founded  on  the  fatigue  of  the  combatants, 
which  is  easily  to  be  explained  by  such  an  ex- 
hausting war.     BerUn  follows  this  reasoning, 


80    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

which  has  a  certain  psychological  merit:  "If 
an  armistice  were  signed,  the  allied  soldiers 
would  think:  'They  are  talking,  therefore  it 
means  peace,  and  demobilization  will  soon  fol- 
low.' Under  these  conditions  the  effect  will 
be  the  moral  slackening  of  our  adversaries." 
The  Germans  could  not  ask  for  anything  better. 
They  would  open  peace  negotiations  with  the 
following  astute  idea:  Assuming  that  the  Allies 
committed  the  enormous  mistake  of  discussing 
peace  on  such  treacherous  terms,  Germany, 
still  intrenched  behind  her  fronts,  which  would 
have  been  rendered  almost  impregnable,  would 
end  by  saying  to  the  Allies:  "I  don't  agree 
with  you.  After  all  you  cannot  exact  of  me 
that  I  should  evacuate  territories  from  which 
you  are  powerless  to  drive  me.  If  you  are  not 
satisfied,  continue  the  war."  As,  while  nego- 
tiations were  pending,  all  needful  steps  would 
have  been  taken  by  German  agents  to  aggra- 
vate the  moral  slackening  of  the  soldiers  of  the 
allied  country  which  had  felt  the  strain  of  the 
war  most  (as  they  succeeded  in  doing  in  Rus- 
sia, during  the  first  days  of  the  revolution), 
the  huge  military  machine  of  the  Allies  could 
not  again  be  put  in  motion  as  a  whole.  The 
real  result  would  be,  in  fact,  the  rupture  of 
the  anti-Germanic   coalition,   and   finally  the 


PACIFIST  MANCEUVRES  81 

conclusion  of  a  peace  based  nearly  on  actual 
occupation.  Berlin  would  thus  have  gained 
her  end. 

VII. 

The  last  German  manoeuvre,  and  the  most 
dangerous  of  all,  is  one  which  I  foresaw  in  the 
beginning  of  1916  as  likely  to  be  attempted  as 
soon  as  Germany  found  it  necessary  to  make 
peace  quickly,  in  order,  above  all,  to  save  the 
Hamburg-Persian  Gulf.  I  said  then:  ''Peti- 
tions against  territorial  annexations  will  be 
multiplied  on  the  other  side  of  the  Rhine.  In 
an  underhand  way  they  will  be  favored  by  the 
government  of  Berlin,  which  will  end  by  saying 
to  the  Allies:  'Let  us  stop  killing  each  other. 
I  am  perfectly  reasonable.  I  give  up  my 
claims  on  such  of  your  territories  as  are  occu- 
pied by  my  armies.  Let  us  negotiate  peace 
on  the  basis  of  the  "drawn  game.'"" 

This  was  exactly  what  happened  when 
about  April,  1917,  the  snare  of  the  "drawn 
game"  was  hidden  under  the  formula  of 
"peace  without  annexations  or  indemnities," 
which  the  government  of  Berlin  suggested  to 
the  Russian  Socialists  through  the  innumerable 
agents  which  she  maintains  in  the  former  Em- 
pire of  the  Czars.     This  formula  has  since  then 


82    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

been  the  basis  of  so  much  discussion  that  it  is 
of  the  highest  importance  to  show  in  a  sep- 
arate chapter  what  in  reahty  lurks  behind 
those  words,  "peace  without  annexations  or 
indemnities."  It  is  certain  that  if  the  trick 
of  "the  apparently  drawn  game"  should  suc- 
ceed it  would,  in  reality,  conceal  a  formida- 
ble success  for  Germany  and  an  irremediable 
catastrophe  for  the  Allies  and  for  the  freedom 
of  the  world. 

VIII. 

Repeated  lessons  from  German  history,  and 
those  which  have  been  learned  in  the  present 
war,  make  it  imperative  that  the  Allies  should 
not  put  the  slightest  confidence  in  the  Ger- 
mans. The  treaties  which  they  sign  in  the 
most  solemn  manner  are  only  "scraps  of 
paper,"  the  obligations  of  which  they  only  re- 
spect in  the  measure  of  their  own  interest. 
This  is  overwhelmingly  proved  by  Berlin's 
cynical  violation  of  the  treaty  guaranteeing 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  which  was  signed  in 
London  by  Prussia  on  June  26th,  1831.  It  is  a 
fact  that  the  Germans,  almost  to  a  man,  only 
respect  might;  and  this  they  proclaim  them- 
selves. Referring  to  the  submarine  warfare 
on  the  coast  of  Norway,  the  Frankfurter  Zeitung 


PACIFIST  MANCEUVRES  83 

did  not  hesitate  to  say:  "Justice  no  longer  ex- 
ists. Only  strength  counts,  and  we  have  still 
strength  to  spare.     Norway  has  felt  it."  * 

The  Kaiser  himself,  in  the  course  of  a  con- 
versation about  submarine  warfare  with  Mr. 
Gerard,  the  American  ambassador  at  Berlin, 
said  to  him:  "There  are  no  more  interna- 
tional laws."  t  A  Grand  Duke  of  Mecklenburg- 
Schwerin  announced  to  Mr.  Gerard  that:  "We 
care  nothing  for  treaties."  J  On  July  10th, 
1917,  the  Reichstag  passed  a  vote  for  a  so- 
called  amicable  peace,  without  annexations, 
which  the  Chancellor  then  seemed  to  approve. 
But  when  the  results  of  this  manoeuvre,  com- 
bined with  the  measure  called  the  "democrati- 
zation of  Germany,"  were  shown  by  the  letting 
loose  of  Russian  anarchy,  and  the  adhesion  to 
the  principles  of  the  Stockholm  congress  by 
some  groups  of  French  and  Enghsh  Sociahsts 
who  were  particularly  credulous,  and  ignorant 
of  the  formidable  realities  of  the  war  map,  the 
Chancellor,  Michaelis,  declared  on  August 
22d,  before  a  committee  of  the  Reichstag:  "I 
never  said  that  I  agreed  with  the  peace  reso- 
lution   which    was    proposed    by    the    parties 


*  Le  Temps,  November  19th,  1916. 
t  Le  Matin,  August  16th,  1917. 
i  Le  Temps,  August  10th,  1917. 


84     UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

forming  a  majority  in  the  Reichstag  and 
adopted  by  that  assembly  on  the  19th  of  last 
July.  In  any  case,  I  wish  to  state  that  I  did 
not  accept  any  terms  of  peace,  as  I  must  natu- 
rally reserve  my  freedom  of  action  for  peace  nego- 
tiations.'" *  .  As  the  cynicism  of  this  speech 
was  considered  likely  to  hinder  further  peace 
manoeuvres,  the  Chancellor  pretended  later 
that  he  had  only  made  a  slip  of  the  tongue, 
and  that  he  upheld  the  peace  formula  voted 
by  the  Reichstag  on  July  19th.  After  words 
as  plain  as  those  used  by  him  on  August  22d, 
this  excuse  of  a  lapsus  linguce  can  only  cheat 
those  who  wish  to  be  cheated. 

This  incident,  coming  after  so  many  others, 
and  after  such  a  number  of  unquestioned  facts, 
does  not  leave  the  least  room  for  hesitation. 
The  Allies  should  be  convinced  that  no  faith  can 
be  placed  in  the  German  word.  All  the  pacifist 
manoeuvres  of  Berlin  have  but  one  object — 
to  separate  and  dupe  the  Alhes  by  means  of 
negotiations  which  will  be  followed  by  a  re- 
fusal to  accept  the  terms  apparently  agreed 
upon,  and  Germany  will  hold  her  positions  on 
the  war  map,  and  at  least  Central  Pangermany. 
In  the  end  of  1916  the  Frankfurter  Zeitung 
warned  its  readers  very  plainly  of  the  exact 

*  Le  Journal,  August  24th,  1917. 


PACIFIST  MANCEUVRES  85 

spirit  in  which  all  German  pacifist  manoeuvres 
should  be  undertaken:  "This  is  the  point  of 
view  to-day:  to  formulate  our  demands  pre- 
cisely in  the  East,  and  in  the  West  to  negotiate 
on  a  basis  which  may  be  modified.  Negotia- 
tion is  not  synonymous  with  renunciation ''  "^ 

To  sum  up:  Unless  they  are  willing  to  be 
frightfully  and  unpardonably  duped,  the  Allies 
will  not  allow  themselves  to  be  taken  in  by  any 
German  manoeuvres  framed  to  induce  them  to 
negotiate  before  they  have  gained  a  military 
victory,  of  which  the  first  proof  having  any 
real  value  will  be  the  retirement  of  all  German 
officers  and  soldiers  from:  1.  All  the  invaded 
territories  of  the  Entente.  2.  All  the  terri- 
tories in  Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria,  Turkey, 
and  any  parts  of  Central  Pangermany  now  held 
under  military  occupation  by  the  Germans  as 
a  result  of  the  war. 

"^UEcho  de  Paris,  December  30th,  1916. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE  "DRAWN  GAME";  THE  INSIDIOUS  SNARE  OF 
THE  FORMULA,  "PEACE  WITHOUT  ANNEXA- 
TIONS OR  INDEMNITIES." 

I.     How  the  hypothesis  is  brought  forward. 
II.     Cost  of  the  war  much  greater  to  the  Allies  than  to 
the  Germans. 

III.  The  struggle  has  allowed  Germany  to  obtain  enor- 

mous advantages  in  the  present  and  for  the  future. 

IV.  The  war  has  brought  the  Allies  only  losses. 

V.     Consequences  of  the  Hamburg-Persian  Gulf  plan  in 

regard  to  Russia  and  Asia. 
VI.     The  blatant  falsehood  of  the  formula,  "Peace  with- 
out annexations  or  indemnities." 
VII.     The  formidable  danger  of  the  Hamburg-Persian  Gulf 
plan  to  the  Allies. 


It  IS  important  first  of  all  to  have  a  clear  idea 
how  and  under  what  circumstances  the  hy- 
pothesis of  the  ''drawn  game,"  or  "peace  with- 
out annexations  or  indemnities"  has  been  pre- 
sented. This  formula  was  proposed  to  the 
Russians  by  the  numerous  agents  whom  the 
Germans  had  been  able  to  smuggle  into  the 
Council  of  Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Delegates 
of  Petrograd  at  the  beginning  of  the  revolu- 
tion.    This  amazing  manoeuvre  met  with  suc- 

86 


THE   "DRAWN   GAME"  87 

cess  because  in  this  famous  Soviet  there  were 
rank  traitors,  unmasked  later,  hke  Lenine  and 
his  accomplices,  and  also  Socialists  who  were 
well-meaning  but  so  densely  ignorant,  not  only 
of  the  Pangerman  plan,  but  even  of  what  was 
important  and  necessary  for  Russia,  that  in  a 
few  weeks  their  ardent  but  unpractical  plans 
had  gravely  aggravated  the  Russian  situation, 
already  serious  enough  under  the  Czar,  and 
had  plunged  their  country  not  only  into  an- 
archy, but  also  into  extraordinary  difficulties, 
political,  financial,  and  economic.  Whatever 
the  reason,  on  March  28th,  1917,  the  Soviet 
proclaimed  the  formula,  "peace  without  an- 
nexations or  indemnities,"  with  which  it  had 
been  supplied  from  BerUn.  On  June  12th, 
1917,  the  imperiaUstic  German  Socialists  who 
had  been  delegated  to  Stockholm  by  the 
Kaiser's  government  also  declared  for  the 
adoption  of  a  programme  of  peace,  with  "nei- 
ther annexations  nor  indemnities."  On  July 
19th,  1917,  at  the  intervention  of  Erzberger, 
one  of  its  deputies,  the  Reichstag  voted  a  peace 
resolution  "rejecting  the  idea  of  acquiring  ter- 
ritory by  force,"  and  declared  that  "the 
Reichstag  seeks  an  amicable  peace.  .  .  .  Any 
violent  action,  political,  economic,  or  social,  is 
incompatible  with  such  a  peace." 


88     UNITED   STATES  AND   PANGERIVIANIA 

Now  this  formula,  due  to  the  intervention  of 
the  deputy  Erzberger,  rejecting  any  idea  of 
"annexations  or  indemnities,"  was  intended  to 
be  combined  with  the  intervention  of  the  Pope, 
which  had  been  already  arranged  by  this  same 
Erzberger.  Indeed,  in  the  spring  of  1917, 
therefore  several  months  before  the  vote  of 
the  Reichstag  on  July  19th,  Erzberger  founded 
''the  Catholic  International  Peace  League"  in 
Switzerland.  This  organization,  which  was 
made  up  of  Germans,  Austrians,  and  a  few 
Swiss  Catholics,  was  directed  by  Erzberger, 
and  its  object  was  to  bring  pressure  to  bear 
upon  the  Vatican.  A  deputation  from  this 
league  went  to  Rome  in  June,  1917,  to  beseech 
the  Pope  to  make  proposals  of  peace.  On  Au- 
gust 1st,  1917,  Pope  Benedict  XV  (who  had  in 
the  meantime  been  implored  to  intervene  by 
the  Emperor  and  Empress  of  Austria)  advanced 
in  his  turn  the  formula  of  ''peace  without  an- 
nexations or  indemnities";  he  was  noticeably 
careful  not  to  condemn  the  crimes  of  Ger- 
many, and  said  nothing  about  the  many  for- 
midable Oriental  problems.  The  Messagero  of 
Rome  explained  this  silence:  "Benedict  XV 
thinks  that  the  door  of  the  East  should  be  left 
open,  or  at  least  ajar,  for  Austria-Hungary,  and 
through  her  for  Germany.     Complete  restitu- 


THE  "DRAWN  GAME"  89 

tion  of  territory  to  Serbia  and  Rouraania  would 
mean  that  the  highway  of  the  Danube  has 
been  brought  back  into  ante-bellum  condi- 
tions, and  that  the  road  to  the  East  is  barred 
in  the  same  way  as  before  the  war."  *  It  is 
true  that  in  his  letter  the  Pope  only  made  a 
clear  pronouncement  as  to  the  restitutions  to 
be  made  by  Germany  in  the  west  and  the 
east;  he  said  absolutely  nothing  as  to  the  ter- 
ritories necessary  for  maintaining  Central  Pan- 
germany.  That  is  an  essential  fact  which  it  is 
necessary  to  notice  and  to  remember.  It  must 
also  be  noted  that  some  groups  of  French  and 
English  Socialists,  as  ignorant  as  their  Russian 
brethren  concerning  the  realities  of  the  war 
map  and  the  Pangerman  plan,  have  also 
adopted  the  formula  of  '*  peace  without  an- 
nexations or  indemnities,"  evidently  not  un- 
derstanding its  formidable  consequences,  po- 
litical, economic,  and  military,  which  will  be 
set  forth  later.  It  is  certain  that  the  effect  of 
an  intensive  German  propaganda  has  been  to 
have  this  formula  of  ''peace  without  annexa- 
tions or  indemnities"  (which  is  part  of  the 
vast  encircling  manoeuvre  of  Berlin)  adopted 
both  by  the  most  anarchistic  of  the  Russian 
maximalists,  and  by  the  most   ultramontane 

*  Le  Temfs,  August  18th,  1917. 


90    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

followers  of  the  Vatican.  On  the  face  of  it, 
the  German  formula,  which  is  summed  up  in 
the  words  "the  drawn  game,"  would  seem  to 
mean  that  each  country  should  keep  the  same 
frontiers  as  before  the  war;  also  that  each 
country  should  bear  the  burden  of  the  outlays 
it  had  made  during  the  struggle. 

But  in  order  to  prove  beyond  doubt  and 
most  emphatically  w^hat  is  really  concealed 
in  this  apparent  German  concession,  we  will 
argue  on  a  hypothesis  infinitely  more  favorable 
for  the  western  Allies  than  that  of  the  "drawn 
game."  We  will  suppose  (see  map  on  p.  91) 
that  Germany  should  declare  herself  finally 
disposed,  not  only  to  evacuate  altogether  Po- 
land, the  French  departments,  Belgium,  and 
Luxemburg,  but  also  to  restore  Alsace-Lorraine 
to  France,  and  even,  let  us  still  further  suppose,  to 
give  as  an  indemnity  all  the  rest  of  the  left  bank 
of  the  Rhine,  under  the  sole  and  tacit  condition 
that  Germany  should  keep  her  preponderating 
influence,  direct  or  indirect,  over  Austria-Hun- 
gary, the  Balkans  and  Turkey. 

If  matters  are  probed  to  the  bottom  it  will 
be  easily  seen  that,  should  the  Allies  negotiate 
peace  with  Germany  on  such  a  basis,  the  resti- 
tution of  Alsace-Lorraine  could  only  be  tem- 
porary, for  a  peace  like  that  would  secure  to 


THE   "DRAWN  GAME" 


91 


Germany  all  the  elements  of  power  which 
would  allow  her,  after  a  very  short  respite,  to 
retake  Alsace-Lorraine,  and  in  the  end  to  over- 


92    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

come  all  the  x41Hes  and  to  achieve  in  its  en- 
tirety the  Pangerman  plan,  not  only  in  Europe 
but  in  Asia,  and  even  throughout  the  world. 


To  give  up  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  ac- 
cording to  our  hypothesis,  would  mean  for 
Germany  the  loss  of  47,450  square  kilometres, 
and  10  million  inhabitants.  The  present  Ger- 
man Empire  would  therefore  be  reduced  to 
493,408  square  kilometres  and  58  million  in- 
habitants. But  this  loss  in  the  west  would 
be  far  more  than  counterbalanced  by  the  close 
union  of  Austria-Hungary  to  the  German  Em- 
pire, which  would  be  none  the  less  real  because 
it  would  be  disguised.  On  this  reckoning  Ber- 
lin's influence  would  be  exercised  directly  and 
absolutely  over  the  German  Empire,  curtailed 
in  the  west,  with  493,408  square  kilometres 
and  58  million  inhabitants,  and  Austria-Hun- 
gary, with  676,616  square  kilometres  and  50 
million  inhabitants. 

It  is  evident  that  a  solid  block  of  States, 
established  in  Central  Europe  under  the  di- 
rection of  Berlin,  would  exercise,  simply  by 
contiguity,  an  absolutely  preponderant  pres- 
sure on  499,275  square  kilometres  in  the  Bal- 
kans, with  a  population  of  22  miUions,  and  in 


THE   "DRAWN  GAME"  93 

Turkey  on  1,792,000  square  kilometres,  with 
a  population  of  20  millions,  making  a  total  of 
2,291,275  square  kilometres,  holding  42  million 
inhabitants. 

Therefore  Berlin's  preponderating  influence 
would  be  wielded,  directly  or  indirectly,  over 
3,461,299  square  kilometres,  holding  172  mil- 
lions of  inhabitants.  We  now  see  clearly  that 
in  the  end  the  trick  of  the  "drawn  game" 
would  really  lead  to  the  consolidation  of  Cen- 
tral Pangermany,  as  summed  up  in  the  formula 
Hamburg-Persian  Gulf,  resulting  in  formidable 
consequences,  financial,  political,  and  economic. 
As  these  would  be  felt  universally,  it  is  impor- 
tant that  we  should  fully  realize  them. 

II. 

Because  it  was  planned  long  ago,  and  there- 
fore slowly  prepared  for,  the  war  has  cost  Ger- 
many infinitely  less  than  it  has  her  adversa- 
ries. There  are  six  fundamental  reasons  which 
combine  to  give  Berlin  the  advantage,  and  are 
consequently  detrimental  to  the  Allies. 

1.  Germany  has  not  had  to  suffer  from  the 
effects  of  improvising  war  material,  which  is 
always  ruinously  expensive. 

2.  Workmen's  wages  in  Germany,  judging 


94     UNITED  STATES  AND   PANGERMANIA 

from  peace  times,  are  lower  than  those  paid  in 
the  alhed  countries. 

3.  Careful  German  preparedness  enabled 
them  to  avoid  enormous  waste  of  raw  mate- 
rials in  munition  factories  and  in  food  supplies. 

4.  Two  millions  of  prisoners  and  nearly  42 
million  inhabitants  of  the  territories  occupied 
by  the  Germans  give  them  a  prodigious  amount 
of  almost  free  labor  on  which  to  draw,  and  of 
this  they  avail  themselves  largely. 

5.  The  iron,  coal,  and  copper  mines  and  the 
petroleum  wells  seized  by  the  Germans  in  Po- 
land, Serbia,  Belgium,  and  France  allow  them 
to  make  munitions  at  a  comparatively  low  net 
cost. 

6.  The  geographical  conditions  of  Panger- 
many  are  such  that  German  transportation  of 
every  sort  is  infinitely  cheaper  than  with  the 
Allies. 

These  six  factors  affect  the  general  expenses 
of  the  war  to  a  very  large  degree.  It  is  posi- 
tive that  Germany  is  running  the  war  under 
conditions  much  less  onerous  than  those  of 
the  Allies. 

This  is  easily  further  proved  by  a  couple  of 
figures.  During  the  three  years  of  the  war 
Germany,  with  68  million  inhabitants,  has 
spent  about  115  milliards,  while  France,  with 


THE   "DRAWN  GAME"  95 

only  40  million,  has  spent  100  milliards.  In 
France  the  State  has  therefore  spent  at  the 
rate  of  nearly  2,500  francs  a  head,  while  the 
German  State  has  spent  only  about  1,690 
francs  a  head.  A  comparison  of  the  relative 
war  expenses  of  the  two  groups  of  belligerents 
will  make  this  demonstration  yet  more  striking. 

III. 

Setting  aside  the  inevitable  losses  which 
Germany,  like  any  belhgerent,  has  suffered  be- 
cause of  the  war,  such  as  the  stoppage  of  ex- 
portations  with  the  consequent  heavy  fall  in 
exchange,  loss  of  ships,  etc.,  we  must  bear 
clearly  in  mind  that  Germany  alone,  of  all  the 
combatants,  has  made  profits  which  far  exceed 
her  losses. 

This  question  of  the  advantages  which  Ger- 
many has  secured  from  the  war,  both  in  the 
present  and  for  the  future,  is  (if  conditions 
such  as  they  are  now  should  continue)  of  such 
paramount  importance  that  it  amounts  to  a 
special  and  separate  subject.  In  this  book  I 
can  only  point  out  that  these  profits  are  mainly 
due  to  seven  chief  causes. 

First  source  of  war  profits:  The  stupendous 
amount  of  plunder  seized  by  the  Germans  in  the 


9G    UNITED  STATES  AND   PANGERMANIA 

500,000  square  Idlometrcs  which  they  hold  in 
Montenegro,  in  Albania,  in  Serbia,  iri  Rouma- 
nia,  in  Russia,  in  Belgium,  and  in  France. 

This  booty  is  made  up  of  human  beings  and 
supplies  of  various  kinds,  such  as  free  labor, 
mihtary  stores,  foodstuffs,  minerals,  raw  and 
manufactured  materials,  movable  objects  such 
as  art  treasures  and  jewels,  forced  contribu- 
tions, specie,  and  securities,  and  has  been  sys- 
tematically collected  by  the  Germans  for  the 
past  three  years.  It  certainly  represents  a 
value  of  several  tens  of  billions  of  francs.  The 
value  of  the  territories  occupied  by  Germany, 
judging  by  estimates  made  before  the  war, 
may  be  reckoned  at  about  155  billions  of 
francs. 

Second  source  of  war  profits:  Pangerman 
mortgages  on  her  allies  held  by  Berlin.  Ger- 
many has  turned  the  war  to  account  by  swin- 
dhng  her  own  allies;  in  order  to  enable  them 
to  carry  on  the  war  (always,  moreover,  to  her 
advantage)  she  has  made  them  loans  which 
were  not  burdensome  to  her,  since  they  were 
only  on  paper.  Now,  by  the  effect  of  these 
loans  (which,  considering  the  circumstances 
and  the  terms  of  their  fulfilment,  constitute  a 
new  form  of  "kolossal"  knavery)  Austria-Hun- 
gary, Bulgaria,  and  Turkey,  which  represent 


THE   "DRAWN  GAME"  97 

a  total  of  2,583,000  square  kilometres,  and 
which  are  countries,  as  the  map  on  p.  43  shows, 
indispensable  to  the  carrying  out  of  Central  Pan- 
germany  and  the  Hamburg -Persian  Gulf,  are 
heavily  mortgaged  for  the  benefit  of  Germany. 
These  mortgages  are  combined  with  economic 
or  political  agreements  made  during  the  war 
between  the  government  at  Berhn  on  the  one 
hand,  and  those  of  Vienna,  Budapest,  Sofia, 
and  Constantinople  on  the  other.  The  trea- 
ties signed  at  Berhn  on  January  11th,  1917, 
may  be  especially  instanced,  as  they  practically 
put  Turkey  under  a  German  protectorate. 
The  result  of  these  loans  and  agreements  (to 
which  should  be  added  military  direction  by 
the  General  Staff  of  Berlin)  has  been  to  put 
Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria,  and  Turkey,  whose 
national  riches  were  valued  before  the  war  at 
about  269  billion  francs,  absolutely  under  the 
hegemony  of  Prussia. 

Third  source  of  war  profits:  The  value  of  the 
sole  right  to  develop  the  latent  resources  of  the 
Balkans  and  Turkey.  The  Balkans  and  the 
Ottoman  Empire  contain  enormous  riches,  both 
mineral  and  agricultural,  which  are  still  unde- 
veloped, and  therefore  not  yet  estimated. 
The  treaties  made  during  the  war  between 
Berlin,   Sofia,   and   Constantinople  practically 


98    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

put  this  development  almost  wholly  into  Ger- 
man hands. 

Fourth  source  of  war  ^profits:  Value  resulting 
from  the  creation  of  economic  Pangermany.  It 
is  clear  that  if  the  economic  Pangermany  (see 
Chapter  IV.,  II.),  based  on  the  Hamburg-Per- 
sian Gulf,  which  the  Germans  are  beginning  to 
organize,  is  to  endure  and  fulfil  its  natural 
consequences,  the  trade  and  industry  of  every 
other  country  in  the  world  will  find  it  abso- 
lutely impossible  to  struggle  against  so  for- 
midable an  organization.  The  fact  that  Ger- 
many has  laid  hands  on  the  territory  of 
economic  Pangermany,  which  is  intended  to  be 
a  permanent  source  of  wealth,  may  surely  be 
considered  a  war  profit.  It  is  true  that  this 
profit  cannot  be  estimated  in  exact  figures, 
but  their  sum  must  certainly  be  gigantic. 

Fifth  source  of  war  ^profits:  The  value  of  mili- 
tary Pangermany  (see  Chapter  IV.,  III.),  as  this 
is  a  guarantee  of  the  duration  of  economic  Pan- 
germany, 

Sixth  source  of  war  profits:  The  value  of  the 
enormous  economic  profits  which  Pangermany 
will  make  for  Germany  at  the  expense  of  Russia, 

It  stands  to  reason  that  if  Pangermany  is  to 
exist  by  cutting  Europe  in  two,  her  economic 
and  military  pressure  will  be  irresistible  in  the 


THE   "DRAWN  GAME"  99 

east.  Russia  will  finally  break  up  into  groups 
of  anarchical  republics,  and  Germany's  influ- 
ence will  predominate  in  the  development  of 
the  enormous  immense  natural  wealth  of  Euro- 
pean and  Asiatic  Russia. 

Seventh  source  of  war  profits :  The  substitution 
of  Germany  for  France,  in  21  billion  francs  at 
least  of  French  loans  to  Russia,  Austria-Hun- 
gary, the  Balkans,  and  Turkey,  these  loans  pass- 
ing as  a  matter  of  fact  to  Germany  in  conse- 
quence of  the  establishment  of  Central  Pan- 
germany.  The  variety  of  these  war  profits  is 
so  great  and  the  mortgages  which  they  impose 
upon  the  present  and  the  future  so  far-reaching 
that  it  is  impossible  to  calculate  them  exactly, 
but  if  we  could  do  so  the  total  sum  would 
surely  be  extraordinary. 

In  three  years  of  war  Germany  has  only 
spent  about  115  billions  of  francs.  If  in  our 
minds  we  deduct  this  sum  from  that  of  her 
war  profits  one  may  well  imagine  that,  count- 
ing the  present  and  looking  to  the  future,  she 
has  made  hundreds  of  billions.  Therefore  the 
war  still  going  on  has  brought  Germany  greater 
material  advantages  than  any  war  recorded  in 
history  has  given  to  a  nation. 


100    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

IV. 

If,  on  the  one  hand,  the  war  has  allowed 
Germany  to  make  enormous  gains  up  to  the 
present  time,  on  the  other  it  has  brought 
only  heavy  losses  to  the  Allies,  who  found 
themselves  suddenly  forced  to  resist  her 
attack. 

Suppose,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  that 
peace  were  concluded  with  Berlin  on  the  basis 
of  the  "drawn  game,"  which  allows  of  no  in- 
demnities. Each  one  of  the  Allies  would  have 
to  bear,  without  any  reduction,  the  immense 
expenses  which  have  been  incurred  to  maintain 
a  war  imposed  on  it  by  Germany. 

These  expenses  have  been  particularly  heavy 
for  exactly  opposite  reasons  from  those  given 
above  (see  II.),  which  show  how  little,  rela- 
tively, the  war  has  cost  Germany.  Besides, 
the  Allies  are  bound  to  take  care  of  and  to 
maintain  millions  of  refugees  from  invaded 
regions,  whereas  the  Germans  have  only  tem- 
porarily borne  such  a  burden  and  merely  in  a 
small  part  of  eastern  Prussia.  After  the  war 
Belgium,  Russia,  and  especially  France  will 
have  to  provide  some  tens  of  billions  of  francs' 
worth  of  extra  charges  for  repairs  of  the  enor- 
mous damages  done  by  the  Germans  in  invaded 


THE   "DRAWN  GAME"  101 

territories,  to  private  persons,  State  proper- 
ties, railways,  roads,  etc.  The  Germans  would 
not  have  a  similar  outlay,  at  least  not  in  any- 
thing like  the  same  proportion.  In  their  con- 
ception of  the  "drawn  game"  the  Germans 
certainly  reckon  that  these  financial  differ- 
ences would  almost  insure,  after  peace,  the 
ultimate  impotence  of  the  allied  countries  with 
regard  to  Pangermany. 

What,  for  instance,  would  be  the  position  of 
France  if  a  war  indemnity  were  not  paid  to 
her.^  A  few  familiar  figures  will  enable  us  to 
form  an  opinion  on  that  score.  As  I  have 
said,  in  the  first  three  years  of  the  war  France 
has  spent  about  100  billion  francs.  As  soon  as 
peace  was  concluded  she  would  need  at  least 
30  billion  to  repair  the  enormous  damages 
done  to  private  individuals  or  to  the  State; 
and  when  the  railways,  roads,  etc.,  had  been 
put  in  good  order  again  the  total  sum  expended 
would  probably  be  about  130  billions  of  francs. 
The  national  debt  of  France,  which  before  the 
war  amounted  to  30  billion,  would  therefore 
be  at  least  160  billion.  (This  is  not  counting 
the  fourth  year  of  the  war,  which  will  cost  at 
least  36  bilhon.) 

In  1914  the  budget  of  France  was,  in  round 
numbers,  5  billion  francs.     After  the  war,  if 


102    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

only  on  a?;count  of  the  increased  cost  of  living, 
this  sum  must  be  increased  at  least  10%; 
therefore  the  budget  will  have  a  first  augmen- 
tation of  500  million.  Besides,  this  same  bud- 
get will  have  to  carry  the  interest  at  5%  on 
the  130  billions  of  new  debt  contracted  during 
the  war,  amounting  to  an  annual  payment  of 
6  billion  500  million.  The  pensions  to  be  paid 
to  disabled  men  and  to  soldiers'  widows  would 
add  at  least  2  billion  more.  (These  figures  are 
probably  far  below  what  they  would  be  ac- 
tually.) 

Therefore,  the  5-billion  budget  of  1914  would 
be  almost  trebled  by  the  addition  of  9  billion, 
making  14  billion  in  all.  This  formidable 
sum  would  not  leave  any  funds  available  for 
carrying  out  important  social  reforms  nor  for 
the  very  considerable  improvements  which 
would  be  necessary  in  order  to  bring  the  eco- 
nomic equipment  of  France  up  to  the  standard 
necessary  for  an  intensive  revival  of  her  eco- 
nomic life. 

How  would  it  be  possible  in  France  to  raise 
9  billions  of  francs  each  year  by  additional 
taxation  after  a  struggle  in  which  her  people 
had  been  cruelly  decimated,  and  when  all  her 
industrial  machinery  would  need  complete  re- 
organization ?     It  is  clear  that  the  most  crush- 


THE   "DRAWN  GAME"  103 

ing  taxes  levied  on  every  person  would  not 
suffice  to  provide  such  a  sum  regularly. 

Such  a  situation  must  inevitably  tend  to 
create  heavy  financial  difficulties  for  the  State 
and  for  each  individual  Frenchman.  The  same 
would  apply  to  economic  undertakings.  Thou- 
sands of  share  or  bond  holders  would  be  in  a 
most  precarious  condition,  as  securities  would 
be  immensely  depreciated.  Landed  property, 
overburdened  by  taxes  and  seriously  affected 
by  the  shortage  of  labor,  would  lose  a  great 
part  of  its  value. 

This  situation  would  lead  to  an  enormous 
general  rise  in  the  cost  of  living,  and  to  unend- 
ing difficulties  which  would  make  the  life  of 
every  Frenchman  well-nigh  intolerable. 

Now,  this  financial  situation,  which  is  al- 
ready beginning  to  exist  for  the  Russians, 
would  also  be  the  lot  of  the  English  and  the 
Italians.  As  to  Belgium,  Roumania,  and  Ser- 
bia, it  is  easy  to  see  that  the  formula  "without 
indemnity,"  if  adopted,  would  be  enough  to 
prevent  entirely  any  reconstruction  of  those 
unfortunate  countries. 

It  is  upon  these  immense  financial  distur- 
bances, which  would  be  still  further  aggravated  by 
the  commercial  competition  of  economic  Panger- 
many    {whose    efficiency    would   grow    with   the 


104     UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

growth  of  her  organization)  that  the  Germans  are 
counting,  their  object  being  to  reduce  the  Allies 
to  economic  slavery  from  which  there  will  be  no 
appeal,  should  peace  be  concluded  on  the  basis  of 
the  "drawn  game.'' 

Now,  would  it  not  be  a  monstrous  iniquity 
that  the  people  of  France,  England,  Russia, 
and  Italy  should  be  condemned  for  tens  of 
years  to  terrible  poverty  and  to  a  condition  of 
servitude  like  that  which  exists  to-day  in  the 
occupied  territory  of  France,  Belgium,  Serbia, 
etc.,  simply  to  gratify  the  execrable  ambi- 
tion of  the  Hohenzollerns,  and  also,  no  matter 
what  may  be  said  to  the  contrary,  that  of  the 
majority  of  the  German  people,  who,  because 
they  have  long  been  Pangermanists,  wish  to 
condemn  the  rest  of  Europe  to  slavery  ?  It  is 
the  plain  truth  that  only  a  complete  victory 
can  save  the  alUed  countries  from  absolute 
financial  ruin,  because  Germany  alone  will  be 
able  to  pay  the  costs  of  the  struggle  which  she 
has  precipitated.  As  she  is  responsible  for 
the  war  she  already  owes  to  the  united  Al- 
lies a  colossal  sum,  which  may  be  estimated 
roundly  at  between  350  and  400  billions  of 
francs.  Even  if  the  credit  of  the  German 
Empire,  as  a  State,  is  doomed  to  disappear  on 
the  day  of  her  defeat,  the  material  riches  of 


THE   "DRAWN  GAME"  105 

Germany,  which  are  very  considerable,  will 
still  continue.  Herr  Helfferich  himself  valued 
them  in  1914  at  about  412  bilHons  of  francs. 

Of  course  Germany  will  only  be  able  to  pay 
her  fabulous  debt  very  gradually.  But  when 
means  for  collecting  the  German  revenues  shall 
have  been  systematically  and  attentively  stud- 
ied by  the  victorious  Allies,  when  these  collec- 
tions of  revenue  shall  have  become  assured  (of 
course  not  by  written  German  promises,  worth- 
less scraps  of  paper,  but  by  real  guarantees  in 
harmony  with  those  precedents  of  history 
which  the  government  of  Berlin  strongly  con- 
tributed to  establish  in  1870),  Germany  will  be 
perfectly  able  to  hand  to  each  of  the  great 
Allied  victors  about  2  billions  of  francs  a 
year,  while  still  keeping  enough  for  her  own 
subsistence.  This  annuity,  thanks  to  modern 
financial  combinations,  will  be  sufficient  to 
allow  each  Allied  State  to  raise  annual  loans  at 
relatively  low  rates  and  therefore  easily  pro- 
curable, and  will  permit  each  State  to  spare 
its  citizens  the  burden  of  taxes  which  would  be 
not  only  crushing  but  fatal  and  inevitable  if  it 
had  to  relinquish  the  hope  of  being  recouped 
for  its  war  expenses  by  Germany. 

Now  this  solution,  which  conforms  to  the 
most  elementary  justice,  and  wliich,  I  insist,  is 


106    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

indispensable  in  order  to  avert  the  ruin  of  the 
AHied  States,  which  have  defended  the  civiHza- 
tion  of  the  world  against  German  barbarism, 
would  be  rendered  impossible  by  a  "peace  through 
negotiation,  concluded  on  the  basis  of  the  for- 
mula "peace  without  annexations  and  without 
indemnities,"  which,  as  can  be  proved,  would 
practically  allow  Germany  to  keep  the  Ham- 
burg-Persian Gulf  and  most  of  her  profits 
from  the  war. 

V. 

The  Hamburg-Persian  Gulf  plan,  by  its 
mere  existence,  involves  results  which  cannot 
be  escaped  and  which  must  be  frankly  con- 
sidered. 

\st.  The  Hamburg-Persian  Gulf  and  Russia, 
It  must  be  evident  to  every  sane  mind  that  if 
an  economic  and  military  Central  Pangermany, 
dividing  Europe  into  two  parts,  should  be  per- 
manently established,  no  really  independent 
Russian  federal  republic  could  be  formed.  The 
results  which  German  agitation  has  already 
obtained  in  Russia  suffice  to  show  that  the 
steady  threefold  pressure — geographic,  eco- 
nomic, and  military — of  Central  Pangermany 
would,  from  force  of  circumstances,  insure  the 
final  success  of  the  Teutonic  intrigues  having 


THE   "DRAWN  GAME"  107 

for  their  object  the  disintegration  of  the  vast 
Russian  provinces,  according  to  the  plan  of 
Lenine,  into  a  series  of  repubhcs,  which  con- 
stant anarchy  would  keep  under  the  permanent 
influence  of  German  agents.  The  practical 
outcome  of  this  state  of  things  from  an  eco- 
nomic point  of  view  would  be  the  preponder- 
ance of  Germany's  influence  in  the  develop- 
ment of  the  immense  n[,atural  riches  of  European 
and  Asiatic  Russia,  and  from  a  political  stand- 
point its  extension  as  far  as  the  Pacific  Ocean. 

German  hegemony  would  thus  be  expanded, 
under  forms  more  or  less  disguised,  but  never- 
theless effective  (besides  those  of  Central  Pan- 
germany)  over  the  180  million  inhabitants  of 
the  present  Russia.  Therefore  350  millions  of 
human  beings,  more  or  less,  occupying  a  vast 
territory  containing  inexhaustible  mineral  and 
ahmentary  riches,  and  geographically  controlled 
by  Central  Pangermany,  would  be  guided  and 
inspired  from  Berlin. 

9.nd,  The  Hamburg-Persian  Gulf  and  Pan- 
Islamism.  Maintenance  of  the  Hamburg-Per- 
sian Gulf  would  allow  the  government  of 
Berlin  to  set  on  foot  a  political  and  military 
Pan-Islamist  movement  which  would  help  Ger- 
many to  consolidate  her  victory  by  putting  the 
Allied  European  Powers  entirely  at  her  mercy. 


108    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

since  these  hold  among  their  possessions  numer- 
ous Moslem  subjects:  France,  particularly  in 
Tunis,  Algiers,  and  Morocco;  Italy  in  Libya; 
Russia  in  the  Crimea  and  in  the  Caucasus,  in 
the  region  of  Kazan,  in  Central  Asia,  and  in 
Siberia;  England  in  Egypt,  in  India,  in  Burma, 
in  the  Straits  Settlements,  and  in  the  greater 
part  of  her  African  colonies. 

As  Pan-Islamism  is  ostensibly  founded  on  the 
restoration  and  wide  extension  of  the  influence 
and  powers  of  the  Sultan  of  Constantinople, 
Commander  of  the  Faithful,  it  could  not  fail 
to  flatter  deeply  the  neo-nationalism  of  the 
Turks,  which  has  manifested  itself  particularly 
since  the  failure  of  the  Allies  at  the  Darda- 
nelles. The  result  is  that,  thanks  to  Pan- 
Islamists,  the  Kaiser's  interests  are  well  served 
by  the  Sultan's  Moslem  subjects;  a  clever 
propaganda  has  dazzled  their  eyes  with  a  pros- 
pect of  the  restoration  of  an  empire  even 
greater  than  in  days  of  old. 

No  doubt  the  Moslem  insurrection  has  not 
become  general,  but  the  Islamic  agitation  has 
nevertheless  yielded  local  results  which  will 
be  better  understood  after  the  war,  and  which 
have  hampered  the  Allies  in  India,  in  Egypt, 
in  Libya,  and  in  the  French  possessions  of 
North  Africa. 


THE   "DRAWN   GAME" 


109 


110    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

What  Germany  has  already  attempted  to 
achieve  with  the  help  of  Islam  should  serve 
the  Allies  as  a  severe  warning  of  what  she 
would  certainly  do  in  the  future  if  the  Ham- 
burg-Persian Gulf  should  become  a  permanent 
reality.  There  are  18  millions  of  Moslems  in 
Russia,  who  are  more  and  more  inclined  to 
give  ear  to  the  suggestions  of  Berlin,  trans- 
mitted by  way  of  Constantinople. 

In  Persia,  in  the  Azerbaijan,  there  are  about 
four  hundred  thousand  men  who  would  make 
very  useful  soldiers;  in  Afghanistan  five  hun- 
dred thousand  first-class  combatants  would  be 
found.  Once  armed  they  could  be  let  loose  in 
northern  India,  which  contains  about  50  mil- 
lion Moslems.  These,  so  far,  have  collectively 
remained  loyal  to  Great  Britain,  but  their 
feelings  might  be  subject  to  a  change  if  Ger- 
many, by  remaining  mistress  of  the  route  from 
Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  appeared  to  be 
victorious.  Hence  we  conclude  that  very  soon 
after  a  peace  leaving  Germany  this  immense 
realization,  the  Pan-Islam  movement  would 
allow  Berhn  to  complete  the  Pangerman  plan  of 
colonization  in  Africa  and  in  Asia;  especially  in 
Russia,  in  India,  and,  as  we  shall  see,  in  China. 

Srd.  The  Hamburg-Persian  Gulf  and  China. 
The  German  programme  of  universal  domina- 


THE   '* DRAWN  GAME"  111 

tion  has  already  been  extended  in  China  as 
far  as  possible.  In  the  first  place,  the  20  or 
30  millions  of  Moslems  who  inhabit  the  Celes- 
tial Empire  have  been  wrought  upon  by  Turco- 
German  agents,  coming  by  the  way  of  Persia, 
Afghanistan,  and  the  old  "silk  route."  Be- 
sides, Berlin  has  employed  every  imaginable 
method  in  order  to  plunge  China  into  the  dis- 
orders which  now  prey  upon  her,  the  object  of 
these  tactics  being  to  make  the  Chinese  situa- 
tion so  disturbing  that  in  the  first  place  it  will 
absorb  the  attention  of  Japan  and  turn  her 
thoughts  from  sending  her  troops  into  Europe 
(a  question  which  has  already  come  up,  and 
may  still  be  possible  and  desirable) ;  and  in  the 
second  that  the  state  of  affairs  resulting  from 
these  disorders  may  make  it  possible,  when 
once  the  war  has  been  ended  on  the  basis  of 
the  Hamburg-Persian  Gulf,  for  Germany  to 
carry  out  exactly  the  same  political  game  in 
China  that  she  has  in  Turkey. 

When  that  time  comes  Berlin  will  say  to  the 
Chinese,  as  she  has  already  said  to  the  Turks: 
''Your  country  is  completely  disorganized; 
your  lives  are  no  longer  safe.  Now  we  are  bold 
financiers,  enterprising  manufacturers,  ener- 
getic business  men.  We  will  help  you  to  turn 
your  country  to  account.     We  will  procure  for 


112    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

you  the  experts  whom  you  need.  We  will  give 
you  the  means  of  defending  yourselves  against 
your  neighbors.  We,  who  are  the  finest  soldiers 
in  the  world,  will  bring  up  to  a  proper  standard 
your  endless  and  magnificent  military  forces, 
now  in  embryo.  With  your  300  millions  of  in- 
habitants you  can  be  the  absolute  rulers  of  all 
Asia.  We  will,  therefore,  build  up  for  you  a 
formidable  army  and  a  very  powerful  navy." 

It  is  easy  to  perceive  what  is  hidden  behind 
this  programme,  with  its  obvious  attraction 
for  the  Chinese.  In  reality,  it  is  a  preparation 
for  the  seizure  by  Germany  of  part  of  China, 
and  her  economic  exploitation  by  Germany 
precisely  in  the  same  conditions  and  by  the 
same  proceedings  as  those  which  she  has  al- 
ready employed  in  Turkey  with  undeniable 
success. 

ith.  The  Hamburg-Persian  Gulf  and  Japan, 
The  combination  of  the  Pan-Islam  movement 
in  Asia,  of  the  splitting  up  of  Russia  as  far  as 
the  Pacific  into  republics  more  or  less  anarchis- 
tic and  of  a  policy  apparently  favorable  to 
China,  are  for  Berlin  powerful  means  of  pre- 
paring the  signal  vengeance  which  Germany 
intends,  after  her  victory,  to  inflict  upon  Japan 
in  the  future.  No  doubt  in  order  to  break  the 
union  of  her  adversaries  Germany  has  already 


THE   "DRAWN  GAME"  113 

hinted  to  Tokio  the  idea  of  a  separate  peace, 
but  that  is  merely  a  tactical  move  exacted  by 
the  need  of  the  moment.  Never  would  Pan- 
germany,  mistress  of  the  route  from  Hamburg 
to  the  Persian  Gulf  and  exercising  a  predomi- 
nating influence  in  China  and  Siberia,  forgive 
Japan  for  having  driven  her  out  of  Kiao-Chau. 

Now  if  an  immense  Chinese  army  should  be 
created  and  put  under  the  direction  of  Ger- 
man ofiicers,  Japan,  in  spite  of  the  bravery  of 
her  soldiers,  would  at  once  be  unable  to  avoid 
the  consequences  of  the  intolerable  situation  in 
which  she  would  be  placed  through  the  relative 
smallness  of  her  population  (70  million,  with 
her  colonies)  opposed  to  300  million  of  Chinese. 

Japan  is  therefore  directly  aimed  at  by  the 
scheme  of  domination  from  Hamburg  to  the 
Persian  Gulf,  which  seriously  endangers  her 
future.  Her  interest  in  its  destruction  is 
therefore  vital  and  she  has  every  reason  to 
make  the  greatest  sacrifices  in  order  to  obtain 
this  end. 

VI. 

We  have  noted  (see  III.)  that  the  profits 
which  Germany  has  already  made  in  the  war, 
or  has  insured  to  herself  for  the  future  if  the 
present  conditions  are  allowed  to  continue  with- 


114     UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERjVL\NIA 

out  essential  change,  certainly  represent  hun- 
dreds of  billions  of  francs  and  come  from  seven 
principal  sources,  which  are: 

1st.  The  booty  amassed  from  three  hun- 
dred thousand  square  kilometres  of  invaded 
territory. 

2nd.  The  value  of  the  Pangerman  mort- 
gages. 

3rd.  The  value  of  the  monopoly  of  exploita- 
tion in  the  Balkans  and  Turkey. 

4th.     The  value  of  economic  Pangermany. 

5th.     The  value  of  military  Pangermany. 

6th.  The  value  of  the  economic  profits 
which  the  existence  of  Pangermany  gives  to 
Germany  at  the  expense  of  Russia. 

7th.  The  confiscation  of  French  loans,  to 
the  extent  of  at  least  21  billions,  either  in  Rus- 
sia or  in  the  States  which  constitute  Central 
Pangermany. 

It  is  important  to  notice  that  only  the  first  of 
these  sources  of  profit,  that  is  to  say,  the  booty 
which  Germany  has  won  by  her  invasion  of 
enemy  territory,  can  properly  be  classed  as  due 
to  the  war;  the  other  six  are  entirely  due  to  the 
creation  of  Central  Pangermany,  and  do  not 
come  directly  from  the  war,  but  from  the  gigantic 
and  not  yet  understood  swindle  which  the  struggle 
has  enabled  Berlin  to  work  at  the  expense  of  her 


THE   "DRAWN   GAME"  115 

own  allies,  Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria,  and  Tur- 
key, because  Serbia  has  been  crushed.  The  oc- 
cupation of  Serbia  is  the  only  positive  hnk 
which  unites  the  six  last  sources  of  profit  with 
the  first  one,  but  this  occupation  of  Serbia  by 
Germany,  or,  to  speak  more  accurately,  by  her 
vassals,  is  of  vital  importance  to  Berlin's  plans, 
for  unless  Serbia  is  held,  Pangermany  must 
crumble. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  geographically  speaking, 
Serbia  was  a  water-tight  bulkhead  which  Ger- 
many, already  in  control  of  the  Austro-Hunga- 
rian  leaders,  was  absolutely  forced  to  break 
down  in  order  to  establish  her  paramount 
influence  in  Bulgaria  and  Turkey.  Besides, 
Serbia  is  indispensable  to  the  working  of  the 
railway  from  Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  as 
the  Belgrade-Nish-Pirot  branch,  which  runs 
through  Serbia,  is  an  essential  part  of  it.  One 
of  Germany's  alhes,  Count  Karolyi,  acknowl- 
edged in  the  Hungarian  chamber  of  deputies 
that  Germany  had  made  the  war  for  the  sake 
of  the  Hamburg-Persian  Gulf.* 

If  it  were  necessary  Germany  could  easily 
afford  to  give  up  her  first  source  of  profit,  that 
accruing  to  her  from  her  invasion  of  five 
hundred  thousand  square  kilometres  of  enemy 

*Le  Journal  de  Geneve,  December  30th,  1916. 


116     UNITED   STATES  AND   PANGERMANIA 

country,  provided  she  could  keep  the  six  other 
sources  which  are  insured  to  her  by  the  pos- 
session of  Central  Pangermany,  always  provided 
she  retained  Serbia  (about  eighty-seven  thou- 
sand square  kilometres),  as  that  Serbian  terri- 
tory means  the  Pangerman  bridge  or  nexus 
which  is  indispensable  to  the  working  of  the 
Hamburg -Persian  Gulf  plan.  In  the  minds  of 
the  Germans  ''Peace  without  annexations  or 
indemnities"  is  most  certainly  not  meant  to 
apply  to  Serbia.  There  have  been  very  clear 
statements  in  this  regard,  evidently  made  with 
the  consent  of  the  German  censorship.  The 
Kreuzzeitung  declared:  ''Mr.  Lloyd  George 
has  said  that  the  restoration  of  Serbia  is  an 
essential  condition  of  peace,  and  that  English 
honor  is  involved  therein.  The  objects  of  the 
war  for  which  England  is  fighting,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  Austria-Hungary  and  Bulgaria,  on 
the  other,  are  therefore  absolutely  contradictory.'^ 
The  Hamburger  Fremdenblatt  added:  ''Ger- 
many and  Austria-Hungary  have  crushed  Serbia. 
It  is  for  them  alone  to  decide  what  shall  be  done 
with  the  former  kingdom  of  King  Peter.'']  The 
Volksrecht  of  Zurich  announced  on  August 
30th,  1917,  that  a  new  map  of  Central  Europe 

*Le  Matin,  August  14th,  1917. 
t  Le  Journal,  August  18th,  1917. 


THE   "DRAWN  GAME"  117 

had  been  published  in  Vienna,  showing  the 
annexation  of  western  Serbia  by  Austria,  which 
agrees  with  the  warning  of  the  Neue  Preus- 
sische  Zeitung:  ''We  may  be  assured  that 
Germany  will  only  make  peace  according  to 
the  war  map."  * 

Let  us  suppose  that,  taking  advantage  of  the 
weariness  of  the  Alhes,  Germany  or  her  vassals 
should  declare  themselves  wilhng  to  make 
peace  by  negotiation,  and  to  guarantee  the 
independence  of  Serbia.  Such  a  declaration 
would  not  change  actual  conditions.  The 
kingdom  of  Serbia  might  exist  legally,  to  be 
sure,  on  "paper,  hut  the  principle  of  ''no  indem- 
nity^' would  leave  her  in  her  present  state  of 
utter  ruin,  which  is  irremediable  unless  there 
should  he  complete  reparation.  Is  it  possible 
that  if  Austro-Germany  shall  say  some  day, 
"All  right,  I'll  give  up  my  claim  to  Serbia," 
that  the  Allies  should  be  taken  in  by  any 
such  grim  jest  ?  Besides,  what  assurance  could 
they  have  that  this  promise  of  evacuation 
would  be  carried  out  at  the  same  time  by  Ger- 
many, Austria,  and  Bulgaria,  in  whose  gov- 
ernments it  is  impossible  to  have  the  least 
confidence  ? 

Therefore  a  peace  said  to  be  "by  negotia- 

*  Le  Journal,  August  30th,  1917. 


118    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

tion,"  drawn  up  on  paper,  without  real  guar- 
antees, might  perfectly  well  respect  the  fron- 
tiers of  1914  on  paper,  and  might  also  respect, 
on  paper,  the  formula  "without  annexations"; 
but  in  fact  Germany  would  be  left  mistress  of 
Pangermany,  and  would  consequently  profit  in 
the  future  by  the  six  sources  of  enormous  profit 
which  she  has  gained  by  the  war.  We  may 
observe  that  Germany's  evacuation  of  the  ter- 
ritory invaded  by  her  in  the  west  and  in  the 
east  (which  we  have  supposed  for  the  develop- 
ment of  our  hypothesis)  would  be  only  tempo- 
rary. It  would  be  ignoring  completely  the 
tenacity  and  ambition  of  the  HohenzoUerns  to 
imagine  that  Germany,  once  mistress  of  an 
empire  from  Hamburg  to  the  Persian  GuK, 
would  sincerely  renounce  the  ambition  of  dom- 
inating the  North  Sea  and  the  English  Chan- 
nel. Hence  the  evacuation  of  Belgium  and 
the  retrocession  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  which  on 
our  hypothesis  Germany  would  have  yielded 
to  France,  would  only  be  for  a  short  time. 

If  economic  and  military  Pangermany  is 
allowed  to  exist,  the  fulfilment  of  Pangerman 
plans  in  the  west  and  in  the  east  would  be  an 
inevitable  and  fatal  consequence.  Indeed,  the 
commercial  competition  of  economic  Panger- 
many would  in  itself  irremediably  ruin  eco- 


THE   "DRAWN   GAME"  119 

nomic  France,  England,  and  Russia,  who,  hav- 
ing no  compensation,  would  sink  under  the 
burden  of  their  colossal  war  expenses,  while  to 
Germany  the  struggle  would  have  brought 
gains  far  exceeding  her  losses,  thanks  to  her 
having  kept  six  out  of  the  seven  sources  of 
profit  won  through  the  war.  What  could  the 
Allied  countries  of  to-day  do  if,  while  they  were 
still  exhausted  by  a  disastrous  peace,  Germany, 
drawing  on  the  30  millions  of  soldiers  that 
Pangermany  would  put  under  her  orders, 
should  proceed,  after  a  short  respite,  to  seize 
again,  both  in  the  west  and  east,  what  she  had 
by  our  hypothesis)  temporarily  renounced? 

It  may  then  be  definitely  stated  that  the  for- 
mula "Peace  without  annexations  or  indemni- 
ties" is  mendacious  in  the  highest  degree,  and 
only  a  screen  for  the  most  formidable  of  Ber- 
lin's snares.  If  the  German  people  seemed  to 
approve  this  formula  it  was  because  its  applica- 
tion would  leave  the  Allies  to  bear  the  unprece- 
dented expenses  of  the  war,  while  it  would  in- 
sure to  Germany  the  enormous  profits  resulting 
from  the  maintenance  of  Central  Pangermany 
and  the  Hamburg-Persian  Gulf,  with  great  and 
manifold  consequences  which  would  enable  her, 
after  a  brief  pause,  to  achieve  her  plan  of  uni- 
versal domination. 


1^0    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERiVLiNIA 

VII. 

It  IS  thus  clearly  proved  that  the  consolida- 
tion of  the  Hamburg-Persian  Gulf  is  a  for- 
midable danger,  both  to  the  Allies  and  to  the 
freedom  of  the  world.  The  economic  and  mili- 
tary power  which  it  would  give  Germany  would 
be  so  intolerable  that  those  who  are  fighting 
for  the  purpose  of  putting  an  end  to  great  ar- 
maments would  find  themselves  once  more 
plunged  into  the  vortex  of  the  most  rigid  mili- 
tarism, for  they  could  not  contend  with  Panger- 
many  except  at  the  cost  of  tremendous  arma- 
ments, which  would  absorb  all  their  resources 
and  all  their  attention.  Now,  would  they  be 
in  a  position  to  undertake  such  armaments  in 
the  infinitely  difficult  financial  situation  in 
which,  according  to  our  hypothesis,  they  would 
stand  .'^  Would  they  even  have  the  resolution 
to  undertake  them,  after  the  frightful  moral 
disappointment  of  their  peoples,  who  would 
learn  too  late  the  enormous  mistake  committed 
by  their  governments  in  negotiating  for  peace 
on  the  basis  of  the  so-called  "drawn  game," 
which  had  allowed  Berlin  to  consolidate  her 
Hamburg-Persian  Gulf  plan?  Besides,  even 
if  the  Allies  were  willing  to  attempt  once  more 
the  overthrow  of  the  atrocious  Prussian  mih- 


THE  "DRAWN  GAME"  121 

tarism,  now  much  more  oppressive  than  before 
the  war,  Pangermany  would  certainly  not  leave 
them  time  to  prepare.  If  the  Allies  were  dis- 
posed to  renew  the  conflict  they  would,  in  their 
assumed  financial  and  moral  situation,  cer- 
tainly be  reduced  to  impotence  before  they 
could  get  ready  to  hold  their  own  against  the 
new  German  colossus. 

It  is  therefore  incontestable  that  France, 
England,  Russia,  Italy,  the  United  States,  and 
Japan  have  a  common  and  absolutely  vital 
interest  in  this  war,  far  greater  than  any  pri- 
vate interest  of  their  own,  which  should  make 
them  stand  firmly,  shoulder  to  shoulder,  until 
the  end,  in  order  that  the  Hamburg-Persian 
Gulf  plan,  or,  in  other  words,  that  odious  in- 
strument of  oppression,  Pangermany,  shall  be 
destroyed  under  conditions  which  will  make 
its  re-establishment  impossible  forever. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

HOW   TO    DESTROY  PANGERMANY. 

I.  Why  Austria-Hungary  is  the  crucial  point  of  the  uni- 
versal problem  presented  by  the  Hamburg-Persian 
Gulf  plan. 

n.     The  thesis  of  the  preservation  of  Austria-Hungary. 

in.  The  application  of  the  principle  of  nationalities  to 
Central  Europe. 

IV.  A  strong  barrier  of  anti-Pangerman  nations  can  be 
established  in  Central  Europe,  and  there  only. 


In  order  to  understand  how  to  destroy  Pan- 
germany,  which  is  the  prime  necessity  of  any 
decisive  victory  on  the  part  of  the  AlHes,  and 
without  which  there  can  be  no  just  or  lasting 
peace,  we  must  study  the  war  as  it  stretches 
over  Europe,  and  see  what  objective,  whether 
geographical,  military,  or  political,  is  common 
to  all  the  Allies,  the  attainment  of  which  would 
at  the  same  time  frustrate  the  Hamburg-Per- 
sian GuK  plan  (and  therefore  Central  Panger- 
many),  deal  Prussian  militarism  a  mortal  blow, 
and  also  guarantee  permanent  attainment  of 
the  legitimate  personal  objectives  which  each 
of  the  Allies  has  in  view  as  they  carry  on  col- 

122 


HOW  TO  DESTROY  PANGERMANY      123 


124    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

lectively  the  formidable  war  which  was  forced 
upon  them. 

Now,  this  common  objective,  this  crucial 
point  of  all  the  problems,  whether  geographical, 
military,  or  political,  which  the  Allies  must 
solve  is  represented  by  Austria-Hungary,  be- 
cause: 

1.  That  State  is  only  the  enemy  of  the 
Allies  through  the  Hapsburg  dynasty,  which, 
yielding  to  the  injunctions  of  Berlin,  has  be- 
trayed its  own  peoples.  In  fact,  Francis  Jo- 
seph declared  war  without  even  daring  to  con- 
sult his  Parliament,  for  he  knew  very  well  that 
three-fourths  of  his  subjects,  sympathizing 
with  Russia,  France,  and  England,  and  being 
definitely  hostile  to  Germany,  would  have  op- 
posed, by  the  voice  of  their  representatives, 
any  bloody  struggle  destined  to  turn  to 
the  advantage  of  Germanism.  The  Emperor 
Charles  I.  cannot  to-day  (for  irresistible  rea- 
sons, financial  and  military,  which  make  Aus- 
tria-Hungary the  vassal  of  Germany)  conclude 
peace  without  the  consent  of  Berlin. 

2.  It  is  manifest  that  Germany  cannot 
maintain  a  war  against  Europe  without  the 
help  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  soldiers  whom 
she  has  dexterously  contrived  to  enlist  in  her 
cause,  the  vast  majority  of  w^hom  only  fight 


HOW  TO  DESTROY  PANGERMANY      U5 

because  they  are  forced  to  do  so  by  the  brutal 
German  staff-officers  who  command  them. 

3.  It  is  clear  that  after  the  peace,  if  Ger- 
many were  to  evacuate  all  the  territories  she 
now  occupies  in  the  east  and  the  west,  to 
restore  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France,  and  yet  to 
keep  her  hold,  more  or  less  disguised,  on  Aus- 
tria-Hungary, she  would  possess  all  the  means 
for  retaking,  after  a  short  delay,  Alsace-Lor- 
raine from  France,  since  the  German  hold  on 
Austria-Hungary  inevitably  iinplies  the  accom- 
plishment of  the  scheme  '^rom  Hamburg  to  the 
Persian  Gulf,''  which  practically  puts  at  the 
disposal  of  Germany  30  millions  of  soldiers, 
who  would  represent  a  formidable  power  be- 
cause of  their  standardized  organization  under 
the  direction  of  the  Berlin  General  Staff. 

4.  From  this  last  consideration  it  follows 
that  if  after  the  peace  Germany  were  to  retain 
her  disguised  hold  on  Austria-Hungary,  the 
solemn  promise  given  by  France,  England,  and 
Russia  to  re-establish  Serbia  in  its  indepen- 
dence and  its  integrity  would  be  practically  in- 
capable of  fulfilment. 

5.  It  is  clear  that  the  new  Russia  could 
not  be  really  independent  if  the  seizure  of  Aus- 
tria-Hungary by  Germany  were  maintained. 
Besides,  on  account  of  the  wide  extension  of 


126    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

Prussian  militarism  resulting  therefrom,  the 
United  States  and  England  would  be  con- 
strained to  keep  up  the  great  armaments  which 
they  have  only  adopted  temporarily.  Belgium 
would  still  be  imperilled,  for  the  same  reason 
that  Alsace-Lorraine  would  be,  even  if  given 
back  to  France  for  a  short  time.  As  for  Italy, 
the  German  hegemony  over  Central  Europe 
would  mean  the  end  of  all  her  national  hopes 
for  the  freedom  of  the  Adriatic  and  for  Italian 
expansion  on  the  eastern  shores  of  the  Medi- 
terranean. For  Serbia  and  Montenegro  this 
continued  seizure  would  be  a  death  sentence 
from  which  there  would  be  no  appeal. 

6.  On  the  other  hand,  if  freedom  from  Ger- 
man control  were  assured  to  the  non-German 
peoples  of  Austria-Hungary  after  the  peace,  it 
would  absolutely  prevent  any  aggressive  re- 
vival of  Prussian  militarism  in  the  future,  for 
the  very  effect  of  that  independence  would  be 
to  take  from  the  General  Staff  of  Berlin  troops 
which  are  indispensable  to  the  realization  of 
the  Pangerman  plan.  This  is  shown  incontro- 
vertibly  by  the  fact  that  if  it  were  not  for  the 
forces  which  she  draws  from  Austria-Hungary 
and  Turkey,  Germany  would  not  be  able  to 
continue  the  war. 

7.  A  glance  at  the  map  on  p.  38  will  show 


HOW  TO  DESTROY  PANGERMANY      U7 

that,  because  of  their  geographical  situation,  this 
independence  of  the  non-German  peoples  of 
Austria-Hungary  in  regard  to  Germany  is  the 
only  thing  which  will  enable  the  Allies  to  keep 
their  promises  toward  Serbia  and  Roumania, 
and  also  (by  definitely  breaking  the  main  axis 
of  the  Pangerman  scheme,  beginning  with  Bo- 
hemia) to  eliminate  the  immense  peril  of  the 
Hamburg-Persian  Gulf  plan.  Every  ally,  with- 
out any  exception,  is  most  vitally  interested  in 
preventing  its  consolidation. 

II. 

The  liberation  of  the  oppressed  Slav  and 
Latin  inhabitants  of  Austria-Hungary  would 
mean  the  dismemberment  of  the  Hapsburg 
Monarchy,  and  would  go  against  the  classic 
formula:  '' If  Austria  did  not  exist  it  would  be 
necessary  to  invent  her.''  There  was  for  a  long 
time  some  reason  for  this  idea,  but  it  has  lost 
its  value  since  the  complete  seizure  by  the 
Hohenzollerns  of  all  the  motive  power  of  Aus- 
tria-Hungary, and  consequently  of  the  Haps- 
burg dynasty,  which  is  intertwined  with  the 
constitution  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  State. 
To  wish  to  preserve  that  State  would  be  to 
play  the  German  game,  for  it  is  practically  im- 


128    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

possible  to  separate  the  Hapsbiirgs  from  the 
Hohenzollerns.  It  would  establish  the  Ger- 
manic yoke  on  the  Slav  and  Latin  subjects  of 
the  Hapsburgs,  thus  facilitating  the  accom- 
plishment of  the  plan  ''from  Hamburg  to  the 
Persian  Gulf."  More  than  that,  the  house  of 
Ilapsburg  has  given  such  ample  proofs  of  its 
incapacity,  its  duplicity,  and  its  readiness  to 
follow  even  the  most  criminal  suggestions  of 
Berlin  that  its  maintenance  at  the  head  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  peoples  should  not  be  re- 
garded seriously. 

I  must  add — and  I  insist  strongly  upon  this 
point — that  this  is  not  only  my  personal  opin- 
ion, but  also  that  of  those  men — few  in  num- 
ber but  of  keen  insight — who,  for  the  last 
twenty  years  and  upon  the  spot,  have  made  a 
special  study  of  the  Central  European  problem. 
Among  them  may  be  particularly  mentioned 
MM.  Louis  Leger,  professor  at  the  College  de 
France;  E.  Denis  and  Haumant,  professors  at 
the  Sorbonne;  A.  Gauvain,  of  the  Journal  des 
Dehats,  and  among  Englishmen,  Sir  Arthur 
Evans,  Seton-Watson,  and  Wickham  Steed, 
foreign  political  editor  of  the  London  Times, 
who  for  ten  years  was  the  correspondent  of 
that  powerful  organ  at  Vienna. 

Now,  all  these  experts  say  as  I  do  that  it  is 


HOW  TO  DESTROY  PANGERMANY      129 

absolutely  necessary  to  "put  the  house  of  Hapsburg 
— the  vassal  of  the  Hohenzollerns — out  of  com- 
mission.  The  opinion  of  these  experts  is  of 
pecuHar  importance,  as  they  were  in  a  position 
to  study  the  Austro-Hungarian  question  under 
conditions  infinitely  better  than  those  which 
fall  to  the  lot  of  professional  diplomatists. 

An  essential  point  remains  to  be  proved,  for 
it  gives  rise  to  peculiar  anxiety  in  the  minds  of 
that  part  of  the  public  in  the  Allied  countries 
which  still  harps  on  the  false  idea  that  Austria- 
Hungary  is  a  specially  German  country.  This 
section  of  the  public  doubts  whether  the  appli- 
cation of  the  principle  of  nationalities,  which 
the  Allies  demand,  would  not  have  the  efiFect 
of  necessarily  and  considerably  increasing  Ger- 
many by  incorporating  in  it  the  Germans  of 
the  Hapsburg  Empire. 

It  is  therefore  necessary  to  demonstrate  by 
means  of  figures  and  accurate  geographical  and 
ethnographical  arguments  that  this  fear  is  quite 
chimerical. 


HI. 

On  the  whole,  President  Wilson,  in  common 
with  the  Allies,  desires  the  reconstruction  of 
Europe  according  to  the  principle  of  nationali- 


130    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

ties,  a  principle  which  is  not  founded  on  race 
and  language,  as  is  too  generally  believed,  but 
upon  readiness  to  live  together. 

A  proof  that  the  principle  of  nationalities 
should  be  so  interpreted  is  furnished  by  the 
Swiss,  where  populations  of  different  races 
(Germanic  and  Latin)  and  of  different  lan- 
guages (French,  German,  and  Italian)  yet  form 
a  clearly  distinct  nationality. 

The  strongly  expressed  desire  of  a  group  of 
the  population  to  live  in  common  is  moreover 
indispensable  before  they  should  have  the  right 
to  form  a  separate  State.  For  instance,  in 
France  the  Basques  and  Bretons,  who  have 
kept  their  own  peculiar  languages,  still  con- 
tinue to  form  part  of  France.  The  principle  of 
nationalities  is  therefore  based  upon  the  demo- 
cratic idea  of  personal  liberty,  a  conception 
which  spread  from  France  throughout  the 
earth  in  1789. 

As  nothing  in  this  world  is  absolute,  it  is 
clear  that  the  principle  of  nationalities  cannot 
always  receive  in  practice  a  complete  applica- 
tion. In  order  to  constitute  States  with  a  po- 
tentiality of  life,  we  must  take  into  account 
not  only  the  nationalities  but  also  the  stra- 
tegical, defensive,  and  economical  needs  of  the 
majority.     There   are,   besides,   countries  like 


HOW  TO  DESTROY  PANGERMANY      131 

Macedonia  and  certain  regions  of  Austria- 
Hungary  where  nationalities  are  so  intermin- 
gled that  the  application  of  the  principle  of 
nationality  can  only  be  relative.  It  also  hap- 
pens that  a  minority  of  the  population  may 
have  to  be  sacrificed  to  the  good  of  the  ma- 
jority, even  though  this  minority  may  be  quite 
alive  to  its  rights.  Finally,  there  are  excep- 
tional cases  where  this  principle  must  give  way 
in  the  general  interests  of  European  peace. 
Thus,  in  the  Europe  of  the  future,  certain 
strategic  regions  from  which  an  aggressive  is 
especially  possible,  should  be  put  out  of  reach 
of  those  Powers  to  which  war  is  ''the  national 
industry." 

Having  given  these  explanations  and  made 
these  reservations,  let  us  see  what  would  be 
obtained  in  the  main  by  the  application  of  the 
principle  of  nationalities  to  the  German  Em- 
pire. In  virtue  of  this  principle  the  Germans 
ought  to  restore  liberty  to  those  peoples  who 
are  included  by  force  within  their  boundaries, 
that  is  to  say  about: 

Inhabitants 

Poles 5,000,000 

Inhabitants  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine 1,500,000 

Danes 200,000 

Total 6,700,000 


132    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

The  Germany  of  to-day,  which  numbered 
68  millions  of  inhabitants  in  1914,  including 
the  non-Germans,  would  be  brought  down  to 
about  61,300,000;  in  round  figures,  61  millions 
of  genuine  Germans. 

But  the  logical  application  of  the  principle 
of  nationalities  would  give  to  Germany  the 
power  of  absorbing  those  Germans  of  the 
Hapsburg  monarchy  who  on  historical,  strateg- 
ical, and  geographical  grounds  could  be  legiti- 
mately added  to  Germany  after  its  reduction 
from  68  to  61  millions  of  inhabitants.  What 
would  be  the  result? 

Let  us  look  at  the  map  on  p.  35,  which 
shows  the  ethnographic  situation  of  Austria- 
Hungary. 

This  map  only  gives  a  very  imperfect  idea 
of  the  ethnographic  facts,  because  it  is  drawn 
from  documents  which  are  German  and  Mag- 
yar, and  purposely  falsified.  In  reality  the 
Slav  regions  are  a  good  deal  more  extensive 
than  is  indicated  by  the  shaded  zones. 

The  following,  however,  are  the  results  given 
for  the  whole  of  the  Hapsburg  Monarchy  by 
the  official  Germano-Magyar  statistics  in  the 
census  of  1910: 


HOW  TO  DESTROY  PANGERMANY      133 

Austria. 

Round  figures  in 
tens  of  thousands 

Germans 9,950,000 

Czechs 6,440,000 

Poles 4,970,000 

Ruthenians 3,520,000 

Slovenes 1,260,000 

Serbo-Croatians 790,000 

Italians 770,000 

Roumanians 280,000 

Total 27,980,000 

Hungary. 

Magyars 10,050,000 

Roumanians 2,950,000 

Serbo-Croatians 2,940,000 

Germans 2,040,000 

Slovaks 1,970,000 

Ruthenians 480,000 

Total 20,430,000 

Bosnia  and  Herzegovina. 

Serbo-Croatians  (orthodox,  or  Moslems  of 

Serbian  origin) 2,000,000 

According  to  these  figures,  there  are  12  mil- 
Hons  of  Germans  in  the  Hapsburg  Empire,  but 
we  shall  see  that  not  nearly  all  of  these  12  mil- 
lions could  be  united  to  Germany.     In  fact: 

1.  As  the  table  shows,  rather  more  than 
two  millions  of  Germans  are  in  Hungary,  where 
they  are  scattered  in  small  groups  among  the 


134    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

other  nationalities.  They  could  not  therefore 
be  united  to  Germany. 

2.  Out  of  the  10  millions,  roughly  speaking, 
of  Germans  in  Austria,  if  we  deduct  those  who 
are  intermixed  with  the  Czechs  and  discount 
the  garbling  of  Vienna  statistics,  we  may  allow 
that  the  true  number  of  those  who  could 
be  geographically  incorporated  in  Germany 
amounts  to  not  more  than  seven  or  eight  mil- 
lions. Let  us  take  this  last  figure.  If  these 
eight  millions  were  incorporated  in  Germany, 
then  Germany  of  to-day,  reduced  for  the  rea- 
sons indicated  on  pages  131, 132,  to  61  millions, 
would  be  enlarged,  at  the  expense  of  Austria, 
by  eight  millions  of  inhabitants.  She  would 
then  have  a  total  of  69  millions  of  inhabitants. 

Therefore,  as  the  present  German  Empire 
had  in  1914  a  population  of  68  millions  of  in- 
habitants, we  see  that  the  application  of  the 
principle  of  nationalities  would  allow  Ger- 
many to  gain  on  the  southwest  just  about  the 
equivalent  of  what  the  same  principle  would 
take  from  her  on  the  circumference  of  the  ex- 
isting Empire. 

It  is  by  no  means  certain  that  the  Germans 
of  Austria  would  wish  to  join  themselves  to 
the  Germans  of  Germany,  but  let  us  suppose  it. 

Would  a  Germany  of  69  or  70  millions  of 


HOW  TO  DESTROY  PANGERMANY      135 

genuine  Germans  be  really  dangerous  for 
Europe?  I  do  not  think  so,  for,  as  we  shall 
see,  the  application  of  the  principle  of  nation- 
alities would  have  the  effect  of  withdrawing 
totally  from  the  influence  of  Berlin's  Panger- 
manism  all  the  rest  of  the  inhabitants  of  Aus- 
tria-Hungary. 

In  fact,  if  out  of  the  50  millions  of  inhabi- 
tants in  Austria-Hungary  of  to-day  about  8 
millions  joined  Germany,  42  millions  of  Aus- 
tro-Hungarian  subjects  would  remain.  Of  this 
number : 

Five  millions  of  Poles  would  join  Poland; 

Four  millions  of  Ruthenians  would  join  Lit- 
tle Russia; 

Three  millions  of  Roumanians  would  join 
Roumania; 

One  million  of  Italians  would  join  Italy; 

Making  a  total  of  13  millions  of  inhabitants. 

There  would  therefore  remain  a  compact 
group,  composed  of  29  miUions  of  inhabitants, 
made  up  of  Czech-Slovaks,  Magyars,  and  Ger- 
mans, these  last  diluted  in  the  solid  mass  of 
Magyars  and  Serbo-Croatians,  or  Yugo-Slavs. 
As  these  last  wish  to  unite  with  the  five  mil- 
lion Serbians  of  Serbia,  we  thus  deduce  the 
presence  in  Central  Europe  of  a  mass  of  34 
million   inhabitants,   containing   an   infinitesi- 


136    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

mal  proportion  of  Germans,  and  so  situated 
geographically  that  they  could  perfectly  well 
form  united  States,  in  which  the  rights  of  each 
nationality  and  the  form  of  government  of 
each  State  would  be  respected,  and  which, 
nevertheless,  would  constitute  an  economic 
territory  extensive  enough  to  correspond  to 
modern  needs. 

The  obstacle  to  the  creation  of  such  united 
States  might  seem  to  be  the  reluctance  of  the 
Magyars  (who  at  present  are  playing  the  Ger- 
man ^ame)  to  come  to  an  understanding  with 
the  neighboring  nationalities.  This  will  dis- 
appear when  the  day  comes  which  will  make 
the  real  Magyar  race,  now  oppressed  by  a 
feudal  nobility,  master  of  its  own  fate.  It 
will  not  then  be  afraid  to  consider  the  possible 
creation  of  united  States. 

In  short,  we  may  conclude  that  there  is  in 
Austria-Hungary  and  in  Serbia  a  mass  of  34 
millions  of  inhabitants,  who  are  practically 
free  from  Germanic  elements  and  could  form 
in  Central  Europe  a  confederacy  of  States  that 
might  in  time  develop  into  the  United  States 
of  Europe. 


HOW  TO  DESTROY  PANGERMANY      137 

IV. 

The  territory  of  Austria-Hungary  therefore 
contains  all  the  ethnographic  elements  which 
would  allow  of  the  establishment  of  new  States, 
constituted  on  just  and  durable  foundations, 
and  under  such  conditions  that  they  would 
form  for  the  future  an  insurmountable  barrier 
to  Pangermanism.  It  is  there,  on  the  road 
from  Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  in  Central 
Europe,  that  the  solution  will  be  found  for  the 
formidable  problem  set  to  the  world  by  the 
temporary  creation  of  Pangermany.  We  may 
be  absolutely  certain  that  this  indispensable  solu- 
tion can  be  found  there,  and  nowhere  else.  In- 
deed, even  without  counting  her  enormous 
losses  of  population,  Serbia,  with  her  five  mil- 
lion inhabitants,  could  evidently  not  form  a 
sufllciently  effective  barrier  to  Pangermanism, 
if  Austria,  still  combined  with  Germany,  made 
a  block  of  118  millions  of  inhabitants,  all  of 
whose  military  strength  would  be  entirely  at 
the  service  of  Berlin. 

The  anti-Pangerman  barrier  necessary  to  the 
freedom  of  the  world  can  nowhere  be  organized 
with  such  powerful  forces  as  on  the  territory  of 
what  is  now  Austria-Hungary, 

We  may  be  definitely  assured  that,  in  order 


138    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

to  break  up  the  scheme  of  ''from  Hamburg  to 
the  Persian  Gulf,"  and  therefore  practically 
Central  Pangermany,  it  will  he  sufficient^  hut 
ahsolutely  necessary,  that  the  Slav  and  Latin 
peoples  of  Austria-Hungary  shall  be  definitely 
freed  from  the  yoke  which  Berlin  has  been 
able  to  impose  on  them  because  of  the  war. 
The  natural  consequence  of  that  freedom  will 
be  the  almost  automatic  formation  of  the  three 
barriers  of  anti-Pangerman  nations  of  which 
an  idea  is  given  by  the  map  on  p.  38. 

From  the  foregoing  reflections  we  may  conclude 
that  the  Austro-Hurigarian  question  is  assuredly 
the  crucial  point  of  the  prohlem,  not  only  Euro- 
pean but  universal,  set  hefore  all  the  civilized 
States  hy  the  creation  of  Pangermany,  which  is 
now  an  accomplished  fact. 


CHAPTER  VIII.  , 

THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  PANGERMAN  PLOT. 

I.  The  moral  principles  of  the  American  people  make 
it  their  duty  to  take  part  in  the  war. 
n.  The  political  interests  of  the  United  States  oblige 
them  to  contribute  toward  a  decisive  victory  for 
the  Allies. 
in.  The  United  States  and  the  Austro-Hungarian  ques- 
tion. 


The  moral  obligation  of  Americans  to  take 
part  in  the  war  is  shown  by  the  Map  of  the 
Martyrs.  (See  map  on  p.  141.)  Not  only  does 
Germany  constantly  violate  the  laws  of  war 
between  belligerents,  but  also  and  above  all 
the  German  authorities  subject  all  the  civil 
anti-Germanic  populations  of  the  territories 
now  under  the  Pangerman  occupation,  from 
the  North  Sea  to  Bagdad,  to  a  frightful  reign  of 
terror.  The  sufferings  inflicted  by  the  Ger- 
mans on  the  French,  the  Belgians,  the  Slavs 
and  Italians  of  Austria-Hungary,  the  Rou- 
manians, the  Greeks,  and  most  of  all  on  the 
Serbians  and  Armenians  (whom  they  have 
caused  to  be  massacred  wholesale  and  sys- 
tematically by  the  Turks),  represent  millions 

139 


140    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

of  unspeakable  sorrows,  of  odious  crimes,  of 
cruel  martyrdoms.  It  is  clear  that  the  hu- 
mane principles  of  Americans  cannot  allow 
such  prodigious  crimes  to  go  unpunished,  for 
that  would  be  to  allow  of  their  being  repeated 
and  extended  to  still  other  countries. 

These  unheard-of  crimes  are  the  result  of 
German  imperiaUsm,  added  to  the  imperial- 
ism of  Austria,  the  feudal  imperialism  of  the 
Magyars,  the  Balkanic  imperialism  of  the  Bul- 
garians, together  with  the  neo-imperialism  of 
the  Turks,  which  is  based  on  Pan-Islamism. 
Now,  all  these  imperiahsms  have  as  their  foun- 
dation the  ties  which  unite,  on  a  basis  of  Prus- 
sian miUtarism,  the  autocrats  of  Vienna  and 
Berlin,  whose  principles  are  radically  opposed 
to  those  of  the  Allies. 

From  a  moral  point  of  view  this  frightful 
war  is  essentially  one  of  autocracy  against 
democracy,  of  the  feudal  spirit  against  the 
spirit  of  the  modern  world.  This  being  the 
case,  and  as  the  victory  of  democracy  was 
still  in  suspense  on  account  of  various  mis- 
takes, technical,  diplomatic,  and  mihtary,  on 
the  part  of  the  European  AUies,  the  United 
States,  by  reason  of  their  principles,  could 
not  expose  universal  freedom  to  so  serious  a 
risk  by  refusing  to  enter  the  war. 


THE  U.  S.  AND  THE  PANGERMAN  PLOT  141 


142    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

II. 

The  political  interests  of  the  United  States 
are  deeply  involved  in  the  struggle,  for  four 
principal  reasons: 

1st.  The  danger  of  German  intrigues  in 
America, 

Citizens  of  the  United  States  can  no  longer 
ignore  the  ambition  of  Pangermany  toward 
America,  especially  in  the  South  American 
countries,  more  especially  Argentina  and 
Brazil,  which  are  destined,  according  to  the 
Pangerman  plan,  to  become  German  pro- 
tectorates. The  manifold  and  incessant  in- 
trigues of  German  agents  during  the  war, 
throughout  the  length  and  breadth  of  both 
North  and  South  America,  and  particularly 
in  Mexico,  where  the  German  plot  against  the 
United  States  was  unmasked  in  the  most  star- 
tling manner,  give  positive  proof  of  the  real- 
ity of  the  Pangerman  programme  concerning 
America.  It  is,  therefore,  a  danger  which 
Americans  can  only  avert  by  striking  at  the 
root  of  the  evil,  that  is  to  say,  by  helping  to 
destroy  the  basis  of  Pangermanism,  which  is 
Prussian  militarism. 

2nd.  The  intolerable  secret  German  organiza- 
tion in  the  United  States. 


THE  U.  S.  AND  THE  PANGERMAN  PLOT   143 

After  having  established  their  fundamental 
plan  of  1895,  the  Germans  set  themselves  the 
task  of  making  a  register  of  all  the  German 
elements,     throughout    the     universe,     which 


might  be  capable  of  helping  them  to  carry  out 
their  plan. 

The  map  on  this  page  is  drawn  up  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  data  of  map  5  in  the  Pan- 
german  Atlas  of  Paul  Langhans,  which  gives 
the  result  of  the   register.     The  map   shows 


144     UNITED   STATES  AND   PANGERMANIA 

what  proportion  the  Germans  born  in  Germany 
who  had  emigrated  to  the  United  States  bore  to 
the  American  population  about  the  year  1890. 
We  can  see  that  the  proportion  was  consid- 
erable, since  at  some  points  (see  the  map)  it 
amounted  to  35  per  cent.  Further,  the  gen- 
eral view  presented  by  the  map  enables  us  to 
observe  that  in  the  United  States  the  Ger- 
mans have  planted  themselves  by  preference 
in  the  industrial  and  commercial  regions  of 
the  East  and  of  the  Great  Lakes.  We  can 
therefore  understand  what  followed.  Ever 
since  1900  the  Alldeutscher  Verband,  or  Pan- 
german  League,  in  obedience  to  secret  instruc- 
tions from  the  ofBcial  authorities  in  Berlin, 
has  laid  itself  out  to  select  from  this  mass  of 
Germans  in  the  United  States  all  such  as  might 
best  serve  the  cause  of  Prussian  militarism  at 
any  given  moment  and  at  any  place,  as  soon 
as  the  European  conflagration  should  break 
out.  Hence,  for  the  last  twenty  years  most 
of  the  10  to  15  million  Americans  of  German 
birth  have  been  organized.  Little  by  little, 
in  the  bosom  of  the  United  States  there  has 
grown  up  a  veritable  State  within  a  State, 
endowed  with  the  most  powerful  means  of 
influence.  In  point  of  fact,  among  the  Ger- 
man-Americans there  are  manufacturers,  mer- 


THE  PANGERMAN  PLOT  145 

chants,  and  bankers  of  colossal  fortunes,  who 
control  the  lives  of  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
workmen  or  employees  living  in  dependence 
upon  them.  As  the  German- Americans  also 
own  many  newspapers  and  have  numerous 
associations,  they  are  able  to  exert  a  consider- 
able influence  on  the  policy  of  the  United 
States,  and  even  to  secure  the  election  to  Con- 
gress of  men  on  whom  they  can  count.  The 
Delbruck  law  has  completed  the  German 
organization  in  the  United  States,  by  enabling 
an  influential  party  of  German-Americans  to 
preserve  the  appearance  of  American  citizens, 
while  at  the  same  time  they  remain  pledged 
heart  and  soul  to  forward  the  Kaiser's  scheme 
of  universal  slavery. 

A  multitude  of  striking  facts — ^political 
pressure,  monster  strikes,  plots  and  outrages 
planned  and  carried  out  by  order  of  the 
Kaiser's  agents,  such  as  Von  Papen,  Boy-Ed, 
Von  Igel,  etc. — have  abundantly  shown  that 
the  German  organization  in  America  threatens 
the  independence  of  the  United  States,  and  is 
of  a  definitely  treasonable  character.  There 
is  only  one  way  for  America  to  rid  herself  of 
this  criminal  and  parasitic  organization  which 
the  Germans  have  been  able  to  foster  on  her 
soil,  and  to  prevent  it  from  any  future  growth, 


146    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

and  that  is,  to  make  victory  certain  for  the 
Allies. 

3rd.  Berimes  plan  for  dealing  with  the  United 
States, 

In  1898,  before  Manila,  the  German  Rear- 
Admiral  von  Goetzen,  a  friend  of  the  Kaiser, 
said  to  Admiral  Dewey:  ''In  about  fifteen 
years  my  country  will  begin  a  great  war.  ... 
Some  months  after  we  have  done  our  job  in 
Europe  we  shall  take  New  York,  and  probably 
Washington,  and  we  shall  keep  them  for  a 
time.  We  do  not  intend  to  take  any  territory 
from  you,  but  only  to  put  your  country  in  its 
proper  place  with  reference  to  Germany.  We 
shall  extract  one  or  two  billions  of  dollars  from 
New  York  and  other  towns."*  At  the  time 
these  words  were  regarded  as  mere  bluster, 
but  they  were  connected,  nevertheless,  with  the 
plan  of  universal  domination  which  was  even 
then  being  worked  out  at  Berlin.  Besides,  a 
phrase  in  a  letter  from  Baron  von  Meysenburg, 
the  German  Consul  at  New  Orleans,  written 
on  December  4th,  1915,  to  Von  Papen,  the 
German  military  attache  at  Washington  who 
organized  the  principal  outrages  in  the  United 
States — which  letter  by  the  way  was  seized 

*  The  Naval  and  Military  Record,  quoted  by  UEcho  de  Paris,  Sep- 
tember 24th.  1915. 


THE  PANGERMAN  PLOT  147 

by  the  English — proved  that  in  the  minds  of 
Germans  behind  the  scenes  the  turn  of  the 
United  States  would  come  after  that  of  the 
European  Allies.  The  phrase  ran:  "May  the 
day  of  the  settling  of  accounts  come  here  also, 
and  when  that  does  come  may  our  govern- 
ment have  found  again  that  will  of  iron  with- 
out which  no  impression  can  be  made  on  this 
country."* 

Finally,  William  II.  himself  said  to  Mr. 
Gerard,  the  American  Ambassador  to  Ger- 
many: ''I  shall  stand  no  nonsense  from 
America  after  the  war."f  These  words  from 
the  head  of  the  Hohenzollerns  leave  no  pos- 
sible doubt  that  the  independence  of  the 
United  States  is  directly  endangered  by  the 
extension  of  Prussianism. 

4th.  The  creation  of  Pangermany, 
Let  us  consider,  as  a  hypothesis,  that  the 
Allies  are  defeated  in  Europe.  Any  one  with 
common  sense  can  see  that  Germany,  with 
the  formidable  means  at  her  command,  could 
impose  her  economic  law  on  South  America, 
would  make  herself  mistress  of  Canada,  and 
practically  dominate  the  United  States,  where 
the  German-Americans  would  help  Berlin  to 

*  Le  Temps,  January  17th,  1917. 
t  Le  Temps,  August  14th,  1917. 


148    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

carry  out  the  German  plan.  The  freedom  of 
the  United  States  is  therefore  strictly  in- 
compatible with  the  economic  and  military 
existence  of  Central  Pangermany,  since  the 
perfection  of  that  organization  would  give  Ger- 
many the  means  of  universal  domination,  and 
therefore  enable  her  to  intervene  effectively  in 
the  affairs  of  the  United  States. 

As  a  result  of  the  new  order  of  things  for 
which  Germany  is  responsible,  Pangermany 
actually  represents  the  present  and  future  danger 
of  the  United  States.  It  follows,  therefore,  that 
even  if  the  United  States  do  not  wish  to  de- 
stroy the  Germans  as  a  nation,  they  should 
most  energetically  desire  the  destruction  of  the 
Hamburg -Persian  Gulf  scheme  and  the  crushing 
of  that  instrument  for  world-wide  oppression, 
Central  Pangermany,  That  objective  is  the  es- 
sential and  vital  reason  why  the  policy  of  the 
United  States  should  be  to  push  the  war  with 
the  utmost  vigor,  in  order  to  insure  a  decisive 
victory  for  the  Allies. 

If,  on  the  one  hand,  the  United  States  felt 
it  their  duty  to  enter  the  war  that  they  might 
help  to  put  an  end  to  German  barbarity  and 
insure  the  triumph  of  democracy  over  des- 
potism, on  the  other  they  should  now  feel  that 
they  have  a  direct  personal  interest  therein, 


THE  PANGERMAN  PLOT  149 

because  any  sacrifices,  no  matter  how  great 
they  may  be,  are  infinitely  less  than  those 
which  they  would  be  obliged  to  make  later, 
if,  from  failure  to  reaUze  the  designs  of  Ger- 
many on  America,  they  should  allow  her  to 
Pangermanize  Europe. 

III. 

The  Interest  of  the  United  States. 

The  personal  interest  of  the  United  States  in 
the  European  war  consists  in  tlie  necessity  for 
doing  away  with  Pangermany.  As  its  destruc- 
tion can  only  come  from  a  complete  reorganiza- 
tion of  Central  Europe,  it  follows  that  the  United 
States  has  a  direct  and  first-hand  interest  in  also 
solving  the  question  of  Austria-Hungary  on  the 
basis  of  the  principle  of  nationalities,  that  solu- 
tion being  absolutely  indispensable  if  the  world 
is  to  see  the  end  of  the  Pangerman  peril,  and  of 
great  armaments. 


CONCLUSIONS. 

If  in  this  war  the  AlHes  are  to  obtain  the 
decisive  victory  which  is  absolutely  indis- 
pensable, they  must  keep  three  things  con- 
stantly in  mind. 


Germany's  responsibility  for  bringing  on  the 
war  is  inexcusable  and  crushing,  since  its  pre- 
meditation by  the  Prussian  Government  ante- 
dates the  outbreak  of  hostilities  by  at  least  twenty- 
one  years. 

In  the  Allied  countries  the  responsibility  of 
the  Central  Powers  for  the  conflict  is  usually 
placed  by  reference  to  the  diplomatic  docu- 
ments which  were  exchanged  in  the  weeks 
immediately  preceding  it.  This  process,  how- 
ever, is  inadequate,  as  it  only  deals  with  a 
very  short  time,  and  gives  Germany  an  op- 
portunity to  wrangle  over  dates,  and  even 
over  the  hours  at  which  telegrams  were  sent. 

In  order  that  the  exact  and  formidable  truth 
should  be  known,  public  opinion  among  the 
Allies  must  be  convinced  that  the  Prussian 

150 


CONCLUSIONS  151 

Government  has  steadily  worked  out  the  Ham- 
burg-Persian Gulf  plan  ever  since  1893,  that 
is  to  say,  for  twenty-one  years  before  the  war 
began. 

German  covetousness  of  Turkey  goes  back 
a  long  way.  In  1866  Doctor  Spenger  wrote 
in  a  pamphlet  about  Babylonia:  '*The  East 
is  the  only  country  on  earth  which  has  not 
been  monopolized  by  one  or  other  of  the  great 
Powers,  and  yet  it  offers  the  finest  field  for 
colonization.  If  Germany  does  not  let  the  chance 
slip,  and  ivill  seize  it  before  the  Cossacks  can 
get  hold  of  it,  she  will  have  won  the  best  share  of 
what  still  remains  to  be  divided  in  the  world.''  * 
This  policy  had  been  advocated  by  many 
learned  authorities  in  Germany,  but  it  was 
William  II.,  soon  after  he  came  to  the  throne 
in  1888,  who  first  thought  seriously  of  laying 
hands  on  Turkey.  The  oldest  proof  of  prac- 
tical preparation  for  this  attempt  which  I 
have  been  able  to  unearth  dates  back  to  1893, 
but  very  likely  still  older  ones  will  come  to 
light  when  the  war  is  over. 

In  1897  a  book  was  brought  out  in  Berlin 
of  which  the  title-page  is  here  reproduced  in 
facsimile : 

*  Deufschlands  Anspriiche  an  das  turkische  Erbe,  p.  12.  Lehmann, 
Munich,  1896. 


152     UNITED   STATES   AND   PANGERMANIA 

KLEINASIENS  NATURSCHATZE 

SEINE  WICHTIGSTEN 

TIERB.  KOLTURPFLANZEN  OND  MINERALSCHiTZB 

VOM  WIRT8CHAFTUCHEN  UNO  KULTURGESCHlCHTUCHEN  STANOPUNKT 


KARL  KANNENBERG 

rntii.  •  ucuT.  ■■  tsohqio.  rttDAATiLLSiuc-RraiMEm  *>,  i» 


MIT  BEITRiGEN 

VON 

PREM.- LIEUT  SCHAFFER 

KosuuKOunr  »um  ofiossev  omuuistab 

UNO 

A6BILD0N6EN  MACH  aUPNaHUEN  VON  HPTU.  IMTOR  (PELDaRT.-REOT.  Nr.  UX 

HPTM.   f.   PBITTWITZ    VJND    GAFFRO!!    (INFANT.. REOT.    Nr.  93)  UND  PREM.-LlfiOTft 

SCeiFFEB  UNO  KlVKERBEBa 


tOT  XXXI  VOLLBILDERN  OND  O  PLiMEH 


BERLIN 

VERLAG  VON  GEBRUDERBORNTRAEQEB 

1897. 


CONCLUSIONS  153 

The  title  of  this  work  is:  ''The  native  riches 
of  Asia  Minor;  her  most  impoHant  wealth  in 
live  stock,  minerals,  and  plants  suitable  for  cul- 
tivation.'' 

Because  of  its  statements,  and  the  deduc- 
tions which  may  be  made  from  it,  this  book 
may  now  be  considered  as  a  valuable  docu- 
ment. It  is  a  painstaking  work,  being  a  very 
remarkable  technical  inventory  of  all  the 
economic  resources  of  Asia  Minor.  It  is  il- 
lustrated by  photographs,  the  dates  on  which 
show  that  the  indispensable  researches  on  the 
spot  w^ere  made  in  1893.  This  is  proved  by 
the  facsimile  here  given  of  a  photograph  (fac- 
ing p.  154),  and  also  by  the  allusions  to  the 
title-page  to  be  found  in  the  body  of  the  book. 
Now,  this  work  is  due  to  the  collaboration 
of  five  German  officers  then  in  active  service: 

Karl  Kannenberg,  first  lieutenant  in  the 
19th  regiment  of  field  artillery;  Captains 
Anton  of  the  17th  regiment,  also  of  the  light 
artillery.  Von  Prittwitz  and  Gaffron  of  the 
93rd  regiment  of  infantry,  and  First  Lieutenant 
Schaffer  of  the  Great  General  Staff. 

We  learn  from  a  note  on  the  fourth  page  of 
the  introduction  that  the  last-named  officer 
went  all  through  Anatolia  for  the  express  pur- 
pose of  making  topographical  reports. 


154    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

It  is  quite  clear  that  this  book  embodies  part 
of  the  results  of  an  investigation  with  which 
William  II.  had  charged  five  of  his  officers. 
It  was  certainly  not  by  accident  nor  for  their 
own  amusement  that  five  German  officers  in 
active  service  were  able  to  make  a  long  and 
costly  stay  in  Asiatic  Turkey,  with  all  the 
necessary  means  for  carrying  on  a  very  arduous 
investigation.  It  is,  therefore,  incontestable 
that  as  far  back  as  1893,  twenty-one  years 
before  the  war,  the  German  Government  sent 
its  officers  to  study  Turkey,  not  only  from  a 
military  point  of  view,  but  also  especially  from 
the  standpoint  of  economics,  in  order  to  ascer- 
tain the  resources  in  the  Ottoman  Empire  on 
which  Germany  might  draw,  either  during 
peace  or  in  the  event  of  war.  Thanks  to  this 
precise  information,  which  certainly  has  not 
been  lost  sight  of  since  1893,  Germany  has 
been  able  to  undertake  the  rapid  development 
of  Anatolia,  a  task  which  she  has  pursued  with 
great  zeal  for  the  past  two  years,  and  which 
has  had  an  important  influence  on  the  evolu- 
tion of  the  war. 

The  German  Government  in  1893  was  that 
which  felt  the  first  forward  pressure  exercised 
by  Wilham  II.,  who  had  begun  to  reign  in 
1888.    We  may  be  sure  that  if  in  1893  it  was 


—     « 


52i    = 


M    a 


CONCLUSIONS  155 

thought  necessary  to  send  five  German  officers 
to  search  out  Asiatic  Turkey  from  an  economic 
point  of  view,  it  was  because  the  Kaiser  him- 
self (and  this  was  proved  by  his  later  actions) 
had  made  up  his  mind  to  find  out  exactly  what 
Germany  might  or  might  not  expect  to  find 
in  the  East.  Finally,  we  must  notice  care- 
fully that  prior  to  1893  neither  the  Panger- 
man  plan  nor  any  movement  in  that  direction 
was  known.  The  formula  of  ''from  Hamburg 
to  the  Persian  Gulf"  was  as  yet  unheard  of. 
It  is  possible  to  prove,  with  the  help  of  dates 
and  indisputable  facts,  that  the  preparations 
for  the  Hamburg-Bagdad  railway  were  the 
Kaiser's  personal  work.  Indeed,  as  soon  as 
investigations  like  that  undertaken  by  the 
five  officers  mentioned  above  had  convinced 
the  Kaiser  that  he  could  lay  his  hands  on 
enormous  booty  by  swindling  Turkey,  he  de- 
voted himself  to  the  task  energetically,  having 
first  paved  the  way  by  appearing  to  yield  to 
popular  opinion.  It  was  in  1894  that  the  Pan- 
german  movement  began  to  take  shape,  and 
its  development  would  have  been  impossible  in 
a  country  so  entirely  under  police  rule  as  Ger- 
many unless  it  had  had  the  secret  support  of 
official  authority.  It  was  in  1898  that  William 
II.  went  to  Damascus,  and  there  assured  the 


156    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

Moslems,  in  a  famous  toast,  of  his  undying 
friendship.  From  Damascus  he  proceeded  to 
Constantinople,  and  there  he  flattered  Abdul 
Hamid,  the  Red  Sultan  (then  under  a  cloud 
on  account  of  the  Armenian  massacres),  so 
successfully  that  on  November  27th,  1899,  the 
Deutsche  Bank  of  Berlin  obtained  the  neces- 
sary concession  for  the  railway  to  Bagdad. 
As  soon  as  the  news  of  this  concession  or 
firman  reached  William  II.,  his  delight  over 
the  success  of  the  first  step  toward  the  realiza- 
tion of  his  marvellous  dream  was  so  great  that 
it  found  expression  in  an  ardent  telegram  to 
Abdul  Hamid. 

When  he  was  at  Windsor,  in  1907,  the 
Kaiser  tried  in  vain  to  remove  England's  ob- 
jections to  the  Bagdad  railway,  but  in  No- 
vember, 1910,  during  the  Czar's  visit  to 
Potsdam,  he  succeeded  in  getting  the  better 
completely  of  Nicholas  II.  Suddenly,  on 
August  10th,  1913,  all  the  Kaiser's  prepara- 
tions were  hindered  by  the  peace  of  Bucharest, 
and  he  made  up  his  mind  at  once  to  bring  on 
war.  As  far  back  as  November  6th,  1913,  he 
told  King  Albert  of  Belgium  at  Potsdam  that 
*'war  was  near  and  inevitable."  In  April, 
1914,  the  Kaiser,  accompanied  by  Admiral 
von   Tirpitz,    paid    a   visit   to    the   Archduke 


CONCLUSIONS  157 

Francis-Ferdinand  at  Konopischt.  Now,  it 
was  also  in  April,  1914,  according  to  the  state- 
ment of  M.  Radoslavoff  himself,  that  the  Kaiser 
concluded  the  treaties  with  Sofia  and  Constan- 
tinople which  assured  him  the  military  co-opera- 
tion of  Bulgaria  and  Turkey  in  the  war  which 
he  meant  to  bring  on  within  a  short  time.^ 

From  this  long  series  of  undeniable  facts 
the  responsibility  of  Germany  stands  out  even 
more  clearly  than  if  we  only  try  to  prove  it 
from  the  diplomatic  papers  which  were  ex- 
changed in  the  days  just  before  hostilities  be- 
gan. We  may  therefore  state  as  did  Count 
Karolyi,  one  of  Germany's  allies,  that  "Ger- 
many is  fighting  for  the  road  from  Hamburg 
to  the  Persian  Gulf."  During  twenty -one  years 
Germany  prepared  all  the  means  necessary  to  at- 
tain this  result;  therefore,  her  responsibility  is 
crushing  and  inexcusable. 

The  people  of  Germany  accepted  this  war 
enthusiastically,  because  Pangerman  propa- 
gandists had  convinced  them  beforehand  that 
it  would  bring  them  enormous  profits.  Maxi- 
milian Harden  acknowledged  this  outright  in 
August,  1914,  writing  in  his  review,  Zukunft, 
at  a  time  when  German  victory  seemed  cer- 

*  Havas  despatch,  in  the  Petit  Parisien,  March  26th,  1916;     Le 
Temps,  April  10th,  1916. 


158    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 


tain:  ''Why  should  we  make  paltry  excuses? 
Yes,  we  brought  on  the  war,  and  we  are  glad 
of  it.  We  provoked  it  because  we  were  sure 
of  winning." 


--^^^       1 

Hamburg^ 

m 

i 

iSa        \        X     \ 

^^^^^^^^^^^P^^^'-' 

mPers'ian 
V    Gulf 

"FROM  HAMBURG  TO  THE  PERSIAN  GULF 
THE  NET  IS  SPREAD." 

PRESIDENT  WILSON'S  FLAG  DAY  ADDRESS.  JUNE  15,  1917. 

To-day  the  facts  are  before  us.  In  his  Flag 
Day  speech,  on  June  15th,  1917,  President 
Wilson  made  the  German  premeditation  and 
aims  admirably  clear.  ''The  demands  made 
by  Austria   upon   Serbia  were  a  mere  single 


CONCLUSIONS  159 

step  in  a  plan  which  compassed  Europe  and 
Asia,  from  Berhn  to  Bagdad.  ..."  The 
object  of  Berlin  "contemplated  binding  to- 
gether racial  and  political  units  which  could 
be  held  together  only  by  force,  Czechs,  Mag- 
yars, Croats,  Serbs,  Roumanians,  Turks,  Ar- 
menians. .  .  .  These  peoples  did  not  wish  to 
be  united.  They  ardently  desired  to  direct 
their  own  affairs.  .  .  .  And  they  [the  Ger- 
man military  statesmen]  have  actually  carried 
the  greater  part  of  that  amazing  plan  into  exe- 
cution !  .  .  .  Austria  is  at  their  mercy.  .  .  . 
The  so-called  Central  Powers  are  in  fact  but 
a  Single  Power.  .  .  .  From  Hamburg  to  the 
Persian  Gulf  the  net  is  spread." 

The  map  given  on  p.  158  explains  this  re- 
ality, and  German  responsibility  is  once  more 
made  clear,  this  time  by  geography. 

II. 

The  Allies  should  constantly  hear  in  mind 
not  only  the  German  occupations  of  Entente 
territory,  but  also  the  Pangerman  seizures  which 
have  been  made  at  the  expense  of  their  own 
allies. 

In  point  of  fact  these  seizures  are  still  more 
serious  than  the  German  occupations  in  the 


160    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

east  and  in  the  west,  since,  in  combination 
with  the  occupation  of  Serbia,  they  make  Ger- 
many mistress  of  Central  Pangermany,  and 
thus  give  Berhn  an  opportunity  to  follow  out 


TERRITORY  OCCUPIED  BY  PANGERMANY 
AT  THE  OPENING  OF  1917 


Petrograd 


all  the  rest  of  the  Pangerman  plan  in  a  very 
short  time.  The  truth  of  this  statement  may 
be  proved  by  reference  to  the  accompanying 
map  or  diagram,  which  shows  the  total  Pan- 
german occupations  in  the  beginning  of  1917. 
The  Germans  themselves  attach  more  im- 
portance to  their  seizures  in  the  southeast  at 


CONCLUSIONS  161 

the  expense  of  their  own  allies  than  they  do 
to  their  occupations  in  the  east  and  west. 

The  German  review  which,  considering  its 
character,  is  so  ironically  named  Peace,  had 
in  its  number  of  February  1st,  1917,  the  fol- 
lowing avowal:  ^'In  two  years  of  war,  Germany 
has  cut  for  herself,  out  of  an  exhausted  Europe, 
an  Empire  which  reaches  from  the  North  Sea 
to  the  Persian  Gulf^^  [sic].  ''Should  the  war  go 
on,  who  dare  say  that  this  Empire  may  not  be 
still  further  extended  by  the  addition  of  Greece, 
Egypt,  Holland,  and  Scandinavia  .^  "  * 

Doctor  Friedrich  Naumann,  whose  propa- 
ganda did  much  toward  the  creation  of  Mittel- 
europa,  is  a  member  of  the  democratic  group 
in  the  Reichstag.  On  July  10th,  1917,  he  voted 
for  the  famous  formula  ''Peace  without  an- 
nexations or  indemnities,"  because  he  well 
knew,  for  reasons  which  I  have  given  in  my 
sixth  chapter,  that  it  would  allow  the  Ham- 
burg-Persian Gulf  plan  to  go  on  unhindered. 
In  his  pamphlet,  Bulgaria  and  Middle-Europe, ^ 
Naumann  gave  away  the  secret  of  the  Panger- 
manizing  of  Europe  by  saying:  '^Whatever  is 
distinctly  national  in  character,  or  of  a  military 
order,  shall  be  decentralized.''     Which  means  in 

*  Le  Matin,  February  28th,  1917. 

t  Published  in  1916,  by  Reimer,  Berlin. 


162    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

plain  language  that  the  old  names  and  frontiers 
of  States  would  be  left  unchanged  for  the 
present,  in  order  to  throw  dust  in  the  eyes  of 
the  world  for  a  short  time,  but  that  all  the 
military  forces  from  Hamburg  to  the  Persian 
Gulf  would  be  centralized  under  the  leader- 
ship of  Berlin. 

It  is  this  military  association  of  at  least  150 
millions  of  men,  brought  under  the  orders  of 
Prussian  militarism,  which  makes  the  very 
great  peril  of  the  Hamburg-Persian  Gulf  plan 
— a  peril  which  sums  up  all  the  others  rep- 
resenting the  outcome  of  Prussian  ambition. 
That  is  why  President  Wilson  so  justly  said 
in  his  message  to  Russia:  ''The' day  has  come 
to  conquer  or  submit  J  ^ 

III. 

The  Allies  should  so  conduct  the  war  that  Pan- 
germany  shall  not  only  he  destroyed^  hut  replaced 
hy  territorial  conditions  which  will  prevent  its 
recurrence,  and  which  conform  to  the  principles 
which  the  Allies  have  proclaimed. 

In  their  answer  of  January  10th,  1917,  to 
President  Wilson  the  Allies  affirmed:  "The  civ- 
ilized world  knows  that  [the  objects  of  the  war] 
imply,  in  all  necessity  and  in  the  first  instance. 


CONCLUSIONS  163 

the  restoration  of  Belgium,  of  Serbia,  and  of 
Montenegro,  and  the  indemnities  which  are 
due  them;  the  evacuation  of  the  invaded  terri- 
tories of  France,  of  Russia  and  of  Roumania, 
with  just  reparation;  the  reorganization  of 
Europe,  guaranteed  by  a  stable  regime  and 
founded  as  much  upon  respect  of  nationalities 
and  full  security  and  liberty  of  economic  de- 
velopment, which  all  nations,  great  or  small, 
possess,  as  upon  territorial  conventions  and 
international  agreements,  suitable  to  guarantee 
territorial  and  maritime  frontiers  against  un- 
justified attacks;  the  restitution  of  provinces 
or  territories  wTested  in  the  past  from  the 
Allies  by  force  or  against  the  will  of  their 
populations;  the  liberation  of  Italians,  of 
Slavs,  of  Roumanians  and  of  Tcheco -Slovaks 
from  foreign  domination;  the  enfranchisement 
of  populations  subject  to  the  bloody  tyranny 
of  the  Turks;  the  expulsion  from  Europe  of 
the  Ottoman  Empire,  decidedly  alien  to  West- 
ern civilization." 

In  his  message  to  the  Senate  on  January 
22nd,  1917,  President  Wilson  said:  "No  peace 
can  last,  or  ought  to  last,  which  does  not  recog- 
nize and  accept  the  principle  that  governments 
derive  all  their  just  powers  from  the  consent 
of  the  governed,  and  that  no  right  anywhere 


164     UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

exists  to  hand  peoples  about  from  sovereignty 
to  sovereignty  as  if  they  were  property. 

"I  take  it  for  granted,  for  instance,  if  I  may 
venture  upon  a  single  example,  that  statesmen 
everywhere  are  agreed  that  there  should  be  a 
united,  independent  and  autonomous  Poland 
and  that  henceforth  inviolable  security  of  life, 
of  worship  and  of  industrial  and  social  develop- 
ment should  be  guaranteed  to  all  peoples  w^ho 
have  lived  hitherto  under  the  power  of  govern- 
ments devoted  to  a  faith  and  purpose  hostile 
to  their  own.  ...  I  am  proposing  .  .  .  that 
no  nation  should  seek  to  extend  its  policy  over 
any  other  nation  or  people,  but  that  every 
people  should  be  left  free  to  determine  its  own 
policy,  its  own  way  of  development,  unhin- 
dered, unthreatened,  unafraid,  the  little  along 
with  the  great  and  powerful." 

In  his  message  to  Russia  on  June  9th,  1917, 
President  Wilson  stated  that:  ''Government 
after  Government  has  by  their  [the  German 
rulers']  influence,  without  open  conquest  of  its 
territory,  been  linked  together  in  a  net  of  in- 
trigue directed  against  nothing  less  than  the 
peace  and  liberty  of  the  world.  The  meshes 
of  that  intrigue  must  be  broken,  but  cannot 
be  broken  unless  wrongs  already  done  are  un- 
done;   and  adequate  measures  must  be  taken 


CONCLUSIONS 


165 


166    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

to  prevent  it  from  ever  again  being  rewoven 
or  repaired. 

"Of  course,  the  Imperial  German  Govern- 
ment and  those  whom  it  is  using  for  their  own 
undoing  are  seeking  to  obtain  pledges  that  the 
war  will  end  in  the  restoration  of  the  status  quo 
ante  out  of  which  this  iniquitous  war  issued 
forth,  the  power  of  the  Imperial  German  Gov- 
ernment within  the  empire  and  its  wide-spread 
domination  and  influence  outside  of  that  em- 
pire. That  status  must  be  altered  in  such 
fashion  as  to  prevent  any  such  hideous  thing 
from  ever  happening  again." 

These  quotations  enable  us  to  see  that  the 
views  of  the  European  Allies  and  those  of 
President  Wilson  are  identical  in  regard  to 
the  remaking  of  Europe.  It  is  by  starting 
from  the  principle  of  nationalities,  and  by 
making  allowances  for  the  natural  contin- 
gencies which  are  inevitable  from  its  applica- 
tion, that  we  may  sketch  a  map  (see  map  on 
p.  165)  which  will  conform  to  the  principles 
laid  down  by  the  Allies. 

This  map  does  not  pretend  to  give  any  de- 
tailed solution  as  to  the  reconstruction  of  Eu- 
rope when  peace  shall  have  been  made,  nor 
to  solve  the  various  problems  to  which  the 
constitution  of  each  State  may  give  rise.    The 


CONCLUSIONS  167 

object  of  this  plan  is  only  to  show  frankly  that 
the  war  objectives  of  the  Allies,  and  the  prop- 
ositions of  President  Wilson  in  regard  to  a 
just  and  lasting  peace,  arrive  at  the  same  gen- 
eral conclusion,  based  on  geography.  Besides, 
these  conclusions  are  the  only  means  by  which 
the  power  of  Prussian  militarism  can  be  laid 
low.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  while  adhering 
strictly  to  the  modern  principles  of  justice, 
they  deprive  Germany  of  the  regions  which 
are  useful  to  her  for  strategic  offensives,  and 
by  the  creation  of  a  belt  of  independent  States 
to  the  south  of  her  they  will  take  away  the 
man  power  which  alone  allows  her  to  continue 
the  war.  This  is  shown  by  the  following  state- 
ments. 

After  having  conformed  to  the  principles  of 
President  Wilson  by  giving  back  the  territory 
of  Poland,  with  its  six  millions  of  inhabitants, 
the  Danish  territory  (including  the  portions 
necessary  to  make  that  source  of  aggression, 
the  Kiel  Canal  to  the  Elbe,  international 
property),  which  would  mean  about  500,000 
inhabitants,  and  the  provinces  of  Alsace  and 
Lorraine,  which  number  about  1,500,000  in- 
habitants, Germany  would  find  her  population 
reduced  from  68  million  before  the  war  to 
about  60  million  more  or  less. 


168    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

President  Wilson's  formula  that:  *' Inviola- 
ble security  of  life,  of  worship  and  of  industrial 
and  social  development  should  be  guaranteed 
to  all  peoples  who  have  lived  hitherto  under 
the  power  of  governments  devoted  to  a  faith 
and  purpose  hostile  to  their  own,"  means  the 
condemnation  of  the  Empire  of  the  Haps- 
burgs,  which  is  a  mosaic  of  peoples  held  to- 
gether in  the  same  State  against  their  will. 

Application  of  the  same  principle  of  na- 
tionality to  Austria-Hungary  would  scatter 
five  out  of  her  12  millions  of  Germans;  one 
into  Roumania,  three  into  the  Czech-Slovak 
State,  one  into  the  Magyar  State.  That  would 
leave  only  seven  millions  of  Germans,  which 
would  reduce  Austria  to  its  normal  limits. 
We  must  take  into  account  that  this  number 
contains  in  reality  nearly  a  million  of  Czechs, 
who  are  wrongly  classed  as  Germans  in  Vien- 
nese statistics.  Now,  would  these  seven  mil- 
lions of  Germans  contained  in  the  restricted 
Austria  wish  to  join  themselves  to  the  Ger- 
mans of  Germany?  Nothing  is  less  certain, 
if  they  still  remember  the  suffering  inflicted 
on  them  under  the  hegemony  of  BerUn,  and 
above  all  if  Austria's  economic  outlet  to  the 
sea  is  to  be  assured  toward  the  south. 

But  let  us  suppose  that  these  seven  millions 


CONCLUSIONS  169 

of  Austro-Germans,  invoking  the  principle  of 
nationalities,  do  wish  to  join  the  60  million 
Germans  of  Germany.  That  would  make 
67  millions  of  Germans,  or  one  million  less 
than  before  the  war.  It  is,  therefore,  not  cor- 
rect to  say  that  to  divide  Austria-Hungary  would 
be  to  increase  the  numerical  strength  of  Ger- 
many, Besides,  the  seven  milhons  of  Austro- 
Germans  would  be  reunited  to  a  Germany 
which,  thanks  to  the  application  of  the  principle 
of  nationalities,  had  lost  all  the  regions  which 
were  valuable  to  her  for  strategic  offensives;  Polish 
territory,  the  Emperor  William  Military  Canal, 
and  Alsace-Lorraine — all  of  them  regions  with- 
out which  the  present  German  offensive  would 
have  been  impossible. 


But  I  insist  that  in  order  to  obtain  this  re- 
sult, which  undoubtedly  in  its  general  hues 
follows  the  declarations  of  the  Allies,  the  liqui- 
dation of  Austria-Hungary,  the  vassal  of  Berlin, 
is  absolutely  indispensable,  I  have  studied  the 
problem  of  Central  Europe  from  all  points  of 
view  for  more  than  twenty  years,  and  I  affirm 
that  victory  for  the  Allies  is  impossible  without 
a  complete  reconstruction  of  the  centre  of  Europe 
on  a  democratic  basis.     An  independent  Poland, 


170    UNITED  STATES  AND  PANGERMANIA 

and  also  a  Czech  State  ^  a  free  Yugo-Slavia,  and  a 
democratic  Magyar  State,  are  the  essential  and 
unavoidable  conditions  necessary  for  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  Hamburg 'Persian  Gulf  scheme,  and 
the  creation  of  a  first  ethnographic  barrier  strong 
enough  to  prevent  any  counter-attack  on  the  part 
of  Pangermanism, 

Unless  these  barrier  States  are  formed,  there 
can  be  no  lasting  restitution  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
to  France,  Russia  becomes  the  prey  of  Germany, 
the  forces  of  Prussian  militarism  are  strength- 
ened tenfold,  the  whole  of  Europe  is  reduced  to 
slavery;  and,  as  a  consequence,  the  freedom  of 
the  United  States  is  now  actually  and  directly 
threatened. 


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DATE  DUE 

d 

DEC  10 

1985" 

:/;.....=;' 

APR  17 

2001 

n^AAjt 

APR! 

SZOQI 

- 

i 

201-6503 

Printed 
in  USA 

COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY 


0035523263 


